

SUDAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN

نشرة جمعية الدراسات السودانية



Thabo Mbeki, former South African President, spoke to 9th International Sudan Studies Conference in Pretoria

In this issue: International Sudan Studies Conference, UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa: conference summary, Declaration, address by former president Thabo Mbeki; More on the mysterious "Kadi of Khartoum" by Mohamed Ibrahim Mohamed; Featured articles: "Cultural Forms among Internally Displaced Persons in Khartoum" by Idris ElHassan; "Coping with Water Security: the role of Zakat in Water Distribution in Khartoum" by Salma M. Abdalla; Reviews: "Economic Development in Southern Sudan" by Nanne op't Ende and "A Religion, Not a State" by Oscar Blayton; SSA Annual meeting at Purdue University; SSA Election results.

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our purpose

The Sudan Studies Association (SSA) is an independent professional society founded in the United States in 1981. Membership is open to scholars, teachers, students, and others with interest in the Sudan. The Association exists primarily to promote Sudanese studies and scholarship. It maintains a cooperative relationship with the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum and works collaboratively with the Sudan Studies Society of the UK. The SSA works to foster closer ties among scholars in the Sudan, North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and other places. Normal activities of the SSA include the publication of this Newsletter, organizing meetings for the exchange of ideas, and recommending research candidates for affiliation with appropriate institutions of higher education in the Sudan. The Association also sponsors panels and programs during the meetings of other academic organizations. It occasionally publishes the proceedings of its annual meetings in book form.

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Please note, after years of no change, our membership charges have increased according to the recommendation of the SSA Board and their acceptance by the members present at the 28th annual meeting at Michigan State University, May 23, 2009.

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**HIGHLIGHTS AND SUMMARY OF
THE 9TH INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF SUDAN STUDIES
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AF-
RICA, PRETORIA, UNISA
NOVEMBER 25-28, 2009**

CONFERENCE THEME: *The Future of Sudan to 2011 and Beyond: African Dimensions of Peace, Stability, Justice and Reconciliation*

UNISA Program Description

The November 2009 Sudan Studies Conference is the eighth in a series of high level academic conferences on the Sudan organized by the Sudan Studies Associations. This time around the Centre for African Renaissance Studies at the University of South Africa has taken the leading role in organizing the Conference. The Conference is the second since the signing of the historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 between the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army. The Conference will interrogate the future of Sudan from multidisciplinary perspectives against the backdrop of the implementation of the CPA.

It is a challenge to put into adequate words the significance and meaning of the 9th International Conference, co-sponsored by the SSA and our collaborating associations, held in Pretoria, South Africa and generously hosted by the University of South Africa and its Principal and Vice Chancellor Professor N. Barney Pityana and the Centre for African Renaissance Studies. The historic conference was given the highest support from the South African government, evidenced by the significant participation of former President Thabo Mbeki.

In every way the conference was a success.

It was superbly organized by a collective

led by the Centre's Director, Professor Shadrack Gutto, and conference co-chairs Professors Samba Mboup, Bankie Forrester Bankie, and attorney Mildred Ariside. Throughout the four days in which 70 papers were presented, discussion proceeded in a disciplined and civil manner with a tone of candor, mutual respect, and a common concern for the future of the Sudan set by Prof. Gutto throughout. The framework for the conference consisted of a series of lead papers in Six Pillars established by the conference organizers including: 1) The CPA, Achievements, Challenges, and Threats for its Implementation with lead presentation by former SSA president Beniah Yongo-Bure 2) History, Culture and Human Development 3) Governance, Electoral Processes, Democracy and Human and People's Rights, with a lead presentation by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban 4) Issues of Statehood and Nation-Building 5) Darfur as Epitome of the Sudan Situation? 6) Regional and International Correlations and Dimensions of the Sudan Situation: Role of the African Union, the Arab League and External Factors. The lead papers in plenary sessions were followed by parallel sessions in which papers were delivered and then discussed in a final plenary session. This method proved to be highly effective for both individual discussion of papers and of the general topics subsumed under the pillars. Each individual session was summarized for the plenary audience by a rapporteur to facilitate the general discussion of each pillar. The effort that the UNISA organizers put into this unique method of presentation and discussion was well rewarded by the richness of the discussion itself.

The conference was underwritten not

only by UNISA but also with significant support by the government of South Africa and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation as well as a number of corporate sponsors—International IDEA and MTN—who made possible the participation of so many Sudanese coming from the Sudan and from abroad. The Sudanese delegation alone was over twenty from the Universities of Khartoum, Juba, Nilein, Universal University of Africa, and also the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Participants, both Sudanese and non-Sudanese, came from Austria, Canada, Germany, Spain, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Italy, United Arab Emirates, Sweden, USA, and the UK.

The tone of the conference was established on its first day with official greetings by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who said that what happens in Sudan affects the entire continent, and as such Sudan is a major priority for the Republic of South Africa (RSA). It is “the most complex of all of the African conflicts,” he said, and is the country with the greatest potential for both success and disappointment. The RSA has been active in post-conflict UNISA, and Professor Gutto added that two published products will follow, an edited book and a special issue of the Centre’s journal *African Renaissance Studies*, published by UNISA.

CLOSING SESSION

At the closing session on Saturday November 28 which former president Thabo Mbeki attended, Professor Shadrack Gutto expressed his gratitude to all of the conference participants. He pointed out that the conference organizers attempted to achieve gender parity and almost achieved it in the papers presented, discussed, and for the chairs of the panels. This was appreciated by the audience collectively. A draft of the

Conference Declaration was circulated to all and requests for amendments or additions were received for revision.

Formal remarks were requested from both the Sudanese Ambassador in RSA and the official representative of the SPLM in Pre-



Lady conferees from Sudan, Germany and US with South African UNISA conference convener Dr. Shadrack Gutto

toria, however since the Ambassador was not present, by consensus the SPLM representative David Yoh did not speak. Professor Gutto announced that preparation was already underway for the special issue of *African Renaissance Studies* and that the conference papers would be published in 2010 as a special textbook. These are to be distributed widely beyond the conference and UNISA.

President Mbeki presented final remarks to the conferees and reiterated his basic message delivered in the November 26 Keynote address. “If Sudan goes right, it will have an enormous impact on the continent of Africa, and the obverse is also true. In Nigeria people say that if Sudan disintegrates a similar path will be followed in their country.” He added that in the Darfur negotiations he noted that when the “Sudanese delegation” was summoned it appeared in two groups. “After the first two experiences we objected and only by our insistence did the delegation succeed in unifying.” Here at UNISA this

was summoned it appeared in two groups. “After the first two experiences we objected and only by our insistence did the delegation succeed in unifying.” Here at UNISA this is what we have tried to achieve. The future of the African continent is in your hands.”

UNISA has been a leader in distance education throughout Africa, and it collaborates with the “Open University of Sudan.”

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CONFERENCE DECLARATION, THE INTERNATIONAL SUDAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION “The Future of Sudan to 2011 and Beyond: African Dimensions of Peace, Stability, Justice and Reconciliation” Adopted by the entire body at UNISA, Pretoria, November 28, 2009

We, the participants, at the 2009 ISSC wish to express our thanks to the Centre for African Renaissance Studies (UNISA), the Sudan Studies Associations of the USA and UK for successfully organizing this conference which is the first of its kind to be convened in sub-Saharan Africa outside of the Sudan. We look forward to the publication of the conference papers and proceedings by UNISA;

We are fully aware that the Sudan is facing serious challenges in its political stability, national integrity and sovereignty and that the country is heading toward a bleak future unless serious and genuine measures are urgently undertaken to defuse the prevailing tensions and help promote and maintain justice, peace, security, reconciliation and unity—conditions vital to the serious amelioration of the condition of women, children, internally displaced people and refugees;

Mindful that the Sudan is facing a difficult and complicated phase in its history characterized as a weakened state a matter that will

cause immense suffering and destruction of lives and livelihoods in addition to massive displacement of people in many parts of the country and aggravate situations in Southern Sudan, Darfur, and other potential conflict areas such as Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan and the far northern Sudan and all marginalized areas;

Further mindful that harmful infrastructure policies currently being pursued by the Sudan pose an imminent threat to the physical environment of the country will result in the massive displacement of Sudanese people and can destroy antiquities that are part of global human heritage; Noting that the CPA represents an important political document in the history of Sudan and that it is the heart of the political transformation in the country, yet its weak implementation is causing serious difficulties which have gravely affected its potentials for democratic transformation, thus we urge an enhanced role for the African Union in ensuring full implementation of the CPA;


Concerned that the country is now preparing for the general national election in 2010 though the political atmosphere is hardly conducive to the organizing of fair and free elections as a number of repressive laws are still in place in violation of the bill of rights enshrined in the CPA and Sudan’s Interim National Constitution, and we indeed call here for the immediate repeal of those laws;

Hoping that all concerned parties to the Question of the Sudan will give heed to the separate specific Statement on the Elections in the Sudan issued by participants of this 2009 ISSC;

We strongly appeal to the parties to the CPA, IGAD and the troika (the US, UK, and Norway), to the African Union and

the United Nations, and to all political forces and civil society in Sudan, to put into place measures that will ensure that credible elections and referendums are held in accordance with the CPA and the Interim National Constitution and the Constitution of Southern Sudan;

Welcoming the report of the African Union High Level Panel on Darfur headed by former President of South Africa, His Excellency Thabo Mbeki as an authentic African contribution to a solution for the country's crisis, and that the report has identified the inequalities of the distribution of political and economic power as well as the marginalized and the exclusion of the people of Darfur as the main causes that underpin the conflict in the region; We declare that this groundbreaking conference affirms the critical role that scholars, thinkers and opinion makers can and should play in generating relevant knowledge to influence informed policy choices, inspire action and contribute to a movement on the ground, in Sudan, to promote change; We solemnly re-dedicate our individual and collective efforts to active involvement in the Sudan issue throughout the remainder of the interim period, 2011 and beyond.



Former President Mbeki's Banquet lecture to the UNISA 9th International Conference of Sudan Studies, November xx, 2009

**SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE
ADDRESS BY FORMER PRESIDENT
THABO MBEKI TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SUDAN STUDIES
CONFERENCE, AT THE UNIVER-
SITY OF SOUTH AFRICA,
TSHWANE, November 26, 2009**

It is proper that I begin by explaining my presence here with you. As we were working on the African Union (AU) High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), Professor Shadrack Gutto asked me to make myself available to speak to this conference, to which I agreed. I knew that by the time conference convened, the Panel would have completed its work and the Report, signifying an end to our mandate.

Throughout the 6 months during which the AUPD worked we made every effort not to compromise its work by making unwarranted public remarks. But after submitting our report, unexpectedly, the AU asked some of to continue to help implement AU decisions on Sudan, both relating to Darfur and the CPA. Thus, I stand before you not as the free spirit I thought I would be when I

I agreed to Professor Gutto's request, but as an emissary of the AU to the Sudan. Put simply, the AU policy towards Sudan is centered on two pillars: 1) support of the CPA and its implementation 2) implementation of AU decisions on Darfur at the meeting of the Peace and Security Council held at Abuja October 29, 2009. (President Mbeki then quoted extensively from these documents, which are not reprinted here.)

It is clear that Sudan and the AU have a truly challenging agenda, that one African scholar has described as a "pressure cooker" meaning there may not be enough time to resolve outstanding issues before the 2010 Elections and 2011 Referendum.

Sudan is one of the most diverse countries in Africa; its unity, therefore, requires that its development should be based on the principle and practice of unity in diversity. "However, the manner in it developed during the colonial and post-colonial periods made this impossible, and diversity has served as a centrifugal rather than centripetal force" (quoting from AU report). Despite a history of excellent agreements, political will has been lacking to implement them to improve the lives of all of Sudan's peoples. For their part the Sudanese actors will have to demonstrate through their practical actions that they are, indeed, such agents of change.

It is known that the CPA affirmed the South Sudan's peoples' right to self-determination. Also, we know that the late John Garang de Mabior made this principle the centerpiece of his vision of the "New Sudan" which would make it unnecessary for South Sudan to feel compelled to secede from present-day Sudan.

However, there are two observations that I would like to make. The first concerns the seeming contradiction between the simultaneous call for unity and self-determination. For almost a century, the view in left poli-

tics and progressive political science that states rightly recognize the right of nationalities to self-determination, including independence. This view arose out of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. I make this point to support the position adopted by the CPA. Indeed, the 25 Sudanese political parties and the 5 civil society organizations—invited by the SPLM—agreed in Juba at their September 26-30 "Juba Declaration on Dialogue and National Consensus" that priority is given to "make unity attractive" and to defend the right of South Sudan to self-determination. This means that the general political forces, not just the signers of the CPA, agree to these twin ideas. First Vice-president and South Sudan President Lt. Gen. Salva Kiir reiterated these points when he addressed the AU Executive Council at its January 2010 meeting in Khartoum. Gen. Kiir having characterized Sudan as a "microcosm of Africa" and identified the CPA as a possible model to manage the diversity characteristic of virtually all African states, based on the principle and practice of unity in diversity. Understandably, President Kiir did not say what would happen to Africa if its 'microcosm' failed to reconstruct itself along the directions spelt out in the CPA.

It is central to the future of the African continent that its two largest countries, Sudan and DR Congo, are key to the overall stability of the continent. Quoting the Preface to the AU Report: "The Republic of the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are the only two whose borders touch nine other African countries. Apart from sharing borders, and in addition to their own domestic challenges, they are currently located in volatile sub-regions. Their stability,

based on peace, democratic rule, development and good governance, is, therefore, of critical importance to the future of the region and the continent.”

Both countries have significant human and material resources with the potential to make a significant contribution to the sustained development of both these countries and Africa at large. The obverse of this is that if these countries were to disintegrate, or otherwise sink into a deep crisis, they would generate enormous “tsunami” waves that would spell disaster not only for their immediate neighbors, but for Africa as a continent, as well as posing many threats to the rest of the world.

This says that as the AU works to implement the program of action it has set out in regard to Sudan, it will have to bear this in mind, that the resolution of the problems of the Sudan are in the fundamental and immediate interest of Africa as a whole.

I am certain that as intellectuals you are familiar with Karl Marx’s famous “Thesis on Feuerbach” in which he says: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point (however) is to change it.”

As I studied the program of this important conference, I took note of the fact that the conference will conclude with “Conference Resolutions and Outcomes.” I am certain that given the enormous intellectual resource that the University of South Africa and its Centre for African Renaissance Studies have brought together at this International Sudan Studies Conference, you will not be satisfied merely to interpret the world.

Rather you will also attend to the urgent and vital task to answer the question—how should we change it, hopefully in a manner and direction that would address the fundamental interests of the peoples of Sudan and Africa as a whole! Thank you.

Editor’s Note: The University of South Africa’s (UNISA) Centre for African Renaissance Studies is intending to publish a selection of conference papers from the November 2009 Pretoria conference, as well as a special issue of its flagship journal *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies*. Order by email: journalsubs@unisa.ac.za.

The Conference conveners included: University of South Africa, Centre for African Renaissance Studies, Sudan Studies Association, Sudan, Sudan Studies Society, UK, Sudan Studies Association USA.



Profs. Al-Amin Abu Manga, Director of the Institute of African & Asian Studies and Dr. Idris Salim ElHassan, both from the University of Khartoum, listen to Pres. Mbeki’s final remarks to the conference


More on the Mysterious “Kadi of Khartoum”

Response to Eltayeb Bushra Babiker: *The Qadi IS Mohamed Khugali Hetaik (Qadi al-Umum)*

*by Mohamed Ibrahim Mohamed,
Librarian Sudan Judiciary*

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(With gratitude to Mahgoub al-Tigani Mahmoud
for the translation)



Our dear friend Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, the diligent researcher, has presented to us a picture having the name of “Qadi von Khartoum.” Two years ago in her visit to the Judiciary Library, she asked me if I knew whose picture it was. I recall that I told her that Qadi Umum al-Khartoum (1858-1885) was Mohamed Khugali Hetaik al-Mahasi who was killed in 1885 in the fall of Khartoum by Mahdists. I copied page 262 on the Qadi in Richard Hill’s *A Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan*. I then asked the knowledgeable person on the history of Khartoum, the late Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim Hetaik, notable member of the Hetaik family, to discuss with her at the library his views about the picture. The Sheikh came graciously and told us additional information on the Qadi. That day was when we had the picture posted on page 1 of the Sudan Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 27 May-June (12-17-2009). I remember very well the Sheikh felt strongly the picture was most likely Qadi Hetaik since he looked like their males. He even copied the picture to the Hetaik family of whom the Sheikh’s own son, Ustaz Hassan Mohamed

Hetaik supported his father’s opinion. I believe, however, the proposition that Qadi Hetaik looks like the Sheikh and his son Hassan actually complicates the issue of authenticating the picture’s identity since more evidence is required from other sources that might strengthen the idea of the Sheikh and his son.

Ustaz al-Tayeb Bushra Babiker wrote an article on “The last Kadi of Khartoum from the Tukiyya: The quest for a name” in SSA Bulletin Vol. No. 3-4 October-November 2007, pp. 3-9. The article indicates that the writer possesses rich information on the history of Khartoum. Moreover, he has an intriguing style of writing and an art of arguments and discussion. Thus, our friend Carolyn gave us another gift.

Let us now discuss some of the doubts raised by this historian on the picture. Because I will question these suspicions based on important references, the reader might want to compare our views by consulting the Bushra article. My questions are: 1) was the person who took the picture German? 2) Did he face a problem for which he came to the Qadi, or was he a victim of misguidance [concerning the Qadi]? 3) Would it be possible to assume the person in the picture was impersonating [the Qadi], or was he actually a qadi? Were he a qadi, what was his judicial rank, Qadi Umum or less? 4) Was the Kalaklah locality large enough to have two judges? 5) Was Qadi a name of the typical job, or a name of a certain family? 6) Would the features cast doubt on the real personality of the Qadi, or would they suggest he might have been a Sufi? 7) Was this ambiguity consequent to the death of Hetaik?

These questions indicate briefly a summary of the writer’s suspicions. And here are the answers in detail: First: Was the person who took the picture German? However, Richard Buchta was not German. He was an Austrian identified by Richard Hill (p. 89) as follows: “Buchta, Richard (1845-94), Austrian photographer; born at Radlow in Galicia. He learnt photography and came to Egypt in 1870. R. Gessi Pasha enlisted him as a photographer in 1877, and in 1877-78 he took careful photographs on the upper White Nile. He later accompanied Emin Pasha on journeys to Unyoro and Uganda. Buchta was the first serious photographer to practice his art in these regions; he was with Gessi at Daim Sulaiman in 1879-80; he returned to Europe and died in Vienna.”

It is clear from this biography the man was not an occasional traveler, but he came about

as a serious professional photographer to take up an official job. He went to South Sudan specifically, not the geographical south Ustaz Bushra mentioned. What is important about the man's biography is that it helps us, to a great extent, to resolve the dilemma, as would be shortly explained. What we want to ascertain here is that the man wasn't German. We do not want to assert that by affiliating him as Austrian and removing him from German nationality that we imply that an Austrian would not be a victim of misguidance. We want to say that Ustaz Bushra's assumptions are purely intellectual and that they conflict, for the most part, with what is available in historical sources, as is clarified in the next paragraphs.

Secondly: Did Buchta face a problem for which he came to the Qadi, or was he a victim of misguidance [about the Qadi]? The man might have been a victim of misguiding persons, or he might have faced a problem for which he came to the Qadi to resolve it – as writer Bushra assumed. My say is that after we knew that Richard Buchta was a professional serious Austrian photographer, we are sure he wasn't a victim of misguidance and he wasn't in need of a Qadi. Buchta was not a victim of misguidance because he was not a casual traveler; he was a cautious specialized photographer. He was cautious by Hill's description of him as "a serious photographer." Seriousness includes caution and carefulness to authenticate a photograph. Added to this, the Austrian nationality of the man meant he would receive information from the Austrian Community in Khartoum: "40 families of which Khawaja Hack Makhier was well known. It should be mentioned that the Austria and Hungary Empire pledged to protect the priests in Khartoum, which was further recognized by the Turkish Empire, the master of Egypt and Sudan at the time" [*Muzakirat Mahmoud al-'Atabani* in: *Tarikh al-Khartoum*, by Mohamed Ibrahim Abu-Saleem, pp. 54-60].

After this description, it is not reasonable to suggest that a careful serious traveler-photographer would be a victim of misguidance since he was a descendant of the oldest empire and a member of the greatest foreign community in Khartoum (the Austrian) which, according to historian Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Abu Saleem writes, "had especially been the most important community since it was a patron of the Catholic Mission inaugurated in 1853" (*Ibid.*, p. 46).

The other piece of the assumption that Buchta might have come to meet with the Qadi to

resolve a problem is more refutable than the earlier one because: 1) Dr. Zaki Mustafa said that, "The cases of the foreigners resident in Sudan were transferred to their counsels" (*Common Law in Sudan*, (p. 14), a comprehensive dissertation published in English, 1968). 2) There were also local judicial councils established in 1850 by Rustum Bay, the Wali of Sudan Government, to adjudicate cases by the tradition of Egyptian councils" (see: *al-Sudan baina yadaya Gordon wa Kitchener*, as well as Ibrahim Fawzi, Part I, p. 66. Also see *al-Sudan 'ibr al-Qurun*, Dr. Mekki Shibaika, p. 246, and *Tatawour Nizam al-Qada fi al-Sudan*, al-Mufti, pp. 113-114. 3) In some cases, the *Mudir al-Mudiriya* [Governor General] might hear for himself some cases (al-Mufti, p. 115). 4) The *Mahkamat al-Jinayat* [criminal court] was located within space of the Catholic Church, as witnessed by historian Mahmoud al-Gabani who said in his memories: "the location of this church occupied the offices of the Khartoum Mudiriya [governorate], and the criminal court was sited at the Camboni chamber in which he passed away" (*Muzakirat al-Atabani*, p. 55 in Abu Saleem, *Tarikh al-Khartoum*). 5) Ustaz Bushra himself thought that the Shari'a judge at that time was weakened by restricted authority that perhaps he was not respected ("a jerk" as we might say today in colloquial English).

Why then would this photographer want to present a case to him, although he was already aware of his limited authority over Muslim family law, whereas Buchta could use various options to resolve problem.

By now, we should enlighten the reader that the distance between the Shari'a court of Qadi Hetaik and the criminal court in the space of the Catholic Church was very close. Hetaik's court was located in the same place as the Judiciary today and the criminal court was situated between the Irrigation Department of Egypt and the Council of Ministers – only separated by Abd al-Monim Street such that if any one called loudly on the other, they would hear his call clearly. That the criminal court stood in the church space, which is the Council of Ministers today – the former Mudiriya in the past times, was supported by historian Mahmoud al-Gabani among others. That the Shari'a court was placed here was proved in detail in my book *al-Haganiya fi Zikraha al-Mia'wiya, 1808-2008*. The question is why would the photographer abandoned the authoritative criminal court, as well as the dominating church and Catholic community over Khartoum, to appeal to the Shari'a court? Why didn't he go to the Mudir al-Mudiriya to deal with his case? Why would he go instead to the weak Qadi, in the writer's view? What

the use then of showing his case to such a judge?

Thirdly: Would it be possible to assume the person in the picture was impersonating the Qadi, or was he actually a qadi? Were he a qadi, what was his judicial rank, Qadi Umum or less? I say that these Bushra assumptions are refuted by Bushra himself since he described the Qadi as a judge with restricted authority who wanted to be famous, which made of him an object of sarcasm. Such description would either identify the Qadi Umum al-Sudan if it is proven that Khartoum didn't have another judge of a lower rank, or it might indicate another judge if there were numerous judges. If the assumption is related to the Qadi al-Umum, then Ustaz Bushra's thought that the Qadi in the picture appears to be a noble person refutes the idea because a judge is supposed to be firm to be able to supervise over judges' behavior to get them to do their job or even to purge them. What is ascertained to my mind up to this point is that the Qadi al-Umum himself was the Khartoum Qadi since there was not any other Shari'a judge in the city which I assert for the following reasons:

1. We found that the Qadi al-Umum was called the "Khartoum Judge" according to Hill who referred to Hetaik as "the last judge of Khartoum." Also, we found reference to the "judge of Khartoum Mohamed Khugali bey" in a section on Sudanese employees in the former Egyptian state by historian Osman Hamad-Allah in his book *Sahm al-Uruba* (p.66). Hamad-Allah's information on the judiciary and judges of the Turkiya and the Mahdiya was taken from al-Sheikh al-Tayeb Ahmed Hashim who was a clerk with Shari'a courts of which Hetaik was the top. This enabled Sheikh al-Tayeb to know everything about the most senior judge (p. 20) in the book claiming that the source of information was al-Sheikh al-Tayeb Ahmed Hashim, although the book does not specifically mention Hetaik himself. Hamad-Allah, a worker with the Antiquities Department belonged to the post-Turkiyah generations (1907-1914).

2. I haven't founded in my search or investigation any name for a judge in Khartoum other than Hetaik's. What Richard Hill mentioned (p. 286) about al-Sheikh Mustafa al-Salawai was that Salawi had been reappointed a judge for Khartoum (1965-1985): "We exclude his reappointment because Sheikh Hussain Saed Ahmed al-Mufti in his book *Tatawour Nizam al-*

fi al-Sudan said about Mustafa al-Salawai that "he stayed in Turah prison in Cairo for a long time until he was released and returned to Sudan away from judiciary. He was taken captive in the fall of Khartoum 1885 and died in 1887" (see *Tatwour Nizam al-Qada*, al-Mufti, first edition). We support al-Mufti finding that Salawi did not resume his job as a judge because we believe he wouldn't agree as a former Qadi Umum al-Sudan to work in the position of a small judge. We believe the authorities wouldn't allow him to return after all he did [against them]. We support al-Mufti's view as an informative judge who dedicated his time and efforts for the definition and history of the judiciary and was thus closer to judicial affairs than Hill did. All in all, the picture itself features clearly a Sudanese, not an Egyptian descendant of a Moroccan origin like Mustafa al-Salawi.

Having discussed all assumptions, we didn't find a judge in Khartoum other than Hetaik, which assured us that Qadi al-Umum is the "Kadi of Khartoum" at the same time, as proved by evidence. So the man in the picture was not impersonating a judge. Nor was he a judge in a junior rank to Qadi al-Umum.


Fourth: Was the Kalaklah locality large enough to have two judges? What was mentioned in the earlier paragraph that Khartoum itself did not have more than one Shari'a judge suffices to negate the presence of two judges in Kalaklah, or even a single judge. The history of Kalaklah is available in *Tarikh al-Kalakla*, a book in two volumes made of 1191 pages authored by Ustaz Sa'd al-Deen Mohamed Ahmed (born in Kalaklah 1925) and is resident in the area. He mentioned in the book everything about Kalaklah since it was founded up to this day and emphasized when I asked him that there wasn't a court in Kalaklah. He said that his generation used to adjudicate at the Khartoum North court: "My mother's father al-Sheikh al-Nazeer Khalid was Qadi Umum al-Sudan in Omdurman in the Mahdiya. My grandfather Abd al-Gadir wad Um-Maryoam was a qadi in Omduram in the Mahdiya. There was not a court in Kalaklah. He mentioned in his book a judicial sentence issued exceptionally by the Judicial Secretary of Sudan Edgar Banham Cater in 1903 (pp. 360-365) as the

Qadi of Khartoum. That was the judiciary in Khartoum and in Sudan. Mawlana Babiker Awad (chief justice 1964-1967) was born in 1916, joined the Judiciary in 1936, and he still lives in good health. He told me when he had been a judge in Shendi, the courts of Atbara, Berber, and Abu Hamad were part of his jurisdiction. He used to travel by train to these towns to decide on cases. We, therefore, are certain that Khartoum had only one judge who was Qadi Umum al-Sudan.

5) Was Qadi a typical name of the job or a name of a certain family? I wish Ustaz Bushra had not assumed that, for if it was a name of a family it wouldn't be "Qadi al-Khartoum" and there wouldn't be a reason to mention Khartoum with the name. Even if we supposed that the name of the man was "Qadi al-Khartoum," that would make of the name his private name not that of the family, and it would be possible to call his descendants "awlad Qadi al-Khartoum." As such, this point shouldn't have been claimed.

6) Would the features cast doubt on the real personality of the Qadi, or would they suggest he might have been a Sufi?

1. *Kitab al-Tabaqat*, 3rd edition, Dar al-Nashr, University of Khartoum, 1985; investigated by Dr. Yusif Fadl Hassan
2. *Tarikh al-Khartoum*, Mohamed Ibrahim Abu Saleem, Dar al-Gabal, Beirut, 3rd edition, 1991.
3. *Tatawour Nizam al-Qada fi al-Sudan*, Hussain Seed Ahmed al-Mufti, 1st edition, 1959.
4. *Sahm al-Uruba*, Osman Hamad-Allah, 1st edition, 1949.
5. *al-Sudan 'abr al-Qurun*, Dr. Mekki Shibaika, Dar al-Gabal, Beirut, 1991.
6. *al-Qada fi Dawlat al-Mahdiya fi al-Sudan*, Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Abu Saleem, Dar al-Gabal, 1991.
7. *Adawat al-Hukm wal Wilayah fi al-Sudan*, Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Abu Saleem, Dar al-Gabal, 1992.
8. *Tarikh al-Kalakah min 954 H – 2000 AD*, Sa'd al-Deen Mohamed Ahmed, 1st edition, 2005.
9. *al-Sudan baina yada Gordon wa Kitchener*, Ibrahim Fawzi, 1319 H.
10. *Geographiyat wa Tarikh al-Sudan*, Na'oum Shuqair, 2007H, Dar 'Aza li al-Nashr.
11. "Khartoum," Vol. xlx II (1966) *Sudan Notes and Records*
12. *A Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan* – Richard Hill, the second edition – Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. 1967



The author with picture of Kadi of Khartoum, he claims is Mohamed Khogali al-Hiteik

The SSA is pleased to continue publishing articles from scholars from Sudan whose work we may not have easy access. The first is from distinguished anthropologist Idris Mohamed Salih whose doctorate is from the University of Connecticut.

Cultural Forms among Internally Displaced Persons in Khartoum IDP Camps

Idris Salim ElHassan

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Department of Social Anthropology

Natural and human-made calamities throughout the world have resulted in large population movements away from their original rural homelands towards urban centers. Africa in particular has over fifteen million such internally displaced persons (IDPs). In Sudan the total number of IDPs exceeds five millions in the country as a whole, and two millions in Khartoum alone. This fact has attracted the attention of many world organizations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and local NGOs, government agencies, and many civil society bodies to deal with the desperate situation at hand by attempting to mitigate the harsh conditions under which the IDPs live.

The majority of works on the IDPs in the Sudan focus on relief, accommodation (settlements), adaptation and coping mechanisms, integration and/or resettlement in terms of IDPs' material needs for their survival. Few material and non-material cultural aspects (e.g. language, performing arts, folklore genres, handicrafts... etc) have been taken into consideration. The assertion made here is that since human beings are cultural beings par excellence, it is expected that the two millions or so IDPs in Khartoum have huge cultural resources and varied forms of cultural heritage and cultural expressions which we know very little about. For example, we do not have any documentation or listings for IDPs cultural forms, and scant knowledge about the mechanisms through which they are preserved, maintained or transmitted to the new generations and to what extent they are accepted and continued by the latter, how they negotiate with other cultural forms of the host communities, which forms are kept and which ones are dropped. The documentation of the social contexts within which these processes take place is very much important for analyzing their operations. This will hopefully give us insight into how cultures perform under conditions of stress. On the practical side of it, such gained insight can be useful in formulating policies of cultural pluralism and implementing their programs in Khartoum State, which up to now does not have such a policy or pro-

grams as stipulated in the current Transitional Constitution which is based on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Culture is very fluid and dynamic; it is always in the making. On the other hand it relates to the surrounding natural and human environments and interacts with them in a dialectical way; i.e. it affects and is affected by them. It is the collectivity of representations of ourselves, the others and the natural world, and expressed, and recreated at the same time, in the different forms of knowledge (practical e.g. hunting and agriculture; theoretical: conceptions of time and space), customs and values, different arts, rituals, and practices. Culture is pinned to the past, enacted in the present and shaped by the envisaged future. Therefore, space (place), time and social relations are both the raw materials and arena for the cultural stuff carried by the human agents. What characterizes the IDPs' situation is that they have been abruptly uprooted from their homelands and located in some new socio-cultural settings to which they have to adapt socially, culturally and economically. The situation is one of uncertainty regarding whether they are going to stay (settle or integrate), move to another place (resettle), or return to their original homelands (repatriate). Any of these choices (some of which may be forced) implies undergoing difficult psychological and cultural negotiations and outcomes.

Based on the above, this project intends to document and study non-material cultural forms, organizations and practices among the IDPs in Khartoum State. These forms concern their war memories, myths, stories and folk tales, values and customs, rituals, life-cycle and socialization.

Methodology to be employed derives from the fluid and dynamic nature of the topic and situation itself, as explained above. Open ended interviews and discussions with key persons and (focused) groups will be conducted in formal and informal sessions. Participant observation is always an indispensable field tool for data collection on qualitative issues like culture. Audio-visual material will be collected for purposes of documentation and, forum discussions and later presentations. The investigator thinks that questionnaires might not be helpful in the present situation.

Since IDPs in Khartoum are about two millions scattered all over the State it is very difficult to trace them and select a manageable sample for conducting fieldwork. Therefore, it is thought that a better approach would be to focus on what is designated as IDP "camps" by the authorities. Permits are needed to be able to enter these camps and engage in humanitarian or research activities. from all parts

The average number of the camps' population amounts to 350,000 from all parts of the of the Sudan with, however, the majority are from Southern and Western Sudan. Besides, the camp dwellers are those who are living under the most stressful conditions and whose situation demands more attention by a study focusing on investigating the issue of culture under stress.

The principal investigator will be assisted by four assistants, 3 females and one male, who have good experience in working with IDPs and doing fieldwork in general. They will be provided, after adequate orientation on the topic of study, with broad items (derived from the cultural list of non-material cultural aspects mentioned above) for making interviews. They will be given freedom to follow on issues they think of as interesting leads that can shed more light on the issues under discussion.

In the field, the Dinka, Nuba, Fur, and Dar Hamid represent Arab and non-Arab groups from Southern, South central, Kordofan and Western Sudan will be the focus of investigation. The cultural diversity of this collection allows for good comparative analysis since all of them, though coming from different parts of the Sudan, they live under the same circumstances of displacement. As all IDP camps are more or less equally representative in terms of socio-cultural diversity stated above, one camp, Mandela (Mayo), will be sufficient for the purposes of the study. Nonetheless, extra material from other "camps" or groups in Omdurman and Khartoum North will be used whenever it is thought to shed light on the points under discussion. Solicited papers to be written by experts will be sought to fill in the gaps of the collected field material. After preliminary results are made out of the collected materials, a group of academic experts in the fields of sociology and folklore, representatives of NGOs' performing art groups from Southern Sudan and representatives from the UNESCO national Committee and Federal and Khartoum State Ministries of Culture will be called to a one day forum to discuss these results and give their comments and advices regarding the outcome and the format the final report should take..

The final product is expected to be a written report and audio-visual documentaries copies which will be deposited in the UNESCO National Committee, Institute of African and Asian Studies' archives, relevant units of the participating NGOs and ministries. Attention will be paid to ensure that the debates and discussions and the final report are oriented with regards to IDPs' policies in general and cultural policies in particular.

Objectives of the Project:

1. Document some cultural forms among some of Khartoum's IDPs.
2. Identify ways of enhancing IDPs' cultural forms and expressions.
3. indicate ways of incorporating findings in national and State's cultural policies.
4. Raise awareness of cultural pluralism in Sudan

Types of activities:

1. Mapping and documenting some of Khartoum's IDPs cultural forms.
2. Conducting interviews and focus groups discussions among IDPs and relevant persons and bodies.
3. Establish networks.
4. Train some graduate students and encourage them to get interested in IDPs' and cultural studies, using innovative fieldwork methods.
5. Hold a workshop to discuss the project's idea and findings, and to see how the outcome of the debates can be policy oriented.
6. Writing up the report.

Expected Results:

1. Gain knowledge of how IDPs' cultures perform and are expressed under conditions of stress (displacement).
2. Suggest ways of including IDPs' cultural forms in national and State's cultural policies.
3. Identify means of raising awareness about IDP's cultural issues and rights through the media.

Target Beneficiaries:

1. Federal Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, and State Ministry of Culture.
2. Federal Ministry of Welfare.
3. IDPs' and relevant NGOs and performing art groups, plus Folklore and Social Science Associations.

FEATURED ARTICLE # 2

The following paper is from doctoral student Salma M. Abdalla, whose photo below was taken as she presented at the UNISA International Conference of Sudan Studies.



Coping with Water Scarcity: the Role of Zākat institutions in Water Distribution in Greater Khartoum

By Salma Mohamed Abdalla, PhD Student at Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), University of Bayreuth, Germany, Summary of a paper delivered at the Khartoum Student Seminar Series, January 2010: salmamohmun@yahoo.com

Introduction: This research is to understand how social groups in Khartoum try to cope with water scarcity and respond to this problem. The study is to analyze the role of one of the religious (Islam) institutions namely *Zākat* in water distribution. This is because since the implementation of Shari'a (the Islamic Law) and the civilization project of the NIF which is aiming at the Islamization of the society in Northern Sudan, we find that

Islamic institutions are playing a significant role in the Sudanese politics and society.

Zakat is an interesting case to look at because it includes religious, political, economical and power relations aspects. The way the Council of Scholars of *Zakat* Chamber manages to interpret the text in order to legitimize certain objective is quite interesting to look at. Therefore, at this case water distribution represents an entry point to interpret the social processes that are going behind this institution. One of the objectives of this study is to provide a thorough description and analysis of how the *Zakat* institution works with a specific focus on the water services. Levels and processes of the Norm, Interpretation, Implementation and Impact at the local levels will be analyzed.

The Role of Zākat Institutions: *Zākat* is an obligation that constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam together with the declaration of faith, prayer, fasting and pilgrimage to Mecca. *Zakat* is one of the most important aspects of the Islamic Economic System. *Zakat* is the third pillar in the five basic tenets of Islam as a critical component of socio-economic justice. *Zakat* includes the fiscal support of the poor and needy, enabling them to enhance their livelihoods and thereby eradicating poverty. *Zakat* is distributed among 8 *as-naf* (categories) of people, namely:

1. Fakir - One who has neither material possessions nor means of livelihood.
2. Miskin - One with insufficient means of livelihood to meet basic needs.
3. Amil - One who is appointed to collect *Zakat*.
4. Muallaf - One who converts to Islam.
5. Riqab - One who wants to free himself from bondage or the shackles of to

slavery.

6. Gharmin - One who is in debt
7. Fisabilillah - One who fights for the cause of Allah.
8. Ibnus Sabil - One who is stranded in journey.

Sources of Zakat: God commands Muslims to pay a certain percentage of their net worth above *nisab* (the poverty line) as well as a certain percentage of the net output of agricultural and mineral production. This payment is not a favor, but rather an appropriate use of their wealth which god has given them as a trust (Quran 57:7), which is 2.5% of the net wealth. *Nisab*, the dividing line that separates the basic necessities of life from luxuries, differs from society to society and changes over time. Sources: 1- life stock. 2- Business. 3- Salary. 4-

History of Zakat Institution in Sudan: In the former times in Sudan it was considered as a religious duty paid voluntarily the needy and poor relatives. *Zakat* was implemented in an obligatory way in particular periods of the countries history. In Mahdiya State in 1884 it was declared as a part of the Islamization of the state. After Mahdiya state the collection of *Zakat* by state has stopped until the Elnumairy regime (1969 - 1985) when *Zakat* payment was taken over by the state and turned into legal institutional "to empower" the poor. In 1980 the state declared the establishment of *Zakat* fund where the money is collected voluntary and the state is responsible of the distribution. This experience continued till 1986 when a general decree was announced which prescribe that one institution is responsible of the collection of taxes and *Zakat* which called Taxes and *Zakat* Chamber.

In a previous study, I found that households within in the squatter areas of Khartoum

spend high percentage (56%) of their income on water purchase from vendors compared with households in the uppers class area and middle class neighborhoods with high water consumption. The poorest households devote the greatest percentage of their income to the purchase of water, while the wealthier households with private connections would be willing to pay at least as much or even less for water that is paid by the poor. Here comes the role of *Zakat* institutions.

The Council of Scholars managed to negotiate the inclusion of responding to water scarcity within the legal framework of *Zakat*? (Note: originally water provision was no part of *Zakat* categories.)

How do social groups at a squatter settlement with highly vulnerable inhabitants within the urban society develop strategies to negotiate their interests and needs? In order to provide answers to these fundamental questions, therefore this research project looks at the role of *Zakat* institutions in water distribution in Greater Khartoum which includes case from Omdurman.

The research is divided to four levels. Firstly the norm level where the actor is the text and the research will employ content analysis for data collection and analysis. The second research level is the interpretation of the text. At this level the actors are the counsel of scholars of the *Zakat* Chamber and the executive office, here the research will use expert interviews and guided interviews as a method of data collection. The third level is the implementation of the policies. Here the research will mainly be dealing with the organizational structure at the *Zakat* Chamber and the *Zakat* committees at the local levels. The forth level is the effect or the impact of the implemented policies. Expert interview, guided interviews as well as participant observation will be used in the third and the fourth levels for data collection.

1963 SOUTHERN PETITION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

(reprint Part II)

As Sudan heads toward the decisive years of national elections in 2010 and the referendum on separation of the South, the SSA Bulletin will reprint periodically documents relevant to the history of 'North-South' relations. Editor.

Social: Relations between the two ethnic groups in the Sudan is one of born masters for the Arabs and of slaves for the Southerners and descendants of ex-slaves in the North. Some of the latter have accepted their inferior position as inevitable. This is the position the Arabs want to create in the South, one of inferiority. We are also suspicious that slave trade is still going on. A number of young men disappear every year from Southern Sudan and although we have no proofs yet, we think they are being sold to Saudi Arabia which is just on the other side of the Red Sea dividing the Northern Sudan from Saudi Arabia, where our people used to be sold in the old days. The Sudan used to be one of the main routes of slave trade. Most of the young men who disappear are those who go to the North to look for employment. On 12th of August 1962, the following article appeared in the London "News of the World", reporting of the experiences of a French traveler Francois d'Harcourt who went to Arabia: "Arabia is still rapped in the slumber of the dark ages. Bin Rashid (an Arab guide) explained the working of the trade. He told me how entire cargoes of human merchandise arrive from Eritrea, the Sudan, the Somaliland, Afghanistan, the Indies, and even the far East. Some land at Gjedda, others on the coast of Oman. On arrival, the groups are separated into two lots; the slaves for the kitchen (*Djaria el-Medback*) and the slaves for the bed (*Djaria el-Sarir*) Bi Rashid estimates there are more than one million slaves in Saudi Arabia. At Mecca they can be seen tethered in groups of seven or eight. And should any slave try to escape and get recaptured there is only one punishment – death by beheading." It is worth mentioning here the Sudan Government has closest relations with Saudi Arabia and she actually borrowed planes from Arabia to carry soldiers from North to South during the Southern revolt in 1955. Saudi Arabia is also one of the money lenders to the Sudan. Although there are no formal segregation laws as in South Africa, Northerners and Southerners in the Sudan live in strict segregated groups and this is most apparent in town clubs. There are various

reasons for this; one of them is economic differences the Southerners forming the lowest class. The other is that the Southerners are despised because of their inferior position and colour. The other inequality, Africans whether Muslims or not, with the exception of very isolated cases, cannot marry Arab girls. The Africans are branded with the stigma of "slave". Dr L. A. Fabunni of Nigeria in his book entitled "The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations", (p. 364) wrote: "The writer" (meaning himself) "is reliably informed by a Northern Sudanese friend that it is practically impossible for the Southerner to marry a northern woman, but that a Northern male can easily marry a southern beauty". This social barrier became a handicap to the Government policy of "assimilation", as intermarriage is one of the best ways of doing it. Faced with this problem, the Government decided to give extra allowances of money to Northern soldiers, police and wardens serving in the South to marry temporary southern beauties. The purpose of the extra allowance is to make it less expensive to maintain the southern concubine and the true wife or wives (since the Muslim law allows 4) left in the North for fear of an uprising in the South. Any children from the temporary wives or concubines are quickly taken to a "Khalwa" (Islamic school) at early stage to be taught the State religion. He is told that he is now an Arab and a true Sudanese. When the husband is transferred back to North, the wife is left in the street and if she has no parents to look after her, she has no alternative but to become a prostitute. No Southern young man will marry her because her virginity has been spoiled, contrary to local custom. The Governor of Eritrea, Ali Baldo instructed the tribal chiefs to value the girls of bride price (dowry in the form of money) so that it is not too expensive for the soldiers whose monthly salaries hardly go beyond Ls 15 (Sudanese pounds). The parents of the girls have to swallow this unjust treatment for fear of victimization in one way or another. Ali Baldo also encouraged the Northern merchants to possess concubines in the South in order to accelerate assimilation. The number of foreign merchants such as the Greeks and Indians were restricted while the door was thrown open for Arab merchants to flock to the South for settlement. Facilities to possess firearms for protection against the Southerners were given to the Northern merchants, while Southerners are refused to buy firearms even though they can afford to.

Today many Southerners walk in ragged clothes or go naked completely and foreigners are

told that they like to be naked. Southerners do the ugliest and dirtiest jobs in towns. Foreigners who have succeeded to obtain "Closed Districts Permit" to enter the South are not allowed freedom to travel or to speak to Southerners except those selected for them. The foreigners are guarded by police when travelling in the South and when they ask why this is being done, they are told that the Southerners are wild and savage that they would kill them if not given protection by the Government. Co-operative societies which could improve social and economic conditions are not allowed to operate in the South, among the Southerners. Mr Eligah Mayom, an ex-Southern Member of Parliament who had money to open a cooperative was refused license by the Government in 1960 and his appeal to General Abboud as head of State was fruitless.

Another social evil which the North has brought to the South is homosexuality. The Southerners are horrified when they see boys being raped. Arab courts are most reluctant to try such cases which involve merchants of their kinsmen. Some local men and police officers do their best to destroy evidence. We know at least of two cases involving senior Arab officials where evidence was destroyed. The incidents were at Rumbek and Tonj. In one case the accused was convicted for 7 years because the evidence was too clear. This was in Yei District in 1960; the accused's name is Mohammed Hassan who raped a small boy 12 years old. Due to failure of rains, hunger strikes people of the South during certain years and people die of it. It occurred in Bor District in 1962 when a number of people died but the Government did nothing to help them. Outside help was refused by the Government and the excuse given was that the matter was "internal", the usual phrase to keep out criticism by outside world. Some Northern grain called "feterita" was brought in by Northern merchants and sold at a very expensive price. The result was that all the little money, cattle, sheep and goats, went North and the native population remained more hungry than before. Yet Government made a false propaganda that if the Arabs left the South, all the Southerners would die of hunger. In the Northern Sudan, the Government and private organizations complete (sic) in providing social services. In the South, the activities of the Christian Missions which were in a position to provide social services of a great variety have been stopped by the "Missionary Societies Act". Because of the policy of "assimilation" through economic domination, the

Government does nothing to replace what it has taken away from the people.

Education: Education is perhaps the most important, particularly in underdeveloped countries, as without trained manpower, progress can be hampered in many ways. In the educational field, Southern Sudanese have benefited nothing since independence of the Sudan, 1st January 1956. Education is going backwards both in quantity and quality. The military junta which seized power in 1958 was so engaged with security matters that it had no time to pay attention to education in the South. Instead of building new schools, both Arab civil and military Governments busied themselves in closing private Mission schools and transferring some of them to new sites far away from Christian atmosphere. Some of the schools for which there were no Muslim teachers were closed down. Example of schools closed down are: Bussere and Mundri training colleges and Yambio Agricultural school. Maridi Institute was transferred North and building used as Army barracks, with the result that fewer boys were interested to go North where they could not fit into the atmosphere of the place. They could not practice teaching because they did not know Arabic. From Sudan Almanic, 1960, we quote below educational statistics which still resemble the position today (gross under-representation of schools in the South). Such is the proportion of education between the North and South Sudan. The South is 30% of the total population but in education it fluctuates only between one and ten percent and in some cases or level of education, nil as can be seen in the above table. In 1960, there were 1216 students in the University of Khartoum; out of these only 60 were Southerners. In the same year there were 1000 students in Khartoum Technical school and out of this, only 30 were Southerners.

Vernacular languages which were taught at lower schools were replaced by Arabic to be taught with the "Khoran" (sic), the Muslim Bible. Village schools where elementary subjects were taught have been closed down and replaced by "khalwas" (Islamic schools). The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs work hand in hand. Christian children who find themselves compelled to go to Khoranic schools in order to learn Arabic must be registered with Muslim

names and to learn “Khoran” or go without education as an alternative. There is no other way because Christian education was forbidden. Non-Muslim children who go straight to elementary schools do not get a good grounding in Arabic because that is provided by the “khalwas” education connected with the Muslim Bible. In the elementary schools, Arabic and Islam are taught but Christian children who refuse to learn or whose parents refuse to let them learn the Muslim Bible, must wait till they are 18 years old in order to obtain a license for baptism and only then can they learn about Christianity. The license has to be approved by a Government official. In the meantime the child will be handicapped in Arabic and if he is much behind his Muslim colleagues (sometimes done intentionally by the Muslim teachers) he is dismissed. Note: (When we say Muslim teachers, we mean Muslim Arabs from Northern Sudan, not our Southern Muslims.) The slightest mistake done by a Christian pupil who is not attending Islamic lessons is enough to dismiss him from school. Children in the South are made to study their lessons in Arabic at the early stages of education because the idea is to make Arabic the mother tongue. This we think is wrong according to educational psychology principles. The child should begin with his native language not with a foreign one. Most of the teachers that teach Arabic in the South are Muslim Arabs from the North and they engage too much in politics-unity of the Sudan, Islamic history, Arab-League- and such other irrelevant subjects that make the children confused and lose interest in the teaching. When children do not follow the lessons, the teacher becomes cruel and starts beating them. In November 1962, school children at all schools (both Christian and Muslims) went on a strike in protest against cruel treatment and discrimination. The children are constantly threatened with military violence when they demand rights of fair treatment; some of them who were ringleaders had their teeth pulled out by means of pliers. Other torture were inflicted on the Rumbek Secondary School students. The Schools in the South have generally become zones of terror instead of learning centres. With the exception of a few Southerners who have enough education to teach in higher schools, the rest of the teachers who have not had the chance of knowing how to read and write Arabic are considered illiterate and dismissed as redundant. Arabic language and Islam are increasingly becoming barriers to employment for many Southerners; this is in addition to racial discrimination.

The Sudan Government has embarked upon conversion by coercion the Southern Sudan where there are nearly half a million Christians of various denominations. The Government has established an Islamic Affairs Department. Ali Abdel Rahman, Minister for Interior made the following statements in 1958 before the close of Parliament and the takeover by the Army: “the Sudan is an integral part of the Arab world and as much must accept the leadership of the two Islamic religious leaders of the Sudan, (Sayed Ali El Mirghani and Sayid Abdel Rahman el Mahdi). Anybody dissenting from this view must quit the country.” (See Second Parliament of the Sudan, first session, sitting No 2. P. 3). Using the same reference, P. 8: Ali Abdel Rahman again said “it is my Government concern to support religious education and that is clearly shown by the progress scored by the religious affairs Department and the development of the ‘Mahads’ (Islamic religious schools) under its aegis”. The two religious leaders referred to always disclaim politics and the leadership meant is Islamic leadership which the Christians, pagans, and other non-Muslims are not bound to follow. The progress of religious affairs Department referred to, is in the Southern Sudan where the Government decided to close Christian schools in favour of Islamic schools. The Sudan Government is working towards an Islamic state.

Islamization of the Southern Sudan started by taking over all schools run by Christian Missionaries. The move which started in 1957 first with Elementary schools was termed “nationalization” by the Government, but it was not a genuine nationalization of schools because the North (assuming that the Sudan was being treated as one country) was not affected by this policy. All private schools in the North from elementary (Ahalia schools) to University level (Egyptian private University) remained functioning. A few mission schools as for example Comboni College to which some Muslims send their children remained unaffected by nationalization. The move therefore was political and was aimed against Christian expansion in the Southern Sudan. The few missions in the North were considered harmless because nearly everybody is Muslim and Christianity there can hardly expand beyond the few Christian families that still survive Islamic pressure.

Syllabuses and selection of teachers is done by the Ministry of Education in conjunction with the Islamic religious affairs department in order to indoctrinate the children in Islam, irrespective

Due to failure of rains, hunger strikes people of the South during certain years and people die of it. It occurred in Bor District in 1962 when a number of people died but the Government did nothing to help them. Outside help was refused by the Government and the excuse given was that the matter was "internal", the usual phrase to keep out criticism by outside world. Some Northern grain called "feterita" was brought in by Northern merchants and sold at a very expensive price. The result was that all the little money, cattle, sheep and goats, went North and the native population remained more hungry than before. Yet Government made a false propaganda that if it the Arabs left the South, all the Southerners would die of hunger. In the Northern Sudan, the Government and private organizations complete (sic) in providing social services. In the South, the activities of the Christian Missions which were in a position to provide social services of a great variety have been stopped by the "Missionary Societies Act". Because of the policy of "assimilation" through economic domination, the Government does nothing to replace what it has taken away from the people.

Education: Education is perhaps the most important, particularly in underdeveloped countries, as without trained manpower, progress can be hampered in many ways. In the educational field, Southern Sudanese have benefited nothing since independence of the Sudan, 1st January 1956. Education is going backwards both in quantity and quality. The military junta which seized power in 1958 was so engaged with security matters that it had no time to pay attention to education in the South. Instead of building new schools, both Arab civil and military Governments busied themselves in closing private Mission schools and transferring some of them to new sites far away from Christian atmosphere. Some of the schools for which there were no Muslim teachers were closed down. Example of schools closed down are: Bussere and Mundri training colleges and Yambio Agricultural school. Maridi Institute was transferred North and building used as Army barracks, with the result that fewer boys were interested to go North where they could not fit into the atmosphere of the place. They could not practice teaching because they did not know Arabic. From Sudan Almanic, 1960, we quote below educational statistics

The Sudan Government has embarked upon conversion by coercion the Southern Sudan where there are nearly half a million Christians of various denominations. The Government has established an Islamic Affairs Department. Ali Abdel Rahman, Minister for Interior made the following statements in 1958 before the close of Parliament and the takeover by the Army: "the Sudan is an integral part of the Arab world and as much must accept the leadership of the two Islamic religious leaders of the Sudan, (Sayed Ali El Mirghani and Sayid Abdel Rahman el Mahdi). Anybody dissenting from this view must quit the country." (See Second Parliament of the Sudan, first session, sitting No 2. P. 3). Using the same reference, P. 8: Ali Abdel Rahman again said "it is my Government concern to support religious education and that is clearly shown by the progress scored by the religious affairs Department and the development of the 'Mahads' (Islamic religious schools) under its aegis". The two religious leaders referred to always disclaim politics and the leadership meant is Islamic leadership which the Christians, pagans, and other non-Muslims are not bound to follow. The progress of religious affairs Department referred to, is in the Southern Sudan where the Government decided to close Christian schools in favour of Islamic schools. The Sudan Government is working towards an Islamic state.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Benaiah Yongo-Bure, *Economic Development of Southern Sudan*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007

Reviewed by Nanne op't Ende

According to Mr. Yongo-Bure *Economic Development of Southern Sudan* is the first book on the economic development, or lack of development, of South Sudan (p. xiii). I think he deserves much credit for his effort to acquaint us with the subject. In twelve chapters he takes us through an introduction to South Sudan's economy; its potential for development (2); policies and projects of the past (3); all sectors of the economy including foreign aid (4-9); the Jonglei Canal project (10); trade (11); and the way ahead (12). In its tone and approach 'Economic Development of Southern Sudan' is directed at a general public. Chapters typically begin with an introduction of basic economic principles and how they play out in a specific sector of South Sudan's economy. The author then discusses the sector in greater detail, and closes off with some concluding remarks or notes. After careful reading I believe 'Economic Development of Southern Sudan' is a very valuable book for anyone with an interest in South Sudan, professional or otherwise. The author believes economic development should benefit the population: "economic growth is a means to enhance people's capabilities." (p.4) The author advocates administrative decentralisation and local participation. He says "economic growth is knowledge driven. [...] Hence, investment in education [...] is crucial. (p.8) The historic overview is cut short by the return to civil war of 1983. In a way, the slate is wiped clean. (Interestingly, the overview is continued in the last chapter.)

Rainfall, soil and vegetation divide South Sudan in three zones: the central rainlands; the flood plains; and the Equatorial zone. (p.16) After describing the zones, the author sings the richness of the land and waters. "Fish abounds in the rivers and wetlands of the South. Fish is found in the Nile, sudd and swamps, shallow lakes, seasonal wetlands, surrounding rivers, lakes, and permanent swamps." (p.23) And even more beautiful: "Just 18 km south-west of Torit, within the Kinyetti Metasediment, there is an outcrop of

white coarsely crystalline marble; steeply dipping bands, up to 6 meters in thickness and a minimum strike length of over 150 meters."(p.25)

Perhaps the chapter entitled "The Addis Ababa Agreement Period" should be called 'rural development' – because that is its main focus, while all the following chapters also deal with the same period. In this chapter the author mentions two means of financing the South's development: to use the oil revenues and to simply print more money. At least, that is how I read his assertion that "the inflationary consequences of credit creation, matched with appropriate volume of output, are minimal". (p.49)

In the chapter on "Industrial Development" one learns about the problems of tariffs and tariff factories before going through a number of industrial projects that include a handicraft centre; a foundry; a cement factory; a fruit processing plant; a plastic and steel pipes project; a farm implements project; a bicycle and motor cycle assembly plant; and an agro-industrial project. The author announces that "South Sudan could become a north-south and east-west transport and communications hub in the Center of Africa." (p.72) He will return to this later, in chapters 6 and 12.

"Mineral and Energy Development" naturally details oil exploitation in South Sudan, and also looks at the potential for hydroelectric development. A bit of a dry story, despite its subject, except for the occasional poetry: "For hydrometry, the following were recommended: (a) restarting of Nimule water gauge observations and periodical performance of discharge measurements; (b) checking and frequent calibration of Mongalla hydrometric station; (c) performance of contemporaneous readings at Rejap, Juba, and Mongalla gauges and at a new gauge to be installed at the site of the envisaged Juba barrage [...]" (p.89)

Chapter six is devoted to transport and communications. "Infrastructure has hardly been developed in Southern Sudan," says the author; "Whatever rudimentary transportation system was developed has fallen into disrepair during the long periods of war."(p.94) I recommend the paragraphs on river transport; rail transport; and rural access roads. Discussing communications the author misses a chance to look at the impact of mobile telecommunications; I think mobile connectivity could prove to be an important part of economic development of Southern Sudan.

The chapter on human resource development stresses the importance of education and health care. Table 7.2 (p.112) perhaps says all there is to ar

goals: all children must receive primary education and “depending on its population, every county must at least have four to five secondary schools within the first five to six years of peace.” I would like to know how this can be financed, but most of all: where all the teachers should come from. Discussing health care, the author states that “practitioners of traditional medicine” (read: witch doctors and medicine men) “should [be] integrated into the primary health care system.” (p.129) Perhaps.

In his discussion of fiscal policies and domestic savings, the author concludes: “The main objectives of Government economic policies have been: promotion of economic growth, efficiency and stability, equity between households and regions, and capturing of rent from natural resource endowments.” (p.133) Have been? Should have been, maybe? Should be? “The general population will most likely look at [spending on defence and security] with high level of understanding, given the general feeling in South Sudan that the war is not over until the referendum on self-determination is held and the results accepted by both sides.” (p.134) Hmm.

Chapter nine addresses the issue of foreign aid. Here the author gets to the core of the problem of South Sudan: its limited absorptive capacity. “A country’s absorptive capacity is its ability to employ both domestic and foreign capital productively in the sense that the resources yield some minimum rate of return.” (p.150) South Sudan’s absorptive capacity is limited by lack of knowledge, lack of technology, lack of skills, lack of management experience and institutional limitations. The first four issues can be (partly) addressed by providing technical assistance, but institutions take a long time to change. Personally I would have been very interested to learn more about possible solutions for this challenge.

The chapter devoted to developing the flood plains “is not aimed at a detailed discussion of the Jonglei Canal. Rather its basic objective is to raise questions on alternative strategies for developing the area with or without the Jonglei Canal.” (Note 1, p.185) Apart from explaining why larger exports of primary products from underdeveloped countries lead to lower prices rather than to higher wages, the chapter on trade and development has little to offer that was not already men-

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Chapter twelve is entitled “The Way Ahead: Goals and Strategies. After picking up the trail of events in South Sudan that had an impact on development, the author sums up his findings in a long list of ‘things to do’ in which every other sentence con-

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
findings in a long list of ‘things to do’ in which every other sentence contains at least one of the words ‘can’, ‘must’, ‘will’, ‘would’, ‘should’, ‘could’, or ‘have to’. Perhaps this is a good place to mention in a comparative context the Joint Assessment Mission’s ‘Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication’. “The Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) was carried out jointly by the World Bank and the United Nations, with the full endorsement, guidance and participation of the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).” The framework lays out detailed goals and strategies for Sudan between 2005 (signing of the peace agreement) and 2011 (referendum in South Sudan), specified for North Sudan; the Three Areas (Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile); and South Sudan. It includes the necessary financial resources, from military expenses down to the price of school books in primary education. I did check if perhaps Mr. Yongo-Bure was involved in the JAM, but he is not mentioned in the list of main contributors.

Conclusion.--In a nutshell: South Sudan never had much economic development to begin with and decades of civil war destroyed whatever was there. South Sudan has potential and resources but lacks efficient administration, infrastructure, finance and qualified personnel – so those are the priorities of any development plan. Oil revenues should be used wisely to pay for it all. The value of the book lies not in the brilliance of its analysis, but in the way it makes the challenges tangible. It hurts to read about the way efforts and resources have been wasted, how projects were mismanaged, neglected and abandoned. This is what a lack of infrastructure means; this is what a lack of finance and a lack of qualified personnel mean for a country. Theoretically it is easy to see the enormity of the challenges in South Sudan, but ‘Economic Development of Southern Sudan’ makes this enormity visible, palpable. “The locomotives are very old, and the maintenance of the track is very poor.” (Rail Transport, p.100) Mr. Yongo-Bure may not be a very structured writer; he may have missed a chance to update his book, but he does know what he is talking about. He is genuinely concerned; and he wrote some beautiful lines. He convinced me. So read the book. These “lessons from the experience, programs, and projects of the Addis Ababa Accord period will help in the process of rehabilitation and development in the

in the post-second war period". Finally, I would like to draw attention to two internet resources where the author talks about the challenges of South Sudan and relates them to his personal experience. Wonderful short lectures of a knowledgeable and passionate man:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?>


<http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=705522359812481233>



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Souad T. Ali, *A Religion, Not a State: Ali `Abd al-Raziq's Islamic Justification of Political Secularism*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2009

Reviewed by Oscar H. Blayton



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The world has become a much more complex place since 9/11. The reciprocal dynamics of Muslim fears of encroachment by Western imperialism, and Western fears of a worldwide caliphate, have generated an escalating and desperate struggle of global magnitude. And one of the complexities embedded in this conflict is the debate within the Umma – or global community of Islam – regarding the relation between Islam and the state. Souad T. Ali's "*A Religion, Not a State*" is a timely and important work that affords the reader an opportunity to better understand this debate that is extremely relevant to the growing world crisis.

The debate that is the focus of Souad T. Ali's book arose within the Islamic community immediately after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE. The debate centers on the proper and desirable relation between the state and religion *within a Muslim context* and therefore the nature of its competing concepts and the underlying epistemologies and beliefs may not be easily understood by those of us who live our lives outside of the Umma. This is mainly because we are not attuned to the linguistic and philosophical nuances of that culture. Souad T. Ali, in her new book, attempts to bring some understanding of that debate to a broader audience in the West. This is because while it is usually difficult for non-Muslims to competently wade into this debate, it is a debate that needs to be recognized and understood by non-Muslims, as well as Muslims.

Western attitudes about Muslims and the Umma often have stood upon the three legs of hubris, ignorance and bigotry. There is no better example of this than the legal opinion rendered by Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in the 1951 case: *Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi*. There, the British Lord held that law governing commercial transactions could not "reasonable be said to exist" in such a "primitive region as Abu Dhabi." In this same vein, many Westerners today believe that no complex and sophisticated processes of governance and authoritative control have developed among the nations of the Umma. This fuels the belief that any state that adheres to Shari'a law and Koranic mores is locked into a medieval posture.

While the debate over the relationship between Islam and the state has persisted for more than 14 centuries, it

not assume that Souad T. Ali and Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq are merely re-stating the concept of “separation of church and state” as it is claimed to exist in the United States and other Western nations. Perceptions of metaphysical phenomena often are not portable from one culture to another. And just as the words “Caliphate” and “Imamate” are rationalized (and thereby distorted) versions of Arabic words created in order to bend the reality within the Muslim world to comport to the world view of Western thinking, so too have the perceived phenomena of the rule of law and jurisdiction within a Muslim context been distorted through a Eurocentric lens in order to adjust these concepts to perceived Western realities. This writer believes that both instances, something is lost in translation. Souad T. Ali presented the concept succinctly when she wrote: Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq declared “the caliphate, considered as an Islamic institution based upon polity supposedly founded by the prophet himself, to be a human innovation, not a religious imperative.”

Souad T. Ali sets in eight chapters out to familiarize the reader with Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s book, and the subject matter. The first chapter provides background and an overview to the subject matter. Next, the author provides a historical perspective on the classical juristic theories of the caliphate in Chapter 2. Because the modern debate was initiated in the 19th century, the third chapter examines the caliphate during the colonial era. In Chapter 4, the

author describes Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s intellectual formation and his place among the disciples of Muhammad ‘Abduh. The core issues of the debate are presented in the fifth chapter, entitled: “The Central Argument.” Chapter Six reviews the history of the ruling system in place at the time of the Prophet because arguments in favor of, and against the caliphate have cited that system as evidence of the legitimacy of their respective positions. And while the author agrees with the arguments of Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, in Chapter 7 she presents the arguments of those who oppose him. In the final chapter, Souad T. Ali examines the current implications of both Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s book as well as the debate over “Islam and Politics.”

Souad T. Ali makes it clear that the Prophet neither named a successor nor clearly delineated a specific form of government and the subsequent Khilāfa (al-khulafa al-rashidun – or “The Righteous Caliphs” as the succession called in English) lasted for only 30 years. After that, the Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, and finally the Ottoman Dynasties held power for approximately the next 13 centuries.

Decades before the end of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, Muslim discussions concerning the state were characterized by a conflict between two forces – commonly described as “tradition” and “modernity.” Muslim scholars who were influenced by Muhammad ‘Abduh’s teachings

has taken on a modern form within the last 100 years. This transformation is greatly due to the teachings of Muhammad ‘Abduh, a religious scholar and liberal reformer of the late 19th century. Muhammad ‘Abduh wanted to make Islam compatible with 19th-century rationalism and is said to have been labeled as an infidel by his opponents and as a sage by his followers.

Souad T. Ali’s book is not about Muhammad ‘Abduh or his teachings. Instead, it focuses on the work of Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, a follower of Muhammad ‘Abduh and a man who is said to have been a secularist Muslim intellectual. But Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s most significant work, “*Al-Islam wa Usūl al-Hukm: Bahth fi al-Khilafa wa-al-Hukmah fi al-Islam*” (*Islam and the Fundamentals of Rule: Research on the Caliphate and Government in Islam*), has not been published in English. By authoring *A Religion, Not a State*, Souad T. Ali seeks to bring Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s “chain of reasoning” to readers of the English language. By doing

this, she hopes to increase the awareness of the existence of the debate as well as its essence. The full title of Souad T. Ali’s book: “*A Religion, Not a State – Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s Islamic Justification of Political Secularism*,” gives the reader an indication of its contents, but it would take a much longer title to fully explain all that the author presents in this work.

Souad T. Ali’s book is laboriously repetitive when presenting facts relating to history, religious philosophy and politics within a Muslim context. And many of its ideas are stated in Arabic, because English cannot accurately express their true meaning. Both of these aspects make for a slow read. But repetition is necessary because many of the facts presented are unfamiliar to the Western reader and need repeating in order to take hold. The lack of familiarity with the facts presented and the language barrier that Souad T. Ali tackles illustrate the need for this book. These are some of the ideas and facts that are seldom presented to Western audiences, thus accounting for some of the ignorance in the West about Islam and the Umma.

Souad T. Ali states in her Introduction that she seeks to: 1.) Elucidate on the arguments in Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s book; 2.) Evaluate Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s conviction that the concept of a universal Islamic polity could be invalidated on Islamic grounds and 3.) Situate Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq’s arguments within the context of previous thinking about the caliphate.

It is clear from the principal title of the book: “*A Religion, Not a State*” that Souad T. Ali sides with Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq and holds that there should be a separation between Islam as a religion – and the state as a governmental entity. But the Western reader should

**SSA Sudan's Elections and the Referendum
Choices, Last Chances, A Time For Change?**

Sudan Studies Association
29th Annual Conference
May 28-30, 2010, hosted by
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana

The forthcoming 2010 national elections, the 2011 referendum on the south, and some violent attempts to impose "solutions" on various issues demonstrates the critical importance to Sudan's immediate future. Complex external economic, cultural, and diplomatic pressures, including interventions by foreign militaries, technologies and ideologies all offer challenges to indigenous decision-making. Questions have been raised about national legitimacy in the resolution of outstanding issues. Closely connected to Sudan's recent troubles have been legal and humanitarian concerns and the challenges of Sudanese refugees and politics. The unfolding events of the next five years will have long and significant consequences. At this key juncture in the Sudanese experience, the *Sudan Studies Association* invites participation in and contributions to its 2010 annual meeting on the main theme or on other Sudanist topics.

PROPOSALS:

The tradition of the SSA conference is to give priority in timing and prominence to papers that address the theme of the conference, but papers on all other issues relating to Sudan--past, present and future-- are also very welcome. Abstracts of proposed papers (please, limit to 150-200 words) should be sent by February 1, 2010 to Dr. Randall Fegley, 2010 SSA Panel Organizer, Coordinator of Global Studies, Pennsylvania State University, Berks Campus, Tulpehocken Road, Reading, PA, USA 19610, Tel. (610) 396-6092, e-mail raf8@psu.edu.

A preliminary program will be announced by April 15, 2010. Late proposals for papers will be considered only if space is available. Proposals and paper abstracts submitted earlier will receive preferential treatment in scheduling. Acceptance for presentation will depend on the quality of the abstract and the judgment of the program committee. Pre-registration is required in order to secure a place on the conference program. Stipends of \$200 are available for assistance to a limited number of graduate students and interested persons should contact SSA President Dr. Stephanie Beswick, Ball State University: sfbeswick@bsu.edu

NOTES: **Registration** and conference fees must be paid before presenters will be placed in the formal conference program. Information will be available at the SSA website www.sudanstudies.org. These should be sent as soon as possible to Dr. Ali B Ali-Dinar, Executive Director, African Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania, 646 Williams Hall, Philadelphia, PA. 19104, Phone (215) 898-6610 or (215) 573-7379 e-mail: aadinar@sas.upenn.edu. The Chairs of the Local Arrangements Committee are Drs. Ellen Gruenbaum and Jay O'Brien, Purdue University, Department of Anthropology, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907; e-mail egrubenbaum@purdue.edu. Tel: 765-496-7422. Especially we especially welcome ABDs from Europe and Africa and points outside of the United States!



SSA Election Results

The following have been elected to the Executive Board of the Sudan Studies Association: Souad T. Ali, Ellen Gruenbaum, Sam Laki, Jay O'Brien, Jemera Rone. Congratulations to these new three? year Board members, and many thanks for your willingness to serve.

Future SSA Meeting Sites

2011 conference, Ohio State University, Athens ?, Scopas Poggo, local arrangements
2012 conference, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, Souad Ali and Abdullahi Gallab, local arrangements



International Sudan Studies Conference site, The University of South Africa (Pretoria),
“the world’s largest university at 250,000 residential & distance learners.. Their motto:
Towards the African University in the Service of Humanity”

Dr. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban
SSA Bulletin Editor
Dept. of Anthropology
Rhode Island College
Providence, RI 02908, USA

