

# SUDAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION

BULLETIN

نشرة جمعية الدراسات  
السودانية



*Dust Storm (Habūb) over metro Khartoum area, May 2007*

## ***3rd Issue of Resumed Quarterly Publication***

*In this issue: Greetings from new SSA president; Passages; SAYAP, new Sudanese Diaspora Youth Group; Articles by Osman Mohamed Osman (Shari`a and the concept of an Islamic State by different Muslim Groups) and Gabriel Warburg (Sinnar during Four Centuries); reviews of Heroic Age in Sinnar (H.Sharkey), In the Shadow of Just Wars (S. Santos), Darfur, Long Road to Disaster (I. Abdalla); SSA 26th annual meeting and call for papers for 27th conference May 16-18, 2008, Tallahassee, FL. [*

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## our purpose

The Sudan Studies Association (SSA) is an independent professional society founded in the United States in 1981. Membership is open to scholars, teachers, students, and others with interest in the Sudan. The Association exists primarily to promote Sudanese studies and scholarship. It maintains a cooperative relationship with the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum. SSA works to foster closer ties among scholars in the Sudan, North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and other places. Normal activities of the SSA include the publication of this Newsletter, organizing meetings for the exchange of ideas, and recommending research candidates for affiliation with appropriate institutions of higher education in the Sudan. The Association also sponsors panels and programs during the meetings of other academic organizations. It occasionally publishes the proceedings of its annual meetings in book form.

## join us

**Membership:** Membership is for each academic calendar year which entitles the subscriber to receive all the issues of the SSA Newsletter, and to discounted registration rates for attending the annual meetings of the Association.

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## Greetings from our new President, Beniah Yongo-Bure

Greetings to all SSA members

The next few years will be decisive for Sudan's future as it resolves its protracted conflicts. Currently two peace agreements are being implemented: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA). It is my hope that the horrendous suffering in Darfur will be speedily brought to an end.

Being the oldest, largest, and continuously active academic body devoted to the scholarly study of various aspects of Sudanese society from diverse academic disciplines, the Sudan Studies Association (SSA) is a valuable source of knowledge for helping the people of Sudan overcome their present tragic situation. Critical analyses are essential for sound policy formulation. Many politicians may claim that they do not like theory as they are practical people, but all policy is based on someone's analysis. The analysis politicians do not like is that which does not serve their interests. Hence, to help the Sudanese people understand their problem from different perspectives, Sudanists and Sudanese academics should make it a priority to analyze, widely discuss, and publish their findings on the country. I hope the SSA Bulletin will publish many of these analyses so that they are available to Sudanese, their friends, and other well wishers.

While the signing of peace agreements are welcome events, there are fundamental issues to be addressed if the peace agreements are to be durable and overcome the underlying issues of protracted conflicts in the country. Do the agreements address the root causes of the Sudanese problem? What are these root causes of the problem – cultural, historical, economic, political, environmental, ethnic, etc.? Many Sudanese elites from the old and existing establishment talk of return to democracy, while most of the marginalized Sudanese do not recognize past civilian and military governments as democratic. What form of democracy should Sudan adopt in the post-wars period that is acceptable to Sudanese from all parts of the country? Should past leaders who had no nationwide appeal have prominent roles to play in post-wars Sudan? How should a national government and its leaders be chosen given the sectarian nature of existing Sudanese society? What exactly are the fundamental features of the New Sudan, now common in Sudanese political vocabulary?

How will the marginalized majority in rural Eastern Sudan avoid continued marginalization given the preponderant political domination of the rich in the large urban areas of Eastern Sudan? Does the implementation of the various peace agreements simultaneously lead to the transformation of the central power in Khartoum? What about

the conflicts over the construction of dams at Meroe and Kajbar? What are the expected national and local benefits of these projects? How much were locals involved in the planning of the projects before their implementation? In addition to the new dams, other controversial major projects in Sudan, with questionable impacts on the locals that might be academically assessed, include the mechanized schemes of Damazin, Gadarif, and Habila, and the Rosereris Dam, Khashm al Qirba, Jonglei Canal Schemes, as well as the vital oilfield areas.

The deliberate delays in the implementation of the CPA will benefit no one as any outbreak of new fighting will surely lead to the destruction of the oilfields, which are currently the only source of income for both Khartoum and Juba. It does not make unity attractive, and guarantees separation. The creating of a “Sudanese Kashmir”, out of Abyei, bodes very badly for the transhumant pastoralists at the borders, especially for those from arid areas.

My hope is that analyses of these and other aspects of Sudanese polity and societies may avail Sudanese policy makers opportunities to choose informed scenarios that can lead to viable policies for a diverse country. These choices are important regardless of which direction Sudan takes, whether as one or more than one country. All Sudanese have lost in the more than fifty years of wars since independence. Had all the resources spent, and being spent, on wars been channeled to development, the level of political, cultural, and socio-economic development of the country and most of its inhabitants would have been much higher, and security of everyone would be ensured. Any preparedness for war leads to further losses and insecurity for every Sudanese, including the seemingly rich and powerful. As one country, peaceful coexistence is essential for the welfare of everybody. This can not be attained without consensuses on a level of justice livable by all. Even if Sudan breaks up into a number of countries, we are going to be neighbors, sharing vital resources such as pasture and water; let alone unavoidable economic interactions such as trade. This could lead to eventual regional cooperation, integration, and union as every separate territory develops its economy and looks for markets. Neighbors can never avoid meeting each other; their fortunes and misfortunes involuntarily flow to each other.

I hope that Sudanists and Sudanese academics, through their analyses and discussions, will help Sudanese policy makers and activists in making wise choices for the good of the Sudanese people, even at this late hour. While individual researchers are free to focus their analyses on any aspect of Sudanese societies, the SSA in the next few years will gear its conference themes to addressing the issues of war and peace, and post-wars governance, reconciliation, restructuring, and development. It is our hope that SSA's sister organizations will join the SSA in discussing these issues during our annual conferences and future international conferences.

## PASSAGES



### FRANCIS DENG NAMED TO U.N. GENOCIDE PREVENTION POST

Long-time friend and supporter of the SSA Dr. Francis Deng has been appointed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as the new Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, succeeding Juan Mendez of Argentina. The position's mandate is to collect information on serious violations of human rights that could lead to genocide and to bring these conditions to the attention of the UN Security Council. A former Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the US, he served as UN representative on Internally Displaced Persons from 1992 to 2004. He most recently served as Director of the Sudan Peace Support Project at the U.S. Institute of Peace where he was also a senior fellow. Dr. Deng also holds academic posts at MIT and Johns Hopkins Universities. He founded and directed the Africa Project at the Brookings Institution where he also was a senior fellow. Francis Deng is one of Sudan's preeminent scholars as well as politicians and human rights activists having authored or edited over 30 books in diverse fields such as law, anthropology, conflict resolution, human rights, folklore, history and ethnography. Dinka ethnography and history and the Sudanese state have served as his primary examples. The SSA warmly congratulates Francis and welcomes collaboration with him in this new endeavor.

## CONGRATULATIONS TO ALI DINAR

The SSA officers and Executive Board members and all who have had the pleasure of working with our most recent president Ali Dinar extend our heartiest congratulations to him and his new bride Farha Suleiman. The couple were married in Fasher in August of 2007. We wish you many years of happiness and health, and we welcome Farha to the SSA extended family.

## OBITUARIES



The SSA belatedly notes the passing of P.M. Holt, noted British historian of the Sudanese Mahdiya, on 2 November 2006. Holt was Professor Emeritus and Honorary Fellow of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London. His classic work *A History of the Sudan* went into its 5<sup>th</sup> printing in 2001, and *The Mahdist State in the Sudan* is also an established work among those on the subject by colonial historians. Holt also published works on Egypt. Among the founders of the National Records Office in Khartoum, his mastery of the Arabic language was such that he was the Sudan Government's examiner in Arabic in the 1950s. He also supervised many graduate students at SOAS including Yusef Fadl Hasan, Hasan Ahmed Ibrahim, R.S. O'Fahey, Mark Majok Abiem (recently deceased), and contributor to this issue of the SSA Bulletin, Gabriel Warburg.

## News and Notes

### **Sudanese American Young Adult Project (SAYAP) announced at 26th Annual SSA conference, May 2007**



The SSA offers sincere sympathy to the family of Dr. Friedrich W. Hinkel. Dr. Hinkel started working in the Sudan in 1960, first in Musawwarat and then in Lower Nubia during the Nubian Campaign. He was responsible for the dismantling and transport of temples and other monuments from many sites to the Sudan National Museum in Khartoum.

Dr. Hinkel was involved in the restoration and preservation of Sudanese heritage all over the country, particularly in the Royal Necropolis of Meroe. He was the author of several books, of which the Archaeological Map of Sudan has become one of the most valuable references for all nubologists. Dr. Hinkel was a recipient of the Two Niles Medal, a high prestige honor conferred by the President of Sudan. Dr. Hinkel's passing will be a great loss to Sudanese archeology.

The officers, executive board, and members of the SSA warmly welcome the formation of the first Sudanese Youth Group in the Diaspora. These youth are first generation immigrants to the U.S. and other parts of the world, whose parents were displaced by political and economic conditions in the Sudan. They are keen to emphasize their dual identity as both Sudanese and American, in this case. They seek ways to re-connect with Sudan. The SSA extends its strong support to this new youth organization. We have promised moral and physical support, including a monthly column in this bulletin. We wish this new organization every success, and we will do everything in our power to assist the SAYAP. SAYAP can be contacted through Nahid Ibrahim, at [nibrahim@yahoo.com](mailto:nibrahim@yahoo.com).



*Founding members of SAYAP  
at 2007 SSA Conference*

## **SAYAP Mission Statement**

### **Vision:**

The Sudanese American Young Adult Project (S.A.Y.A.P.) is an organization aimed at bringing together the youth in the Sudanese Diaspora and engaging them to discuss and take action, by creating new ways of helping, regarding modern issues of concern in Sudan.

### **Background:**

Sudanese youth in the Diaspora have long struggled with the question of self-identity, an inability to completely claim a nationality, or a separation from where they regard as home. Approaching adulthood and the stage of choosing professional and/or academic careers makes this struggle only clearer. Therefore, Sudanese youth in the Diaspora who regard themselves as bicultural or recognize the effects of their separation, and who are concerned about the current state of Sudan, have an urgent need and responsibility to learn about the political, economic, and social structures of the country as well as a responsibility to partake in its development.

Drifting from their roots has become a problem of primary concern for Sudanese youth outside of Sudan and therefore this project is a call to action.

The name Sudanese American Young Adult Project reflects the current location of the project, which is the United States.

Our goals as SAYAP members will be as follows:

1) Recruit as many interested Sudanese youth in the Diaspora as possible into the Project. The Youth who may become mem-

bers will be defined as Sudanese individuals between the ages of 18 and 29 who have spent a period of time outside of Sudan and who currently living in the U.S. This recruiting effort will at first be limited to Sudanese youth in the DC Metropolitan area, New York City and Philadelphia but will eventually expand. Although members must have the above specifications, the Project will work with others outside of the specified ranges, although they will not be regarded as members (but rather friends), and therefore will not have voting/deciding rights.

2) Collect information about the Sudanese history, cultures, religions, languages, and all other types of intellectual work on Sudan with the help of scholars. We will be responsible for disseminating this information among ourselves and to any others who are interested.

3) Act as liaisons between existing organizations and interested individuals in the US working on Sudanese issue(s) and in Sudan by creating and working on projects dealing with Humanitarian/Educational Development as well as contributing alternative and unique ideas about different approaches of how to help the Sudanese cause.

We will accomplish this by researching what selected organizations in Sudan need to continue their work and growth and identifying parties here that will be able to provide this assistance, and then pursuing this assistance.

4) Work with Sudanese youth in the Diaspora (not limited to members) to continuously generate discourse regarding their situation.

This is a secular project by Sudanese Youth and essentially for Sudan and its Youth. We will run it, lead it, organize it, and steer it in whatever direction we think is necessary.

## Diverse Views of the Sharia



*Osman Mohamed Osman at the 26th SSA Conference*

### **The Islamic Shari'a (Laws) and the Conceptualisation of an Islamic State by Different Muslim Groups in Northern Sudan**

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#### **Brief Background of Islam in Sudan:**

In the centuries known in Europe as Middle Ages (from about A.D. 350 to about A.D. 1450) the northern region of the present Sudan was divided into three kingdoms: Nobatia, Makuria (these two kingdoms were united in the middle of the 7<sup>th</sup> century A.D. into one kingdom called "Nubia"), and Alodia. Between these kingdoms and the Red Sea lied the Beja country, which extended from Aswan to Massawa and which was composed of a number of principalities. The Introduction of Christianity in the second half of the sixth century marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Sudan. In the Nile Valley, Christianity was

adopted to such an extent that it became the state religion, and a symbol of Nubian 'nationality.'

With the fall of Egypt in the hands of the Muslims in 641 preparations began at once for the conquest of Nubia. By 652 a large Islamic force invaded the northern Nubian kingdom, Makuria. The Nubians won decisively and for six centuries thereafter they were able to impose their own terms upon relations with the Islamic world. The Islamic conquerors, then, turned their acquisitive attentions eastward towards the Beja. Early raids on borders were undertaken to impose tribute upon nearby chiefs and to open their county to Muslim traders. The initial concern of the traders was safe transit to the Red Sea, but they soon found the Beja to be a convenient source of slaves. Muslims who penetrated the Beja homeland soon rediscovered the mines of gold and precious stones of the Wadi al-Allaqi. The last half of the ninth century witnessed a mining boom that attracted many Arabs, and stimulated a new demand for slaves to serve as miners. In years to come, many immigrant Arabs would be absorbed – through the Beja matrilineal descent – into the northern Beja lineages with whom they made common interests. During the tenth century, a few of these bilingual communities of mixed descent were recognized as the first Beja Muslims.

After a time, the Red Sea area witnessed a general decline in resources, and therefore many Arabs drifted towards the southern Nubian kingdom of Alodia. The capital city of Soba had a quarter for Muslim traders as early as the tenth century; and by the twelfth century the kingdom began to break up. Al-Abwab Province (which existed in the area that is presently known as Kabushia - in Shendi area) sponsored a rising international trading entrepot near the Atbara confluence and conducted a foreign policy that supported the Muslim opponents of Christian Makuria. Then, the hostilities between the northern Nubian kingdom and the Muslims began to erupt. In 1276 a major Mamluk force conquered Makuria. Under the terms of settlement the Nubians were allowed to keep their

religion as protected persons under the Islamic Shari'a and were to be governed via a puppet king to be chosen by the conquerors. In 1324 the Kanz al-Dawla seized the throne from the old dynasty and the country disintegrated into warring factions. The Makurian heartland now became a rich slaving ground for Muslim traders.

Renewed centripetal social forces restored royal rule to the Nile in about 1500 and introduced the state form of government to the western highlands over the century and a half to follow. Legends about the Funj kingdom in the Nile valley and Darfur in the western highlands characterize the rise of the kings as a triumph for Islam. Thenceforth, the Sudanese kingdoms were lands of Islam that received recognition as such from their neighbours.

**Islamic culture penetrated northern Sudan** through traders and Muslim holy men. The holy men were missionaries who brought with them the Qur'an and the Islamic Shari'a along with the Arabic language. Some of these holy men set up schools that taught religion and Arabic. A few acquired political influence and were awarded by leaders with great wealth. Overwhelmingly, these men transmitted the version of Islam known as Sufism. The more charismatic of them bonded with their followers into societies called "*tariqas*" (orders).

A transition from what may be described as a "Sudanic belt" pattern of individualistic holy men to a Middle Eastern and North African one with organized Sufi *tariqas* was beginning to take place. The coming of the *tariqas* into northern Sudan could be divided into two stages. The first, which may be dated from about the 16<sup>th</sup> century, began with the recruitment of some holy men into the decentralized "ancient" *tariqas*, the Gadiriyya and the Shadhiliyya. The second stage took place in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries when the country came to be dominated by a number of centralized "reformist" *tariqas*, namely, the Sammaniyya, the Khatmiyya, the Idrisiyya and the Tijaniyya. As to the internal organization of the *tariqas*, it could be noted that the "ancient" *tariqas* were

autonomous branches, each with its independent Sheikh and its particular chain of spiritual authority, *silsila*. The meeting ground for these branches was the common respect they paid to the founder of the order. By contrast, each centralized "reformist" *tariqa* had a Sheikh at the head of its hierarchy who enjoyed absolute authority and who was assisted by a number of *kebulafa*, "deputies," and local representatives.

In 1881, a Sufi leader, Mohammad Ahmed, proclaimed his mission as the Imam al-Mahdi (divinely guided leader). He preached a message that the rulers were impious and oppressive and **materialistic**. He called upon people to fight against the Turks who, because of their impiety and oppression, were unbelievers. By the time of his death in 1885, the Mahdist forces controlled most of the northern Sudan and began to establish a centralized state based on principles of rule defined by al-Mahdi. When al-Mahdi died, his successor, Khalifa Abdullahi, faced the tasks of consolidating the gains of the revolution in Sudan by building a state on the conventional Islamic model. The followers of al-Mahdi, the Ansar, did not disappear when the Anglo-Egyptian army conquered the Mahdist state in 1898-99, although they changed in dogma and political action beyond recognition. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, they emerged as the largest organized group in Sudan.

In the three eras of parliamentary politics (1953-58, 1964-69 and 1986-89), the politics of the central state continued to be the politics of northern Muslim organizations and interest groups. One important new element was the emergence of a significant non-sectarian but still Islamic grouping: the Muslim Brotherhood (or the Islamic Movement), which began as a student organization in the 1940s and had some following among urban intellectuals and professionals. One more Muslim group was the Republican Brothers, which was founded by al-Ustazh Mahmoud Mohammad Taha in 1945. The Republican Brothers aim at constructing a new civilization that is based on Islam and the Qur'an. They show the necessity of an Islamic revival through religious education in the first

place, and then political action. A recent Muslim group in northern Sudan is the Ansar al-Sunna, who call for the revival of the traditions of the Prophet Mohammad. Their simple version of Islam is akin to that of the Wahabi, the influential and dominant religious doctrine in Saudi Arabia.

At the present time, Sudan presents a religiously divided/pluralistic society. It is estimated that more than 70% of the Sudan's present population are Sunni Muslims. About 11% are practitioners of indigenous tribal religions and about 19% are Christians. The Muslim population is concentrated in the north, while the Christians and the practitioners of indigenous religions live in the south or in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile areas in central Sudan. Importantly, the media's shorthand simplification of "Muslim-Arab north, Christian-African south" is inaccurate. There are thousands of Muslims in the south of Sudan, and millions of Christians and believers in indigenous religions in the north. At least two million southern Christians have settled in northern urban areas as internally displaced resulting from the civil war. Also, there are long established Coptic Christians who share urban space with Muslims in the North. Growing adherence to Christianity is reported among southerners, Nuba and other groups in Sudan. Such growth could have been at the expense of the indigenous religions. Statistics on religion, on one hand, show a continuous decline of the percentage of adherents of the indigenous religions (from the total population) from 20.8% in 1970s, to 16.7% in 1980s, to 11% in 1990s and at present. The percentage of adherents of Christianity, on another hand, has experienced a continuous rise from 7.2% in 1970s, to 8.3% in 1980s, to 19% in 1990s and at present. The adherence to Sunni Islam has been fluctuating within the range (70-75%) since 1970s.

The Muslim population is almost entirely Sunni, but is divided into many different groups. The greater number of them adheres to either "Sufi" or "non-Sufi" doctrines. The Sufi doctrines (i.e., the Khatmiyya, the Tijaniyya, the

Gadriyya, etc.), are more historically and socially rooted in the area than the non-Sufi ones. They are the older, have more proponents and retain deeper impacts on the communities. Importantly, the different Muslim groups, except the Sufis, consider the newly emerged Republican Brothers as the most genuine Sufi group in Northern Sudan. The non-Sufi doctrines are peculiar to the "Ansar al-Mahdi" who are relatively a new religious group in the area with presently decreasing adherents. They are peculiar also to lately existed, but now rapidly expanding, small groups, such as the Ansar al-Sunna and the Islamic Movement.

#### **Field data from Shendi Province, Northern Sudan:**

The present paper is supported by field data from the urban and rural communities of Shendi Province, which represent the southern part of the present River Nile State, on the eastern bank of the Nile. These communities experienced socio-cultural transformations in their recent history. In the religious aspect, they saw the successive domination of polytheistic paganism, Christianity and then Islam. As to the ethnic composition, they experienced the changes from the Nubians, who perhaps contain Negroid elements, to Arabized Nubians (Jaaliyyin) to a mixture of ethnic groups from all parts of the Sudan and various African and Asian countries. The most important change in the politico-administrative setup was that the traditional leaders are no longer the real rulers since the imposition of the Turko-Egyptian Rule, though they do participate in the present local government. Economically, cultivation has replaced trading as the major occupation. Nowadays these case study communities are multicultural, multiethnic and inclusive of numerous religious groups.

Shendi town in terms of its natural environment, economic activities, social services, kinship ties, and other aspects, is comprised of four sub-cultural regions in greater Shendi Province: Shendi town, villages north of Shendi town, villages south of Shendi town, and no-

mads' camps. The Muslim groups (the Republican Brothers, the Sufis, the Ansar al-Mahdi, the Ansar al-Sunna, and the Islamic Movement) are found here and there within these subcultures.

This paper reveals the ideas of an Islamic state that the various Muslim groups in Shendi Province have, and how each conceptualises an ideal Muslim society and an ideal government. These issues represent areas of religious beliefs and practices over which a controversy among the Muslim groups in Northern Sudan is presently debated regarding the implementation of the Islamic Shari'a in an Islamic state.

Treating each group separately, we start with the Republican Brothers, followed by the Sufis, the Ansar al-Mahdi, the Ansar al-Sunna, and then the Islamic Movement.

***(1) The Republican Brothers:***

The Republican Brothers, who appear entirely as an urban elitist group in Shendi Province, argue that Islam came with two messages: a first message corresponding to Judaism, and a second message corresponding to Christianity. They state that God sent Moses to a society with a more recent experience of the law of the jungle, hence the message of the Old Testament to that society was little more than the requirement to be just and fair (a life for a life, and an eye for an eye), as that was closer and more acceptable to their primitive human nature. In that way, the laws of the Torah (Old Testament) came more in the nature of excessive materialism. Then Jesus Christ came with a message that went to the other extreme. Hence the New Testament came more in the form of excessive spirituality.

Both messages of Islam, according to the Republican thought, are contained in the Qur'an. The First Message was based on the Islamic Shari'a, which had to come down to the primitive realities of the 7<sup>th</sup> century. It was founded on the principles of guardianship that of Muslims over non-Muslims, of a ruler over his subjects, and of men over women. It is to be found in those parts of the Qur'an revealed

in Medina, which abrogated, at that time, those parts previously revealed in Mecca. The Second Message was based on the personal example of the Prophet himself (i.e., the Sunna), in contrast to the Islamic Shari'a for the nation at large. It is based on the principle of freedom, and is to be found in the parts of the Qur'an revealed in Mecca, which were binding on the Prophet personally, although they were abrogated with respect to the nation as a whole. This Second Message is regarded as the original Islam.

To the Republican Brothers, the First Message of Islam was detailed in the Qur'an and the Hadith, while the Second Message was expressed only in general terms, with no details except insofar as given in the Sunna. The Republican Brothers argue that there is a series of prophecies from the Prophet Mohammad on the coming of the final Messiah, and they all demonstrate that he will come with the Second Message of Islam. For the Republican Brothers, there is a spirit of peace in the prophecies of the final Messiah in a way that ends all sorts of antagonism. To fill the earth with equity, to them, prepossesses the achievement of social justice, namely socialism, democracy and social equality between sexes, creeds, etc. In the phrase, "wealth will be in such abundance that no one will accept it," they find reference to the fruits of socialism, where through increased production and fair distribution, the wealth of the earth will be shared in a way which will accommodate everybody. The phrase, "abolish the Jiziya," means for them that all compulsion and discrimination on grounds of religious faith, as well as any other features of guardianship derived from the Medina Qur'an shall be abolished and replaced by the rules of tolerance, freedom and equality derived from the Mecca Qur'an.

Worth mentioning, the Republican Brothers think that the Jihad (fighting) in God's Cause, which is meant in the Hadith: "I have been ordered (by God) to fight against people until they recite the Shahadah-- 'If they do so, they shall preserve their blood and wealth, unless a further order from God will be re-

vealed” (Sahih Muslim: 001.029), is not a fundamental principle in Islam and will be of no importance in the future. What is fundamental in Islam is the struggle inside the personality that is termed “the Greater Jihad” in the Hadith: To the Republican Brothers, the final Messiah will abolish all struggles with the outside forces (i.e., the Lesser Jihad), and their subsequence – in the future. To them, the Jiziya is the offspring of the Lesser Jihad, for it is imposed on the non-Muslims when they are defeated in struggles.

The Second Message of Islam invites to political, economic and then social equities among people. The political equity is embodied in democracy, which the Republican Brothers define as majority rule by the people themselves. The “majority” is used here to mean “those who are intelligent and well instructed.” The Qur’anic verses, which speak in favour of tolerance, respecting the other’s opinion, and avoiding coercion as to religious affiliation, are classified as democratic. Here, democracy differs from the Islamic Shura (consultation). The Shura is taken as part of the Islamic Shari’a, and its supporting Qur’anic verses were revealed during a time when people used not to respect the other’s opinion. It is the absolute power of an individual over the mass or a “mature” guardian over the minors, as it makes the Prophet Mohammad a guardian over the Muslims, the Muslims guardians over the non-Muslims, and male guardians over women. As to the economic equity, the Second Message looks with favour on socialism, which in some aspects means getting rid of the oppression on the poor and securing their rights. The social equity is between man and man and between man and woman as to the advantages and the law.

The Republican Brothers expect democracy, which they prophesy to prevail, to help every individual to attain his absolute freedom. For them, the absolute individual freedom is the area where Islam becomes a way of life that leads every individual to his genuine individuality and originality. It means that every

individual could think as he wills, say what he thinks and do what he says, with the *proviso* that he should not infringe upon the freedom of others, lest freedom degenerates into anarchy. A constitutional law should deal with any infringements upon the freedom of others, as it should reconcile the individual’s need for absolute freedom with the society’s claim of total social justice. All people, whether Muslims or non-Muslims are, are supposed to be equal before such law, since citizenship is admitted to all of them.

To the Republican Brothers, socialism is offspring of the abundant machine-production. Because of the availability of all means of living, the human beings shall feel in no need of treasuring up under this mode of production. They assert as true that when socialism prevails people shall arrive at the conviction that all hours of the day should be given for the worship of God, and that everything in the cosmos, which they own or use (i.e., their wealth, resources of earth, etc.) is actually the ownership of God. In consequence, people shall see whatever they spend in charity as their provisions in the Hereafter. All means of living shall be available when people get well-instructed, their fear is alleviated, the machine becomes extremely productive, and their economic planning is based on producing no more than what is actually needed and hence on not making the human being get tired. For the Republican Brothers, this is the successful and true socialism.

To the Republican Brothers, democracy that is reconciled with capitalism (as it is the case in almost Western countries) suffers shortcomings. For example, if the well-known capitalist Ford enters elections as candidate for parliament in his country against some common people, he will surely sweep the elections because of the unequal financial facilities, which are necessary for activating propaganda and working staff. Accordingly, the Republican Brothers see democracy as unsuccessful in the West, for it lacks both socialism and equity among the people. They aspire to establish a

modern, progressive society where democracy and socialism are “happily married together” and where social equity prevails.

Furthermore, the Republican Brothers criticize the way of thinking that everything could be done through seizing the political power. For them, one should firstly apply the intended principles to himself, so as to produce himself as a good example that the other people would follow and hence get righteous.

### **(2) The Sufis:**

The Islamic state for the Sufis in Shendi Province rests in their belief in inseparable exoteric (Shari'a) and esoteric (Reality) aspects of the Islamic religion. They believe that the “esoteric” is always beforehand with everything or every action, and the “exoteric” just follows in response. In other words, the Sufis in Shendi Province speak about two simultaneously existing governments, exoteric and esoteric. The exoteric government is the government of people in any territorial state in the real world. The esoteric government, which is unseen, rules over all creation and consists of some Muslims who have managed to transmute themselves into subtleties and consequently come to occupy high spiritual ranks (i.e., the top Awliyya). Though the esoteric government is supposed to influence the structure and functioning of the exoteric one, both are believed to work according to God's Will, i.e., they are no more than ways and means that God uses in running the cosmos.

The Sufis in Shendi Province call this esoteric government “Daywan al-Awliyya” (administration of holy men), and further believe that the main Sufi orders (the Ruffa'iyya, the Gadriyya, the Ahmediyya Badawiyya and the Dusoghiyya Shadhaliyya), take the presidency (the “Qoasiyya”) of Daywan al-Awliyya by turns through time. Each of the four main Sufi orders presides the Daywan al-Awliyya at a limited period of time, which God destines to it as He wills, as well as the lengths of time they will preside.

To the urban, village and nomad Sufis in Shendi Province, non-Muslims may pre-

dominate throughout the world or some parts of it whenever their habits become better than the Muslims'. God makes choice of such people, because the greatest wisdom is to show mankind the right way, to honour and save them, and to eliminate bad habits and sustain the good ones among them. These Sufis think that these are some of the duties that the Wali who takes the Qoasiyya should carry out. It is added, God sometimes chooses non-Muslims to predominate as punishment against Muslims when they fail to handle their affairs successfully. The junior holy men, the religious ascetics (Dervishes or Majadhib), and other religious people help that Wali to carry out his responsibilities.

The esoteric government thus is to prop up the exoteric “Islamic” government and state. This is to say; the exoteric “Islamic” government and state are the creation of the divine force. They appear as responses to some actions that take place in the unseen aspect of life. Consequently, the exoteric and the esoteric bodies of government are assumed to agree with each other. What people see in their real life is actually what the Daywan al-Awliyya decides upon.

The Sufis in Shendi Province maintain that the Gadriyya were the first who took the Qoasiyya in Sudan, and that the period of time at which they presided the Daywan al-Awliyya was very long (more than 500 years). The Qoasiyya was being transmitted to many Gadri branch orders during that period. The burden of charges of the presidency of Daywan al-Awliyya was then transmitted to the Khatmiyya. The founder of the Khatmiyya, Sidi Mohammad Osman al-Khatim, took the Qoasiyya when he was in al-Ta'if in Saudi Arabia. After that he moved to Sudan. Since then, the Khatmiyya in Sudan have tried to hold the Qoasiyya fast to their order. Worth mentioning, there is a common belief among many Sufis in Northern Sudan that the Khatmiyya is inclusive of, and hence a substitute for all Sufi orders. This is mainly because its founder collected and adopted its teachings from the Sheikhs of some

Sufi orders, and with this collection of teachings is believed by its proponents to be the termination of the newly emerging orders, and its founder to be the terminal of the Sheikhs. Still other Sufis argue that in every specific period of time some people are reported by their contemporaries to be prominent Sufi scholars, and that there should be one of them to terminate their time. So, Sidi Mohammad Osman al-Khatim is to be the terminal only within a specific period of time. To these other Sufis, all the Sufi orders take teachings from each other, seek the blessing of each other, and support each other. Consequently, they reject the claim that the Khatmiyya is inclusive, substitute and terminal of the Sufi orders. They tell a story which shows that Sidi Mohammad Osman Al-Khatim handed the Qoasiyya over to the Khatmi Sheikh Sidi Al-Hassan al-Mirghani, who in turn delivered it to the Khatmi Sheikh Sidi Ali al-Mirghani. Sidi Ali al-Mirghani is considered to be the terminal of the Qoasiyya of the Khatmiyya, and was assumed to submit the Qoasiyya to the Sheikh of Burhaniyya Sufi order, Sidi Mohammad Osman Abduh al-Burhani; but he did not wish for doing so. Instead of submitting the office of presidency of Daywan al-Awliyya to Sidi al-Burhani, Sidi Ali al-Mirghani solicited the Prophet Mohammad for asking God to prolong his days and make him continue with the Qoasiyya. His solicitation was accepted, and he was given fifteen years more above his estimated age – in recognition and honour of his efforts. By the end of these fifteen years, Sidi Ali al-Mirghani solicited the Prophet once again for asking more time from God, and he was given other fifteen years as an extension of his age. Because the burden of the Qoasiyya charges was to be stripped of from him and then be handed over to the Sheikh of Burhaniyya, some conflict took place. For some Sufis, all states of chaos in the real world at present (including the Second World War) are the reactions of the conflict that resulted from stripping off the Qoasiyya from the Khatmiyya, for their Sheikh Sidi Ali al-Mirghani wished not to submit it to the Sheikh of Bur-

haniyya. During this time the Khatmiyya managed to found a broadly based political party, namely, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which is still active in the Sudanese politics.

As many Sufis in Shendi Province say, nowadays the Burhaniyya are taking the Qoasiyya. This means that the Qoasiyya has been confined to Sudan since the Gadiriyya firstly took it. At present the Burhaniyya have become active and started to lay the base bricks for the construction of a political party, which they call “the Nile Valley Congress.” This political party aims at achieving the unity between Sudan and Egypt and hence at establishing “the State of the Nile Valley” as first steps leading to a more comprehensive regional unity. Its ultimate goal is the unity of all Muslims in the world.

As to the specifications of the “exoteric” Muslim society and government, the Sufis in Shendi town, villages north and south of Shendi town and nomads’ camps think that all man-made systems of thought and organization (i.e., democracy, socialism, etc.) are inadequate. For them, it is the thought that is bestowed upon the human beings from the presence of God, which is comprehensive of all details in all fields of life and free of any deficiency. They stress, no one is more knowledgeable about God’s creation than God. They argue that Islam is inclusive and terminal of all “revealed” religions. It includes everything that is needed for the construction of ideal Muslim society and government. The Sufis assert that a Muslim government should implement the whole Islamic religion of which the Shari’a is one part. The people in such a society should follow the Islamic teachings, intensively and continuously perform the dhikr, follow the ways and the means that God gives to them, to increase their knowledge that could help in the foundation of their Islamic state. Here, they are of the opinion that for an Islamic thought to be perfect and sound, it should take hold of the whole Islamic religion, i.e., both its exoteric (Shari’a) and esoteric (Reality) aspects.

The urban and rural Sufis in the villages south of Shendi town think that the religious

and the man-made systems of thought and organization, which could be adopted in constructing an Islamic state, should keep pace with the fundamentals of Islam and avail people. These systems of thought and organization should fulfil the conditions of the Islamic Shura (consultation), which should not be known with injustice or oppression. The Shura is defined here as “giving every member of a given society, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, a chance to express and defend his opinion and giving his opinion, if it is sound, a chance to be enacted – regardless of his religious beliefs.” The Sufis in the villages north of Shendi town and nomadic areas also keep to the Islamic Shura, which they restrict to the scholars who are assumed to be pious. For them, these scholars could take into account the opinions of all other people on the issues under consultation as long as these issues represent their immediate problems and needs.

The urban, village and nomad Sufis in Shendi Province show themselves as adversaries to those who reject the Islamic Shari’a as base for the political organization. To them, the Islamic Shari’a is a system of rule, which God projected for all humans, and therefore it is inclusive of all things that could bring happiness about to them and free of any deficiency. One can find in the Islamic Shari’a the best planning for every smallest or largest element in all aspects of social life.

The Sufis in Shendi Province believe that the Jihad (struggling) in God’s Cause is a religious obligation as long as Muslims confront enemies, or are treated with injustice on the condition that they have proper military capabilities. However, they consider the struggle inside the personality that is termed “the Greater Jihad” in the Hadith: “We have returned from the Lesser Jihad to the Greater Jihad” (al-Baqdadi: 13/523) to be more important than fighting (i.e., the Lesser Jihad). To them, the struggle inside the personality should always be the starting point for the construction of an Islamic state. Through the peaceful application of the principles of Islam to one-

self, then to one’s own family, then to one’s local community, and so forth, the Islamic state could spontaneously be produced. This is to say; to bring an Islamic state into existence should be a peaceful bottom-up process of construction. They think that for a society to become ideally Muslim, people should concentrate on socializing themselves to religiosity.

The urban Sufis add that the government is to be all in all (i.e., the body that prohibits and orders) in the Muslim society. The people are to obey the government. Here, it is stressed that the laws, which would control people in the Muslim society, may include Islamic Shari’a and customary laws. But, these Sufis argue that such laws may not restrain the individuals as the morals and the conscience do. So, they consider both morals and conscience as props to Islamic Shari’a and customary laws in an Islamic state.

As such, all Sufis in Shendi Province think that an Islamic state is founded upon three main pillars: the socialization of people, the enactment of Islamic Shura and the implementation of the Islamic Shari’a. They always start with socialization to the Islamic teachings, for it could prepare the people for easily accepting the Islamic Shari’a, correctly dealing with the Shura, etc. The Shura is enacted so that no person or group could tyrannise over the other people in a particular community or society, and so that the opinions of all people could be utilized. Though socialization of people, enactment of Shura and implementation of Islamic Shari’a precede each other at the beginning, they become simultaneous, continuous processes later in an Islamic state.

### ***(3) The Ansar al-Mahdi:***

The Ansar al-Mahdi in the villages north of Shendi town speak about some conditions without which an Islamic state could not be constructed. They assume the socialization of young generations to the Islamic values and norms as the starting point. Such socialization should mainly be run through “amicably ordering (to do good deeds) and interdicting atroci-

ties (to persons).” These Ansar al-Mahdi villagers are of the opinion that the implementation of Islamic Shari’a may be less effective in keeping up control and solving social problems in a given society than the enactment of values and norms. Another condition, which they assume for constructing an Islamic state, is that it is to be a state of Islamic Shura. As they depict, councils of Shura are to be founded starting from the grassroots level (i.e., urban blocks, villages and nomads’ camps) and graduating to the state presidency level. Only people who are well acquainted with the Islamic thought, and who are highly pious, could attend these councils of Shura, mainly because they are the people who could investigate and find solutions for problems and needs and could advise, direct and mobilize the others. Here, these Ansar al-Mahdi villagers point out that the Islamic Shura differs from democracy in that once people reach a decision or an agreement, opposition is no longer accepted. In democracy, on the other hand, opposition is basic and permanent.

The Ansar al-Mahdi in the villages south of Shendi town differ. They think that an Islamic state should be a true copy of the one that the Imam al-Mahdi founded in Sudan in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. They insist on the implementation of the Islamic Shari’a without omission of a single element. They reject any adoption of the local values and norms beside the Islamic Shari’a. Also, they think that the Islamic Shura is primary as compared to democracy of the West, since God projected it for the human beings. Whatever level democracy reaches, it could not be equal to the Islamic Shura. They point at some characteristic features of the Islamic Shura. The first feature, which they identify as a difference from democracy, is that there will be no opposition after a decision is taken. A second feature is that a person who is appointed as ruler is to be both pious and well acquainted with the Islamic teachings. A proverbial saying, which shows how the rulers are selected, is cited: “The Sultan (supreme ruler) by the ministers, and the ministers by the common people.”

The Ansar al-Mahdi nomads mention about six specifications of the Muslim society and assume that the Muslim government is to bring them into existence: 1) the Muslim government is supposed to care for socializing the subjects to the Islamic teachings; 2) it is to meet the basic needs of people and be acquainted with their living conditions; 3) it is to secure both justice and equity among all people; 4) good relations and fraternity among the Muslims are very important for the Muslim government; 5) the Islamic state must act according to the Islamic Shari’a; they argue that nothing in this world could rise above the “religious;” 6) the government should enact the Islamic Shura, which they define as “what gains the general consent of people and, therefore, becomes an obligation for them all – provided that it should not deviate from the Islamic Shari’a.” Consequently, these nomads state that no one could oppose such consent, i.e., there is no opposition in the Islamic Shura. Importantly, they regard democracy as alien to Islam, since it was not even mentioned in name in the Qur’an or the Hadith.

The Ansar al-Mahdi in the villages north and south of Shendi town and the nomads’ camps say that the possibility of threat of military invasion or a group that intends to tyrannize the others means preparing all Muslim people within a territory for the Jihad (fighting) in God’s Cause. Here, the Ansar al-Mahdi villagers stress they shall accept fighting a Jihad if it is meant for religious purposes and not for political or other worldly pursuits. The Ansar al-Mahdi nomads think of all types of Jihad to be the same one thing, i.e., the struggle inside the personality. To them, fighting against other people is also a struggle inside the personality, for it is meant for something supernatural, i.e., in God’s Cause. However, they maintain that the person or group against whom they should fight is to meet two conditions: be non-Muslim and/or foreigner. They do not consider the fighting against a Muslim or a citizen as Jihad, unless this person intends some destruction inside the country.

**(4) *The Ansar al-Sunna:***

The Ansar al-Sunna in Shendi town and villages north and south of Shendi town say that their wish for an ideal Muslim society recalls the true Salaf of Islam (i.e., the Prophet's Companions, their successors, and the successors of their successors). They state that the Prophet Muhammad was delegated to a society, which embraced numerous groups with differing beliefs and practices mostly linked to idolatry or atheism. He came to reveal a religion that could bring these groups together. First, he invited them to the unity of God (al-tawhid). The archetype Muslim society, for the Ansar al-Sunna, is one in doctrine and person followed, just as that which the true Salaf of Islam had. They argue that now is a time of disunity and weak Muslim Caliphate, mainly because the Muslims have fallen in the "shirk" (joining others in worship with God).

The Ansar al-Sunna in Shendi Province argue that a Muslim government is to take upon itself the establishment of religious teachings, justice and security in the society, and the treatment of people's affairs in accordance with the Qur'an and the Sunna. The Ansar al-Sunna in Shendi town and villages north of Shendi town suppose that a Muslim government should implement the Islamic Shari'a in all fields of life in a given society (e.g., the houses, the markets, the streets, etc.). In order to establish the religious teachings in the society, a Muslim government is to keep the places of worship open and to admit liberality and freedom of preaching to all Muslim people, to dominate and control the markets and the prices, etc. They also think that one of the main duties of a Muslim government is to implement the Islamic Shari'a, but they restrict this implementation to what they call "the general Shari'a" that deals only with facts outside the domestic sphere. They assert that a Muslim government is not concerned with what they call "the private Shari'a," which deals with facts within the domestic domain.

Concerning the ways and means that would be used in controlling people's behav-

our, all urban and village Ansar al-Sunna in Shendi Province present three possibilities, all of which concern the government. A Muslim government could resort firstly to the Islamic Shari'a principle of "amicably ordering (to do good things) and interdicting atrocities (to persons)." Here, they say that the government is to recruit special police from amongst the pious people to establish this principle. Secondly, a Muslim government could activate the "ijtihad" (deriving qualified judgments) as to the issues about which there is no single Qur'anic or Hadith text, or which the religious scholars did not deal with before, with the proviso that the new judgments do not contradict the Qur'an and the Sunna. Thirdly, a Muslim government could deliver sermons, lectures and doctrinal lessons to people via the mass media.

The Ansar al-Sunna in Shendi Province consider the rejection of Islam as base of the political and other practices in a state as an attempt to destroy the Islamic religion. However, the Islamic laws are not the central pillars of an Islamic state. The construction of an Islamic state begins with the socialization to "al-tawhid" and good habits, and the clearance of corrupt beliefs and practices and bad habits – as did the true Salaf of Islam. They argue that people now are ignorant of the Islamic religion and its teachings. Therefore, the Muslim government must first of all concentrate on the Islamic religious education of people. People should at first understand and become familiar with the Islamic religious teachings before they reach the stage of the implementation of the Islamic Shari'a. Importantly, these Ansar al-Sunna are of the opinion that militarizing Muslims is encouraged in Islam, since it is meant for making Muslims ready for resisting possible invasions. They also take the Jihad (struggling) in God's Cause to be of the best good deeds according to what has been cited in the Islamic texts. But, they define a fighting as Jihad whenever they could classify one of the conflicting groups as Muslims and the other as non-Muslim forces that expose Islam and Muslims to danger. They maintain that the Jihad has

nothing to do with the geographical or political borders. In effect, some of them travel for long distances to fight besides Muslim groups.

Also, the Ansar al-Sunna in Shendi Province declare that Islamic expressions of democracy (e.g., the numerous political parties and confederates, the elections, etc), are invalid because God wants the Muslims to be one single nation under one single leader. They identify the political plurality as a call to “ignorance” and as being subject of much displeasure in the Qur’an, so far as it adds to Islam nothing other than weakness. Because of this belief, these Ansar al-Sunna feel in no need of such man-made systems of thought and organization. They put it the other way round as that Islam was communicated to the human beings by God who created them and who is the most knowledgeable about their own affairs – including their rule; while capitalism, democracy, etc., are just human references that should not be looked at with favour. They argue that secularism is a broad body of thought that develops as the human societies develop; and, as such, it takes many different forms. They identify capitalism, democracy, and other systems of thought and organization as some of these secularist forms. Because they see secularism as an attempt to destroy religion (and Islam in particular), these Ansar al-Sunna villagers maintain that capitalism and democracy are destructive.

For the Ansar al-Sunna in Shendi Province the Islamic shura is one of the main principles in Islam that could be utilized in running the political organization in an Islamic state. To them, the Shura means adopting or acting according to the opinion upon which a group of people agreed. They state that the persons who could be consulted in the different matters are those who are supposed to have good knowledge about them, i.e., the religious scholars, the economists, the political scientists, the literary men, or others according to the type and the nature of the matter under consultation. These specialists, however, could consult the common people in matters that concern their own prob-

lems and needs.

Extracting from the above, one could say that the Ansar al-Sunna in Shendi town and villages north and south of Shendi town conceive the construction of Islamic state as a process that is set up upon some bases, including the socialization to “al-tawhid” and good habits, the clearance of corrupt beliefs and practices and bad habits, the implementation of the Islamic Shari’a, and the enactment of the Islamic Shura.

### **(5) *The Islamic Movement:***

To the members of Islamic Movement in Shendi town and villages north and south of Shendi town, a Muslim government is to be responsible for every individual in the society in all fields of life. They accept as speaking truth that nothing in Islam is a private act of conduct; that is, the individual’s morals and other private aspects are also some charges for which the Muslim government is responsible. A Muslim government should meet all the needs of individuals and groups in the given society, and should put these individuals and groups away from error. Consequently, if a man, for example, receives monthly salary that is lesser than what he actually needs, and as a result he is compelled to steal from the public treasury in order to feed his children for whom the government is responsible, he should be exempted from punishment. An example from the Islamic history, which serves as evidence of this opinion, demonstrates that the Caliph Omar bin al-Khattab abrogated the doctrinal punishments for theft during what was called “Aam Ar-Ramadah” (literally, the Year of Ash) when famine was widely spread. As such, these urban and village members of Islamic Movement let be known that a Muslim government must take much care of people, particularly the needy. Importantly, these members of Islamic Movement are of the opinion that any Islamic rule should proceed gradually in the implementation of the Islamic Shari’a. They stress the significance of the graduation in doing so. They say that not to perfectly prepare for such imple-

mentation perhaps would be a cause of refuting the Islamic Shari'a. To them, the implementation of the Islamic Shari'a and the socialization to the Islamic teachings must be carried out simultaneously. They reject any complete implementation of the Islamic Shari'a before people get well acquainted with them and get satisfied as to all their basic needs.

The urban and village members of Islamic Movement in Shendi Province argue that law is not the only agency of social control for a Muslim government. The morals, the individual's conscience, etc., are important. This is because they suppose that the perfect socialization of people to the Islamic teachings is the principal foundation of any Islamic state and not the implementation of Islamic laws. To them, because anyone could escape the laws, their implementation would never be the central means of reforming people. The socialization that is needed should concentrate on breathing into the morals, the individual's conscience, the religious drift, the patriotic feelings, and so on.

As the members of Islamic Movement in Shendi Province point out, religious freedom is to be guaranteed for both Muslims and non-Muslims in any Islamic state. To them, there must not be any question of inhibiting people's freedom to express any understanding of Islam. They believe that the Islamic Shari'a allows any interpretation of the Islamic texts. For them, the Party of God (hizbollah) is one, but it could be divided into various types that are characterized by specialization, tolerance and kind dealings with one another. As such, these members of Islamic Movement call all Muslim groups to accept the principle of liberality and to sit down around a table to discuss and develop their views with the ultimate aim of proving which is right and which is wrong. Members of Islamic Movement are committed to the concept of Islamic Shura, which they confine solely within the circle of the scholarly specialists who are elected to fill in Shura councils. They let be known that the Islamic Shura differs from democracy. They depict democracy as that some

people enter a parliament. The majority of these people sit on the right-hand side; the minority sit on the left-hand side. This shows the formation of government (the Right) and opposition (the Left). Then, the opposition starts to constantly oppose the government's proposals. This means that the opposition is legitimate in democracy. What the largest number of these scholarly specialists recommends is an obligation upon all people in an Islamic state even if some of them do not believe in it.

The urban and village members of Islamic Movement in Shendi Province speak about the necessity of militarising all Muslim people in an Islamic state. They think of such militarisation as one of the tools that could be used to create within the Muslim people a spirit that would encourage them to fight against the enemies. It is also a process of technically preparing them for the same purpose. Because they believe that the religious drift is stronger within almost all Muslims than the patriotic or other feelings, these members of Islamic Movement commit themselves to the concept of Jihad (fighting) in God's Cause.

In brief, the members of Islamic Movement in Shendi Province formulate an image of Islamic state, which they set up on specific bases. The first of these is the socialization to Islamic teachings. Then the commitment to the principle of Islamic Shura (of the scholarly specialists) comes. The third base is the implementation of the Islamic Shari'a altogether.

### **Recent Government-initiated Politics of Re-Islamization in Sudan:**

Sudan is pioneering with regard to government-initiated politics of re-Islamisation. Since the installation of a new "Islamic order" under President Jaafar Nimeiri in 1983, every government has had to deal with public discussions about the Islamic Shari'a. The present National Salvation Government, the outcome of the 1989 coup led by Omar al-Bashir, has opted for Islam as its system of government, following the Islamic model that Nimeiri introduced in 1983. Within this government, "there is strong

support for the rule by means of the Islamic laws.” However, it removed southern Sudan from the Islamic Shari’a, as Islam is a minority faith in several of the southern states. Sudan’s Constitutional Decree No. 7 in 1993, while affirming that “Islam is the guiding religion for the majority of the Sudanese people,” states that “revealed religions like Christianity, or traditional religions, may be freely adopted with no coercion in regards to beliefs and no restriction on religious observances.” Although the laws recognize Sudan as a multi-religious country, in practice, the government treats Islam as the state religion.

Hassan Abdallah Al-Turabi, the Islamic Movement’s secretary general in Sudan since 1964, began working with Nimeiri in the mid-1970s, and, as his attorney general in 1983, played a role in introducing the Islamic Laws. After the overthrow of Nimeiri, Al-Turabi was instrumental in setting up the National Islamic Front (NIF), a Brotherhood-dominated organization that included other small Islamic parties. Following the 1989 coup, the National Salvation Government arrested Al-Turabi and held him in solitary confinement for several months. This action failed to dispel a pervasive belief in Sudan that the NIF actively collaborated with the National Salvation Government. NIF influence within the government was evident in its policies and in the presence of several NIF members in the cabinet.

In 1993 Al-Bashir was named president of a new civilian government, which held general presidential and legislative elections in 1996. Al-Bashir and his supporters swept these elections. Al-Turabi was elected to the National Assembly and made speaker. In 1999 Al-Turabi attempted to pass constitutional amendments designed to reduce Al-Bashir’s presidential powers by calling for the creation of the office of a prime minister, accountable to the National Assembly, and the removal of presidential control over the election of state governors. In response, Al-Bashir dismissed Al-Turabi and declared a state of emergency, dissolving the National Assembly and suspending parts of the

new constitution of 1998, which allowed multi-party politics and guaranteed freedom of thought and religion. In 2000 presidential and legislative elections, Al-Bashir was re-elected and his party, the National Congress, won 355 of the 360 seats in the National Assembly.

Historically, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which was based mainly on the Khatmiyya, has been plagued by factionalism, stemming from the differing perspectives of secular-minded professionals in the party and the traditional religious values of the Khatmiyya supporters. The DUP leader and Khatmiyya spiritual guide since 1968, Sidi Mohammad Osman Al-Mirghani, tried to keep these tensions in check by avoiding firm stances on controversial political issues. In particular, he refrained from public criticism of Nimeiri’s Islamic Laws, so not to alienate the Khatmiyya followers who approved of implementing the Islamic Shari’a. In the 1986 parliamentary elections, the DUP won the second largest number of seats and agreed to participate in Sadiq al-Mahdi’s coalition government. Like Sadiq al-Mahdi, Al-Mirghani felt uneasy about abrogating the Islamic Shari’a, as demanded by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and supported the idea that Nimeiri’s Islamic Laws could be revised to expunge the “un-Islamic” content. By late 1988, other DUP leaders persuaded Al-Mirghani that the Islamic laws issue was an obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the civil war in Southern Sudan. Al-Mirghani became convinced that the war posed a more serious danger to Sudan than did any compromise over the Islamic Shari’a. It was this attitude that prompted him to meet with the SPLM leader, John Garang, in Ethiopia where he negotiated a ceasefire agreement based on a commitment to abolish Nimeiri’s Islamic Laws. During the next six months leading up to the 1989 coup, Al-Mirghani worked to build support for the agreement, and in the process emerged as the most important religious figure to advocate concessions on the implementation of the Islamic Shari’a. Following the coup, Al-Mirghani fled into exile and he has remained in Egypt. Since 1989, the National Salvation Government has

attempted to exploit DUP factionalism by co-opting party officials who contested Al-Mirghani's leadership, but these efforts failed to weaken the DUP as an opposition group. Presently Al-Mirghani is the leader of the Sudan Democratic Alliance, which is in armed conflict with the government.

Founded in 1945, the Umma Party is the political organization of the Ansar al-Mahdi. Since Independence in 1956, the Umma Party has experienced alternating periods of political prominence and persecution. Following a brief reconciliation with Nimeiri government in the mid-1970s, Sadiq al-Mahdi, who has been the head of the Umma Party and the spiritual leader of the Ansar al-Mahdi since 1970, was imprisoned for his opposition to the government's policies, including his 1983 denunciation of Nimeiri's Islamic Laws as being un-Islamic. He did not object to the Islamic Shari'a being the laws of the land, but rather to the "un-Islamic" manner in which the Shari'a was implemented. When he became prime minister in 1986, he was loath to become the leader who abolished the Islamic Shari'a in Sudan. Failing to appreciate the reasons for non-Muslim antipathy toward the Islamic Shari'a, Sadiq al-Mahdi cooperated with the NIF leader Al-Turabi to draft Islamic legal codes for the country. By the time Sadiq al-Mahdi realized that ending the civil war in the South and retaining the Islamic Shari'a are incompatible political goals, public confidence in his government had dissipated, setting the stage for military intervention. Following the 1989 coup, Sadiq al-Mahdi was arrested and kept in solitary confinement for several months. He was not released from prison until early 1991.

The Ansar al-Sunna interpret some Islamic texts, which do not oppose Muslim governments even if they are unjust or oppressing the people. They declare that they, in effect, support the National Salvation Government, which they consider as Muslim, and participate in its organizations and activities. Even, they point to some ministers and state/province governors to be Ansar al-Sunna. For them, peo-

ple should revolt against a government only if it reveals some kind of infidelity. Still the Ansar al-Sunna frequently criticised the present government for collaborating with certain groups, like the Islamic Movement for the delay in implementing the Islamic Shari'a altogether. In consequence, several of the group's leaders and members were arrested and detained from time to time, and some of their centres closed.

The Republican Brothers think that the "Islamic Laws" of 1983 have continued under the National Salvation Government. These laws are a disfigurement of the Islamic Shari'a as they contain many shortcomings. They think that the Islamic model of state that the government adopts is devoid of justice, for there power and wealth are seized for the few.

### **Conclusion: Building Upon Findings:**

It could be concluded that Islam and state structures have been closely related in Sudan since the time of the Mahdiyyah of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Through their conceptualisations of an Islamic state, the Muslim political groups have been crucial to the definition of the Sudanese political system. At present, these groups share the same objective, which is the creation of an Islamic state, but they have different views on the strategies and the socio-economic and political structures of this type of state. These efforts for an Islamic state in Sudan and the different views on its strategies and structures have become clearer in the government-initiated politics since independence from the British rule in 1956. We find a similar conclusion in Ernest Gellner's model "Islam as the Blueprint of a Social Order." According to this model, Islam is a distinctive historical totality, which organizes various aspects of social life. This model maintains that a set of rules exists (in Islam), eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society. For Gellner, two conditions favour the great social pervasiveness of Islam: its rapid and early political success, which inhibits the handing over of some sphere of life to non-religious authority; and

the idea that the divine message is complete and final, which makes it harder to offer rival versions of the blueprint. This gives the sense that Islam could be an instrumental ideology, i.e., it could be a conscious means of achieving political, economic and social goals.

The different views of the Muslim groups in northern Sudan present them as either *radical* or *moderate* regarding the societal realities. To the radical groups, like the Islamic Movement and the Ansar al-Mahdi, the Islamic state should be created from the top downwards and if necessary through violent action. They do not want to wait until society gradually becomes Islamised. The moderate groups like the Ansar al-Sunna, the Sufis and the Republican Brothers condemn the violence and highly value “the Islamisation of society via socialization” as means to the creation of an Islamic state. In other words, the moderate groups think of the creation of Islamic state as a peaceful bottom-upwards process.

Other two fundamental positions reveal themselves in the arguments. First is the *esoteric position*, which is the contemplative mystical perspective that is based on the spiritual transformation of the self and the understanding of the nature of reality. The Sufis, the Republican Brothers and the Ansar al-Mahdi show the characteristics of this position. To them, if a human develops spiritually and reaches a certain rank, some knowledge will be bestowed upon him from the presence of God, so as to be able to interpret the Qur’an or do other things. Second is the *exoteric position*, which is the perspective that is based on the everyday understanding of things. It assumes that the everyday human mind alone can understand the nature of reality. It takes the reason as means of knowledge. The Ansar al-Sunna, who deny the existence of the “esoteric knowledge,” typically represent this position. The emergence of the radical and moderate views regarding the societal realities has nothing to do with the emergence of these *esoteric* and *exoteric* positions. For example, both the Sufis (esotericists) and the Ansar al-Sunna (exotericists) are moderate

groups, as they all think of the creation of an Islamic state as a peaceful bottom-upwards process.

Besides, the Muslim groups under study show different views that present them as either *reformist* or *conservative* regarding the interpretation or the understanding of Islamic texts and principles. The groups that have reformist tendencies (like the Islamic Movement and the Ansar al-Mahdi) consider the Islamic Shari’a as a system of universal reference, which must be interpreted and adapted to the realities of today through the opening of the fates of “ijtihad” (deriving qualified judgments). The Ansar al-Mahdi point out at the necessity of considering the recent scientific and technological developments in the world in the interpretations of the Islamic texts. The groups that are conservative (like the Ansar al-Sunna) advocate a return to the roots of Islam and the early, original model of Muslim society, which existed during the times of the true Salaf of Islam, and reject all new interpretations of the Islamic Shari’a.

As also observed, the newer the Muslim group the lesser are the differences in its conceptualisation of an Islamic state. Whereas the urban, village and nomad Sufis and Ansar al-Mahdi (i.e., the older groups) differ in such conceptualisations, the Ansar al-Sunna and the members of Islamic Movement (i.e., the more recent groups) in Shendi town and villages north and south of Shendi town have similar ideas. These differences could have been an outcome of the prolonged influence of the different main cultural features of the communities in Northern Sudan on Islam, or to be a conservative group could mean guarding against the attempts to differently interpret the Islamic texts.

Muslim diversity that Abdul Hamid al-Zein, Michael Gilsenan, Dale Eickelman and others speak about in their models is applicable to our field data from Shendi Province. El-Zein’s contention is that there are diverse forms of Islam, each equally real, each worth describing. He suggests replacing the term *Islam*

by *islams*, better to emphasize the multiplicity of Islamic expression and to show that the “*islams*” of elite and non-elite, literate and illiterate, theologians and artisans, tribesmen and peasants are equally valid expressions of a fundamental, unconscious set of principles. Gil-senan uses Islam as the anthropologist’s label for a heterogeneous collection of items, each of which has been designated Islamic by informants. He argues that groups and individuals may use the same signs and codes but see events in quite different ways. He gives a more cautious awareness of what the term Islam comes to mean in different economic, political, and social structures and relations. Eickelman describes and analyses the processes by which religious symbols and institutions are reinterpreted and modified to accommodate new and evolving social and historical realities, and describes how religious ideologies themselves shape the social order. He states that the key traditions of world religions remain vital and meaningful through the actions of their carriers, who maintain and shape them over long historical periods and in diverse contexts. These ideals, truths and rituals must be open to reformulation and reinterpretation by their carriers over successive generations and in novel contexts.

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
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## Reviews



J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins. *Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006. i-xvii + 340 pp., maps, index, bibliography. Price not given.

**Reviewed by  
Ismail H. Abdalla**

**The College of William and Mary**

J. Millard Burr and Robert Collins have written a rich, dense and focused book on a poor, fragile and culturally diverse region. The Central Sahara and the Sahel form a landlocked triangle stretching from the southern borders of Libya to Dar Fur in the Sudan and to Lake Chad further west, a region the authors repeatedly describe as worthless wastelands (p. 185). The book is a new edition of the authors' 1999 *Africa's Thirty Years War*, which was well received and went out of print very quickly. They have changed the title and added a fourteenth chapter on Dar Fur and an Epilogue to bring the story of this tragic region up to the present.

The authors' "worthless wastelands" on Libya's southern borders have proven to be not so worthless after all, considering the human carnage that has taken place in recent decades over ownership of them. There were several players in this hotly contested region, indigenous and foreign. The ethnic groups involved in the struggle to control these lands include the Zaghawa, Gourane, Toubou, Teda, Daza, Bedeit, Sara, Hedjeria, Masalit, Fur, Rizeiqat, Um Jallul, as well as others. Foreigners (the Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Berbers

and Turks in pre-colonial times; the French, British, Italians, Libyans and Americans in recent history [p.19]), attempted, often unsuccessfully, to project their imperial power into the wastelands of central Africa, or to frustrate the designs of rivals. To further complicate the inter tribal inter state relations, new non-statal players appear on the scene, the NGOs, the African Union and the United Nations. When outsiders exerted pressure on local actors, the latter resisted invaders, collaborated with them or remained neutral, depending on each warlord's personal ambition or conceit, inter-ethnic competition and blood feuds, and the harsh and unpredictable Sahelian climate. Recently ideology in the form of Pan-Arabism and especially Islamic fundamentalism has been added to other factors of destabilization in the region.

The authors forward several well documented if less articulated arguments throughout the book. The "worthless wastelands" have never been under effective control of any government, be that government in Tripoli, Khartoum, or N'djamena. Marginalization of the region has been the norm rather than the exception for the simple reason that, as the authors put it, "conquest, occupation and presumably exploitation of these marginal wastelands ..... were always disproportionate to the return" (p. 19). The fiercely independent and impetuous inhabitants of the worthless wastelands "reverted to a Hobbesian state of man against the elements and against one another for survival" (p. 66), "a familiar litany of confrontation between leaders, tribes, regions, races, and religions, of nomads against farmers, of cultivators against city dwellers" (p.1). They are indifferent to an exclusionary ideology of Arabism or fundamental Islamism, or the purity of faith dished out to them by their uncaring riverine brothers in the east, or the opportunist, flamboyant and mercurial Gaddafi from the north. Alliances and pacts of understanding were and remain as unreliable and volatile as their greedy, self-

centered and ruthless authors, local or foreign. Finally, the more the socio-ecological environment changes, the more it stays the same. Toyota land cruisers may replace camels in shortening distances in desolate lands, automatic weapons render spears and swords obsolete, and the NGOs may shoulder governments' responsibility to feed starving citizens during frequent famines. Still the inhabitants of this remote and inhospitable frontier, like their forefathers before them, remain as vulnerable to the ravages of severe climatic changes as they are hostile to adventurous intruders or ambitious proselytizers. Like their ancestors, they respond to these arduous environmental and political challenges in time-tested similar ways. They migrate from areas of water, food or grass deficit to more favorable places across porous national borders, forge and dismantle friendship alliances when expedient, and engage in banditry and pillage if necessary. The result is the chronic instability and internecine warfare from which Chad and Dar Fur continue to suffer to this day.


This reviewer finds the authors' explanation of the historical, political and environmental factors contributing to the region's insecurity and volatility comprehensive, informative and often convincing. What he identifies problematic in the authors' discourse is the tendency to see rigid and clear lines of racial or cultural discontinuity where none or only blurred ones exist. This is the case when they explain the ongoing civil war in Dar Fur or Gaddafi's relentless but hopeless attempts to control the worthless wastelands in terms of a presumed racial "Arab-African" divide, a stereotypical approach common only among Western journalists. As the authors themselves admit, most Arab leaders were opposed to Qaddafi's incessant and destructive interventionism in Sub-Saharan, particularly in Chad. According to the authors' own findings, presidents Mubarak of Egypt and Nimeiri of the Sudan shipped in 1980s enormous quanti-

ties of weapons to Qaddafi's enemy; President Habre of Chad, while Saudi Arabia paid the bills. Again, almost every Chadian claimant to the throne in N'jemena was at one time or another in the pay of the "pan-Arabist" Qaddafi. And these Chadian warlords were Africans, not Arabs. Qaddafi's pan Arabism rhetoric, which he later, and just as suddenly and dramatically, switched to his own version of "pan-Africanism", was for Libyan local consumption and not a strategic and well designed plan for hegemony in Africa. He supported, for example, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army in Southern Sudan against his Muslim Arab "brethren" in the North just as enthusiastically as he funded the marauding remnants of his Islamic Legionnaires in Dar Fur or the Irish Revolutionary Army in Northern Ireland.

There are minor points that have been overlooked or are inaccurate in an otherwise well-conceived and lucidly written book. On pages 55 and 192 it is stated that the war between the North and the South in the Sudan "continues with ever greater intensity to the present day" even though the authors talk in the Epilogue about the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the SPLA and Khartoum Government that has ended that war. The statement (p.193) that Republican Brotherhood in the Sudan "advocate a liberal interpretation of the Quran for non-Muslims and women" reduces the revolutionary and complex teachings of Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, which challenge the received Islamic Shari'a heritage, to a simple formula for the benefit of non-Muslims and women. The word "*Ansar*" (p. 60) describes the Muslims in Medina who welcomed the Prophet Mohammed after his flight from Mecca, not those who had accompanied him there, as the authors contend. Finally, it is reasonable, even defensible, for a conscientious writer to be an advocate on behalf of the oppressed anywhere. However, this reviewer finds it difficult to designate, as the authors do, all insurgents in Dar Fur as "patriotic", unless by

“patriotic” they mean self-preservation of a warlord and his immediate clan or ethnic group. There are many among these fighters who live by plunder and pillage who say in public “my government is my gun” or “the Klash is as good as Cash”. Such men are not worthy of the appellation ‘patriotism’.

Notwithstanding these minor reservations, *Dar Fur: The Long Road to Disaster* is a must read for any individual in need of understanding the root causes of ethnic cleansing in Dar Fur and neighboring localities. In this dense but readable book Burr and Collins explore complex climatic and geo-political issues, and ably frame them in social, religious and historical context. Their work is unique in African scholarship on the region in that it weaves together in one place the disparate histories and designs of so many individuals and peoples in multiple countries, all acting in conflicting ways that render the “worthless wastelands” unstable and ungovernable.



Fabrice Weissmann and Marc Lavergne, eds. *In the Shadow of 'Just Wars': Violence, Politics, and Humanitarian Action*. London: C. Hurst and Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.

**Reviewed by Stephanie E. Santos, Ph.D.**  
Student, Department of Anthropology, African Studies Program, Indiana University

*Médecins Sans Frontières* (Doctors Without Borders) is one of the best known non-governmental humanitarian aid organizations in the world. Winner of the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize, MSF works to deliver emergency aid and medical care to affected persons in over seventy countries around the world. MSF staff have written numerous books, articles, and instructional manuals for humanitarian aid and health professionals working in conflict and disaster zones. *In the Shadow of 'Just Wars'* is the latest book put out by this organization. It offers essays on thirteen conflicts in which MSF has provided relief; these give the reader a condensed overview of the major players, issues, and challenges in each situation. An additional four essays at the end of the book attempt to outline the theoretical framework of humanitarian assistance; this material might have been more appropriately placed at the beginning.

Editors Fabrice Weissmann and Marc Lavergne have extensive experience and education in the area of relief work in Africa, and particularly in the Sudan. Lavergne holds a Ph.D. in geography and possesses many years of experience working in various capacities in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, including a stint with the French Cultural Center in Khartoum. Weissmann is the current head of the MSF mission in Darfur and has worked extensively in South Sudan.

The contributors to this volume bring diverse experiences and backgrounds as scholars, journalists, and relief workers in their work with MSF and other aid agencies. Several of the essays seem to have been translated into English from another language by one person in particular (perhaps the editor?) as the style of writing seems overly uniform, making it a dry read at times. Most of the authors seem strongly (and perhaps rightly) critical of humanitarian aid efforts put forth by the United Nations, whose staff in the field too often “take the word” of government officials. The reader may decide if this bias nega-


tively affects the validity of statements in the book in any way. Most of the essays argue that the difficulties in delivering humanitarian aid are usually due to politics, whether international, national, or local. Truly, each of the small chapters in this volume, covering a different crisis in a different area of the globe, could be a volume unto itself.

Africa seems to be the focus of this collection, as six of the thirteen crises covered are from this continent. Although this book was published almost 3 three years ago, three of these six conflicts are still ongoing in one form or another. Included in this list of three is the Sudan, where ongoing humanitarian crises in various parts of the country will be of particular interest to the readers of this review. The chapter on Sudan is entitled "Who Benefits from Humanitarian Aid?" (This is an excellent question, not only concerning aid given to Sudan but aid distributed around the world.) Focusing on the conflict in South Sudan, which is now experiencing what can best be termed a tenuous and erratic peace, this essay discusses the various actors involved and what each hopes to gain from their struggles and at a cost to whom.

Of particular interest to this reviewer was an anecdote of the experience some MSF staff had at Bentiu in Upper Nile. The authors discuss how South Sudan United Movement (SSUM), a pro-Khartoum militia, would come to the hospital to reclaim injured soldiers they thought fit enough to fight, and occasionally other Nuer who happened to be around. Lavergne and Weissman note that "although MSF managed to free members of its local staff and demand that sick soldiers should not be forced back to duty until they had recovered, the organization is often forced to return these young Nuer to their tormentors". [pp. 149-150] This Catch-22 arrangement meant MSF was able to continue its work in Bentiu for the over 50,000 civilians affected by the fighting, but they had to bow to the will of the SSUM in order for such aid to occur.

Such is the arrangement for humanitarian aid in this small corner of Sudan, and undoubtedly similar compromises may also be found in many other parts of the world. Personal accounts such as these, provided by humanitarian aid staff, are given in boxed text separate from the main essays. They illustrate well the point that there is often a large ethically grey area in humanitarian aid work, and what one is taught or told theoretically is not necessarily what actually goes on when one is working at the ground level in disaster and conflict zones such as the Sudan.

The target audience for this book seems to be non-professional; it is not aimed at humanitarian aid workers in, or scholars of, the conflict zones covered. However, it would be appropriate to use this volume in an introductory-level class concerning humanitarian aid, public health, or international politics, where it might well inspire students to read more deeply about the various conflicts introduced in the essays.



Russell McGuirk,  
*The Sanusi's Little War: The Amazing Story of a Forgotten Conflict in the Western Desert, 1915-1917*. London: Arabian Publishing Ltd, 2007. ISBN-10: 0-9544792-7-0, ISBN-13: 978-0-9544792-7-5, pp xvii, 332, maps, photographs, appendices, index.

**Reviewed by: Jay Spaulding**  
**Kean University**

For readers who may have feared there could be no worthy sequel to the turn-of-the-twentieth century epics of Winston Churchill and Ismat Hasan Zulfo, it is a pleasure indeed to introduce a fine new book that conveys in full the drama of the Condominium's World War I Western Front, a story in which the Sudan, the Sudanese, and many contemporary figures familiar to aficionados of Sudanese history figure prominently.(1) In addition to his command of the voluminous published literature, the author draws skillfully upon a wealth of primary sources both archival and oral in Arabic, English and German; the present reviewer was particularly pleased with the prominence granted to the wartime memoirs of Ottoman liaison officer to the Sanusiyya (and future Iraqi Prime Minister) Ja`far al-`Askari,(2) fifteen new letters of Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi (Appendix 2), and a valuable interpretive compendium of contemporary Libyan sources.(3).

The battlefield upon which this study focuses lay along the south shore of the Mediterranean between Alexandria and Benghazi; the world warriors who came to blows there, however, arrived not only from Egypt, Libya, Chad and the Sudan, but also Turkey, Iraq, South Africa and India, as well as Europe. At the heart of the narrative plot was Ahmad al-Sharif's successful invasion of western Egypt in November 1915 and the subsequent Allied operations undertaken to expel him, culminating with battles near the Libyan border in early 1917.

The excellence of this history, however, lies in its intricate tapestry of detail concerning the setting and background to the conflict, and especially the gradual and painful collapse of the web of peaceful, constructive regional relationships that preceded the encroachments of war. Here the author has made wise use of unusual sources concerning frontier veteran Leopold Royle, wartime airman and intelligence officer but formerly Bimbashi in the Coastguard Camel Corps largely re-

sponsible for the modest pre-war official Egyptian presence west of Alexandria. Royle's mandate had called for accommodation to the respected Sanusi establishment that owned the hearts of almost everyone west of the Nile, including many of the Camel Corps' officers; Royle was the first Englishman invited to meet the Grand Sanusi himself. The adversaries, as war clouds gradually gathered at the border, included not only famous Ottoman officers Enver, Kemal, Nuri and Ja`far, but also colorful German agents such as Max von Oppenheim--later permitted to live by Hitler despite his Jewish origins, perhaps because of his services in mobilizing the Sanusiyya to the Central Powers. The British side too included memorable individuals, notably a not-yet-famous T.E. Lawrence, and the actual or future Sudan eminences Reginald Wingate, Douglas Newbold and Wilfred Jennings Bramly. Central to events was Ahmad al-Sharif, forced reluctantly into war against the British in Egypt by Italian and French aggression and wider political and diplomatic currents over which the Sanusiyya had little control. Once committed, the Sanusis proved formidable foes.

It is not possible in the context of a short review to do justice to the full range of concerns introduced by this volume, which provides sufficient background to allow the uninitiated to understand the course of World War I in the eastern Mediterranean. Readers of the *SSA Bulletin* will be most interested in matters that specifically concern the Sudan, and these fall into two general categories.

From the perspective of British authorities in Cairo a major preoccupation was defending Egypt militarily, a matter made difficult at the beginning of hostilities by the transfer of many units from the army of occupation to the European front. Seasoned newcomers were imported from remote quarters of the empire—India, New Zealand, and South Africa—to support inexperienced and imperfectly trained “territorials” from Britain

in holding the Suez Canal against the Turks and other defensive duties. There existed a colonial Egyptian army too, of course, but for the moment its presence in Egypt itself could not be tolerated because it was a hotbed of anti-British feeling. As the author expresses the situation: "This predominant disapproval of the Occupation among Arab Egyptians was why most of the Egyptian Army was kept in the Sudan—so that it would not pose a threat to the British. But even in the Sudan this simmering discontent of the average Egyptian soldier had to be watched. The Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, Reginald Wingate, admitted as much when he wrote: '[T]he internal situation in the Sudan is satisfactory . . . but I cannot say the same of the Egyptian officers and officials, who all seem to be tarred with Turco-German propaganda.'" (p. 85; see also p. 54, where particular emphasis is given to nationalist sentiments among the Egyptian officer corps in the Sudan.) Subsequent events in the Sudan itself may thus be seen, at least in part, as a natural consequence of deliberately manipulative wartime policies.

Sudanese soldiers figured prominently in the fighting on the Condominium's Western Front, and they served with equal distinction on both sides of the conflict. Perhaps best documented historically are those who, under Egyptian and British officers, dominated the ranks of the Coastguard Camel Corps that undertook to patrol the coasts, sometimes assisted by police units, also primarily Sudanese, who shared training as well as duties with them. (pp. 8, 29-30, 42) Certainly Bimbashi Royle, who came to Egypt and entered service as a boy of 17, owed a great deal to the desert wisdom of his Bishari friend and mentor Husayn Faris; Beja scouts such as Husayn not only patrolled the Red Sea coastline, but helped consolidate control over the western border with Libya. (pp. 45-46) When the Sanusis attacked many Egyptian officers defected; the Sudanese did not. Sources available to the author tell less about

the Sudanese who served on the Sanusi side of the conflict, but testify to their importance. Ahmad al-Sharif was customarily surrounded by Sudanese guards, to whom he entrusted the controversial task of lowering the Ottoman flag raised briefly without his permission by Turkish officers visiting Jaghub (pp. 35, 93); Sayyid Hilal also had conspicuous Sudanese military retainers. (p. 37)


More subtle is the evidence offered concerning the distinctively traditional Sudanic mechanisms for the conduct of foreign trade employed by Ahmad al-Sharif before the outbreak of hostilities. One briefly encounters `Abd Allah al-Kahhal, Egyptian-based commercial agent for the Sanusis and a number of other contemporary Sudanese leaders, and a regular informant to German intelligence. (p. 73) Both Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif and Sayyid Hilal attempted to use Bimbashi Royle as an official conduit for requests for trade goods from Egypt, especially arms; it is doubtful that the Englishman understood the significance of what the Sanusi leaders were doing—the initiation of an administered trade between governments. (pp. 37-38). Equally obtuse was the Khedive himself; Ahmad al-Sharif, in typical fashion, sent two female slaves to the monarch in the hopes of facilitating an official arms trade, and he wondered why he did not receive an appropriate response (pp. 36-37) (Although not mentioned here, a similar overture to Enver Pasha resulted in a comparable disappointment.)

In short, this is a well-told war story that—among other things—opens unexpected and valuable new vistas on the Sudanese experience.

#### NOTES

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- (2) Ja`far al-`Askari, *Mudhakkirat Ja`far al-`Askari* (London: Dar al-Lam, 1988).
- (3) Mustafa `Ali Huwaydi, *al-haraka al-wataniyya fi sharq libya khilal al-harb al-`alamiyya al-ula* (Tripoli: Markaz Dirasat Jihad didd al-Ghazu al-Italiyya, 1988).



**Jay Spaulding.**  
*The Heroic Age in Sinnar.*

Trenton and Asmara:  
The Red Sea Press,  
2007.

**Reviewed by:**  
**Heather J. Sharkey**  
**University of Pennsylvania**

Jay Spaulding's *The Heroic Age in Sinnar* has become a classic in Sudanese history. First published by Michigan State University Press in 1985, it was long out of print, until the Red Sea Press issued it in a new paperback edition in 2007. This book deserves a place in every research library that claims a serious interest in African history, and in the collection of every scholar of Sudanese studies.

In the words of its author, *The Heroic Age in Sinnar* "is the story of the erosion and overthrow of one system of social organization by another" (p. 2). The book covers the late Funj era of Sudanese history, namely, the period from 1750-1850 which witnessed the demise of the Funj kings who ruled from Sinnar, on the Blue Nile; the rise of warlords known as the Hamaj regents following a military coup in 1762; and the Turco-Egyptian conquest of 1820-21. The author explains that he intended the title to draw a parallel to the age before the emergence of Islam in Ara-

bia, the period known as the *jahiliyya*, which some writers have characterized as a heroic age of Arab antiquity.

In order to construct a picture of Sinnar's highly stratified society of nobles, commoners, and slaves, and of the political tensions that affected the kingdom, Spaulding draws upon Arabic manuscript sources such as marriage contracts, land deeds, and tax assessments, as well as upon the accounts of European travelers. The book describes everything from court life and marriage practices to military organization and leadership. It considers, for example, the court custom of killing (or more accurately, trying to kill) all the brothers of a newly appointed sultan, in order to eliminate rivals to the throne, or the means by which noblemen periodically assessed a ruler's competence and upon deeming him lacking, executed him in a public ceremony (while encouraging him to put up little fuss for the sake of decorum). Spaulding's prose is lively and occasionally humorous. For example, on page 24, in the midst of describing how kings passed their superfluous former wives to frustrated bachelor noblemen, Spaulding writes, "The Funj sultan, who enjoyed the assistance of about 600 parallel cousins in producing the one male heir necessary to fill his office, provides an extreme example of this 'condition of demographic increase': his practice of wife-donation helped reduce the number of excess heirs to eradicable proportions."

The rulers of Sinnar confidently proclaimed their state to be an Islamic one, but Spaulding notes that their society nevertheless deviated from certain customs now deemed orthodox. Thus while male circumcision was commonly practiced, so was the raising and eating of pigs. Nor did kings limit themselves to four wives, in keeping with the Qur'anic injunction; some claimed scores, even hundreds, of wives at a time. Strikingly, the rulers of Sinnar were also accustomed to regard all their loyal subjects as Muslims and there-

fore as protected peoples. This situation changed once the Turco-Egyptian armies of Muhammad Ali invaded in 1820 and made the southern reaches of the former kingdom subject to intensive slave-raiding. "The Turkish system," Spaulding observes on page 157, "perverted or destroyed the traditionally protective relations between southern subjects and southern rulers and imposed new and antagonistic relations between the folk of the southern provinces and from northern Sinnar."

If the end of the "heroic age of Sinnar" signaled the birth of "the modern Sudan", (see p. 159), then Spaulding nonetheless feels great nostalgia for the pre-modern society that he reconstructs in this volume. Indeed, he openly calls his book a work of "advocacy" and "sympathy" for Sinnar, and explains: "The intended goal of this partisan approach is not a condemnation of the modern Sudan but clarity of vision concerning an important although neglected era in its past; it is healthy to regard one's forefathers with respect, even if one has chosen not to emulate them" (p. 1). Spaulding clearly admires what he describes as the "royal policy of religious tolerance and cultural pluralism" (p. 10) that prevailed throughout the Funj era.

The Red Sea Press edition of *The Heroic Age in Sinnar* is missing one thing: it lacks a new introduction to situate and explain this edition relative to the 1985 original. Historians would benefit from reading Spaulding's reflections on how his own thinking about this history has evolved in the twenty-two years since the book first appeared. (Along these lines, Spaulding should be encouraged to write a historiographical essay, reflecting on the new edition of this volume and on its place in Sudan historiography, perhaps for the *Journal of African History* or even for this newsletter.) The bibliography and footnotes of this 2007 edition do show some changes. For example, the author has incorporated materials from *Public Docu-*

*ments in Sinnar*, a volume of translated and annotated Funj documents (mainly Arabic materials dating from the 1702-1821 period), which he and the late Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim published in 1989. This 2007 edition also includes references to Anders Bjørkelo's *Prelude to the Mahdiyya* (published in 1989), though it is missing references to works such as Neil McHugh's *Holymen of the Blue Nile* (1994) and P.M. Holt's annotated edition of the Funj Chronicle, published in 1999 as *The Sudan of the Three Niles*.

*The Heroic Age in Sinnar* remains required reading for historians of Sudan. Demonstrating a magisterial use of manuscript sources, it constructs the history of a kingdom that remains under-studied within the context of both African and Islamic history. It does so while conjuring the world of the late Funj era in rich and loving detail, thereby reminding us that this land of the Niles had a flourishing social and political life long before the armies of Muhammad Ali barged onto the scene.

## Humiliated in the Shackles

*A Poem by Sami al-Haj, Sudanese journalist with al-Jazeera held at Guantanamo since June 2002*

When I heard pigeons cooing in the trees,  
 Hot tears covered my face.  
 When the lark chirped, my thoughts composed  
 A message for my son.  
 Mohamed, I am afflicted.  
 In my despair, I have no one but God for comfort.  
 The oppressors are playing with me,  
 As they move freely about the world,  
 They ask me to spy on my countrymen,  
 Claiming it would be a good deed.  
 They offer me money and land,  
 And freedom to go where I please.  
 Their temptations seize my attention  
 Like lightning in the sky.  
 But their gift is an evil snake,  
 Carry hypocrisy in its mouth like venom,  
 They have monuments to liberty  
 And freedom of opinion, which is well and good,  
 But I explained to them that  
 Architecture is not justice.  
 America, you ride on the backs of orphans,  
 And terrorize them daily.  
 Bush, beware.  
 The world recognizes an arrogant liar.  
 To God I direct my grievance and tears.  
 I am homesick and oppressed.  
 Mohamed, do not forget me.  
 Support the cause of your father, a God-fearing  
 man.  
 I was humiliated in the shackles.  
 How can I compose these verses? How can I now  
 write?  
 After the shackles and the nights and the suffering  
 and the tears,  
 How can I write poetry?  
 My soul is like a rolling sea, stirred by anguish,  
 Violent with passion.  
 I am a captive, but the crimes are my captors'.  
 I am overwhelmed with apprehension.  
 Lord, unite me with my son Mohamed.  
 Lord, grant success to the righteous.  
 (reprinted from the *Boston Sunday Globe*, August  
 5, 2007)



*Khalid Kodi Art Exhibit at May 2007 SSA Meeting, Philadelphia*

### *Violence Inscribed*

Khalid Kodi's exhibition, *Violence Inscribed* is about how we all relate to war, and to the large-scale, dehumanizing, and destructive violence that ravaged Darfur, Sudan, since 2003.

Illustrating a theme that the artist addressed in the past in relation to massacres in the Nuba Mountains and Southern Sudan, the installation is a protest against reducing those killed in Darfur to mere statistics. "I want to illustrate that these are individual human beings that each had memories, homes and dreams, jokes, friends, and loved ones," says Khalid Kodi, the artist, "these memories and dreams were brutally destroyed, and people were killed or forced to abandon a whole way of life."

Kodi is very particular about the individuality of those killed. "The installation consists of eighteen corpses: sixteen adults and two children." Painted in black, the corpses have detailed and individualized features. "Those criminals did not differentiate between men, women, or even young children." The corpses are wrapped in colorful *tobes* (traditional garments that women in Northern Sudan, including Darfur, usually wear) used as coffins as is seen in recent images from Darfur.

The colorful *tobes* that women used to wear when visiting friends and family or during Eid celebrations, are currently used to cover the dead....

Violence and sadness are etched on these garments forever  
 (From "Violence Inscribed," *installation text* by Nada Ali)

26th Annual SSA Meeting, University of Pennsylvania. SSA Officers and Members of the Executive Board



Seated: Stephanie Beswick, Ali Dinar, B. Yongo-Bure, C. Fluehr-Lobban, Khalid Kodi  
Standing: Randall Fegley, Richard Lobban, Malik Balla, Mohammed El-Gadi Ibrahim

**MINUTES OF THE SUDAN STUDIES  
ASSOCIATION BOARD MEETING,  
PHILADELPHIA, PA. May 26, 2007**

Present: Malik Balla, Stephanie Beswick, Yongo Bure, Ali Dinar, Randall Fegley, Mohamed al-Gadi [late], Khalid Kodi, Richard Lobban, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban,

Absent: Michael Kevane

The meeting was called to order at 2:30 p.m. (Saturday afternoon)

**Elections of SSA President, President-elect**

**New Board members (nominations)**

This is the final year of the presidency of Ali Dinar. The board thanked him for doing an excellent job over the past three years. A discussion ensued as to who should be the new president, in light of Elias Wakoson's (the next elected President) sudden departure for South Sudan last year. In light of this highly irregular situation, Yongo Bure, the president-elect, was informally asked and graciously accepted the immediate position of president. In light of the urgency to appoint a new president, no ballots were sent out. Rather, a motion was put forth and by universal agreement Yongo Bure was elected by the board as the new president. It was agreed that Dr. Bure's election by the board

would be announced at the Business Meeting. If there were any objections, a secret ballot would be handed out.

The next topic concerned the appointment of a president-elect. Stephanie Beswick was nominated and accepted. To protect against future irregularities in the SSA leadership sequence Beswick suggested that there be two more provisional presidents-elect to follow her. Randall Fegley and Malik Balla, in this order, graciously agreed to offer their services as future possible presidents-elect (after Yongo Bure retires as president and Beswick takes over).

Hence the persons named below have agreed to be President and Presidents-elects of the Sudan Studies Association in the next six years, with the understanding that ballots will also be sent out to SSA Members:

Yongo Bure  
Stephanie Beswick  
Randall Fegley  
Malik Balla

It was then moved that the board's decision should be announced at the Business Meeting and if there were any objections, it would then go to a secret ballot.

Lastly, it was universally agreed that the following people would be nominated by the board as its new members for next year: Amir Idris, Peter Garretson, Lako Tongun, and Amal Fadlalla as a number of board members will be retiring this year (Beswick, Fegley, Khodi, and Bure).

**SSA Bulletin (report on production, scheduling, costs)**

Senior editor, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban announced that the *Sudan Studies Association Bulletin* is now in its second edition. It was agreed that we need to use the *Bulletin* as a

mechanism for change; that there would be more than one review in the *Bulletin* for books. Further the editor suggested that she would like to return to a quarterly journal for 2008. It was also noted that the *Bulletin* would need to be punctual.

The editor suggested that there was a keen desire for the information published in the *SSA Bulletin* in Sudan. To this end it was suggested that the *Bulletin* could be sent electronically or that it may be a good idea, for a small fee, to send to members in Sudan an on-line *Bulletin*. Another suggestion was that a small selection of the *Bulletin* could be put over the internet and then for a fee, the entire *Bulletin* could then be acquired. It was also suggested that if we raise the membership fees a few dollars, the entire *SSA Bulletin* could be sent to Sudan online. In the meantime it was agreed that only those who actually paid would be able to access the *Bulletin* online immediately. All of this, however, would only be possible if the *Bulletin* had a secure site. No decision was reached by the board.

**Issue of Youth and Increased Attendance:**

The subject of increasing the membership of young scholars in the Sudan Studies Association was raised. The possibility of inviting a student to be part of the board was discussed but eventually discarded. This is because, as was discussed and informally agreed upon, board members need to be extremely active within the organization serving in leadership positions. A student, however, would not be able to fulfill this role. It was also suggested that \$200.00 could be given each year to a graduate student for attendance and presenting a paper at the SSA conference. Ultimately the board universally agreed that the SSA must make a concerted effort to encourage younger Sudanese scholars and others who are interested in Sudan to join the Sudan Studies Association to maintain membership levels.

**Future Conference Venues**

SSA President, Ali Dinar, was approached by Salah Hassan about the possibility of the next SSA Conference (the 27<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of 2008) being held at Cornell University. Additionally, another offer (now accepted) was made by Peter Garretson of Florida State University. The board made no decisions as it was decided that it will be necessary to set up specific criteria for acceptances of offers to host future conferences. It was thus decided that the board would make a decision on this topic at a future date. It was agreed, however, that all offers must include 1) a free facility 2) support for hosting the dinner and 3) affordable (cheap) accommodations.

**Future Venue for the International SSA Conference of 2009**

The issue of the venue of the upcoming international conference of 2009 was discussed. Among the venues considered was South Africa and Khartoum. No decision was made. Nor was there any agreement on the conditions that the SSA would insist upon for future international conferences held outside of the United States.

**University of Pennsylvania's Economic Support for this Past Conference:**

Ali Dinar informed the board that the African Studies Center as well as a number of other University of Pennsylvania centers had contributed \$6,500 for events which took place at this conference. This included the honorarium of Sondra Hale, her hotel and travel expenses, coffee, entertainment, posters and bags (two hundred were made). The other key-note speaker graciously contributed his honorarium to the SSA. (Addendum: Sondra Hale later also donated her honorarium for her presentation to a Sudanese youth group at the conference).

**Membership, Economic Report and Endowment**

Concerning the SSA Membership, as of 20 June 2007 our membership was 244. This number was reached after a purge of members who did not respond to repeated requests for renewals. Fluctuations in membership are normal as members come and go. This does not reflect new members however, who joined the SSA membership during the last Philadelphia meeting.

Concerning the SSA Checking Account balance, as of 9 May 2007 it was \$14,884.99. This includes the funds from the USIP grant that the SSA is administering and does not yet include revenues (\$2,842.00) and expenses (in process) from the Philadelphia meetings.

The following concerns the SSA Endowment:  
 SSA TIAA/CREF Money Market Fund, as of 23 April 2007 -- \$6,870.47  
 SSA TIAA/CREF Bond Plus Fund II, as of 23 April 2007 -- \$7,848.45

In short, the financial health of the SSA is very strong and while our membership has declined a little from lack of renewals, new members are joining from the website and from our last annual meeting.

**FINAL BUSINESS**

The Agenda for the upcoming Business Meeting was handed out by outgoing president, Ali Dinar, and the Board meeting was adjourned at 3:30 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,  
 Stephanie Beswick

**A Message from Lee Burchinal and SAFE, the  
Sudanese American Foundation for Education**

**Donate Books, Get a Tax Deduction, and Help Sudanese Students and Faculty**

Universities in Sudan desperately need recent American reference and textbooks. You can help by donating books you no longer use – you know, some of those books on your shelves that you haven't opened for a long time.

Send your books to our warehouse and the Sudan-American Foundation for Education, Inc., will guarantee their delivery to colleges and universities in Sudan. For more information, go to:

[www.sudan-safe.org](http://www.sudan-safe.org)

After consulting the criteria for selection of books, under "Donations", please contact Dr. Lee Burchinal at [lee.burchinal@verizon.net](mailto:lee.burchinal@verizon.net) for the name and address of the warehouse where books are received and stored until we enough to fill a container for shipment to Port Sudan.

You can also designate the university or department where you want your books to go. Put the name of a person, if you know a specific person, and the university or department name on the top and bottom on each box. When the boxes are received by SAFE's partner in Sudan, the boxes will be set aside for pickup by the designated person or a representative of the indicated department or university.

Beginning in 2008, deliveries will be made to universities in the south as well as to over 60 colleges, universities, ngos, and other organizations that have received over 275,000 books in past years.



**Sudan Studies Association  
27<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference  
Theme: "Sudan's Wars and Peace  
Agreements"**

**May 16-18, 2008  
Florida State University  
Tallahassee, Florida**

**Call for Papers**



*Audience at the 26th Annual Conference*

The next few years will be decisive for Sudan's future as it resolves its protracted conflicts. Currently two peace agreements are being implemented: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA). The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is incomplete although partially being implemented. It is hoped that by the time of the holding of the 27<sup>th</sup> SSA Annual Conference, there will be a functioning comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur.

Will the signing of these peace agreements lead to the end of the half a century period of protracted conflicts in Sudan? Do the agreements address the root causes of the Sudanese problem? What are these root causes of the problem – cultural, historical, economic, political, environmental, ethnic, etc.?

How are these agreements being implemented? Does the implementation of the various peace agreements lead to the creation of the New Sudan, now common in Sudanese political vocabulary? What exactly are the fundamental features of the New Sudan? What are the consequences of non-compliance with the terms of the peace agreements? Should the referendum at the end of the CPA end in separation, what are the implications for the new separate countries, border communities, etc.? What areas of cooperation should the separate countries pursue as neighbors? How will reconciliation among neighbors, who have been pitted against one another, be promoted in Darfur after the war and the resettlement of the victims of war in their original villages? How will the marginalized majority in rural Eastern Sudan avoid continued marginalization given the preponderant political domination of the rich in Gadarif, Kassala, Khashm al Qirba, and Port Sudan; and the alliance of the rich in the East with the Khartoum establishment? Does the implementation of the various peace agreements simultaneously lead to the transformation of the central power in Khartoum? What is the role of major and regional powers in the Sudanese conflicts and their resolution? etc. etc., etc.

What about the conflicts over the construction of dams at Meroe and Kajbar? What are the expected national and local benefits of these projects? How much were locals involved in the planning of the projects before their implementation.



*People at the 26th Annual Conference, (l-r) SAYAP members Nashwa Ellgadi, Sirein S. Awadalla, Izzeldin Bakhitm Abdel Salam Sidafmed*



*Incoming President Yongo-Bure presenting at the 26th Annual Conference*

### **Proposals:**

The tradition of the SSA conference is to give priority in timing and prominence of presentation to papers that address the theme of the conference, but papers on other issues relating to Sudan are also welcome.

Abstracts of proposed papers (150-200 words) should be received by **February 1, 2008**.

Please send paper abstract to Dr. Stephanie Beswick, 2008 SSA Panel Organizer, Department of History, #212 Burkhardt Hall, Ball State University, Muncie, Indiana, USA 47304, Tel. (765)285-8700, e-mail:

[sfbeswick@bsu.edu](mailto:sfbeswick@bsu.edu). A preliminary program will be announced on **March 15, 2008**. Late proposals for papers will be considered only if space is available. Proposals and paper abstracts submitted earlier will receive preferential treatment in scheduling. Acceptance for presentation will depend on the quality of the abstract and the judgment of the program committee. Small stipends of \$200 are available for assistance to a limited number of graduate students, and interested persons should contact SSA President Dr. B. Yongo-Bure, Kettering University: [byong@kettering.edu](mailto:byong@kettering.edu).

Registration forms and fees are available at SSA website and they should be sent to Dr. Richard Lobban, Executive Director, Sudan Studies Association, Rhode Island College, 600 Mt. Pleasant Ave., Providence, RI 02908.

The Chair of the Local Arrangements Committee is Dr. Peter Garretson, Florida State University, Tallahassee; [pgarret@mailier.fsu.edu](mailto:pgarret@mailier.fsu.edu). Accommodation information will be available on SSA website: <http://www.sudanstudies.org>

The site is run by SSA members Michael Kevane and Martha Saavedra.



SSA fan Mrs.Sahar El-Ga`ali proudly displays 25th anniversary commemorative T-shirt at May 2007 conference, Philadelphia, PA



Dr. Richard Lobban  
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