Panel #9:
"NIF: Alliances & Expansion of Ideology"
Al-Turabi as an Ideologue
Ismail Abdallah
Literature on the nature and rule of the Omer Hasn al-Bashir of the Sudan
is abundant, and the role of Dr Hasan Abdallah al-Turabi in,first, the 1989
coup that brought the Muslim brotherhood to power, and, second, in the establishment
of a religious dictatorship in the Sudan, is well documented. What is still
only dimly understood is al-Turabi ideas about Islamic reforms, Islamic government,
and the ideal Muslim community he and his brotherhood strongly believe they
are endeavoring to bring about. The planned paper critically explores these
ideas in an effort to go beyond the news headlines to a deeper and balanced
evaluation of this important political and religious figure in the recent
history of the Sudan
Revisiting the Turabi/Bin Laden Relationship
Ann Lesch
Villanova University
Osama bin Laden lived in the Sudan from December 1991 through May 1996.
He was invited there by Hasan al-Turabi, with whom he then worked closely in developing
his global Islamist network. This paper will examine the dynamics
of their relationship during those five years: Who influenced who?
Who manipulated who? To what extent did bin Laden's financial network and
Afghan Arab cadres bolster Turabi's aims? And to what extent did Turabi
influence bin Laden's operations? The paper will explore their complex relationship,
opening up ideas for discussion and hypothesizing about their relationship after
May 1996, when Turabi acquiesced in the Sudan government's expulsion of bin Laden.
Sudan-Ethiopia Relations & Islamization Policies
Solomon Hailu
University of South Florida
The central focus of this paper is on Sudan’s islamization policy under
Al-Bashire’s regime and its regional impact. In the past, some African countries
have officially protested against Sudan's muslim fundamentalism policy while other
states have officially broken relations with Sudan and have come close to taking
military measures against it. Ethiopia has become one of Sudanese negibours which
had her relations severely stained due to Sudan’s cross-border Islamic expansionist
agenda. The study will analysis the fact that the quest for Ethiopia’s internal
opposition have always been characterized as having fully political motives rather
than religious ambitions. It would therefore appear that Sudan's cross-border
policy based on radical islamisation principles did not have its root in any realities
of Ethiopian politics. It is not so much a question of explaining existing tensions
in Ethiopian society, but of hoping to create them in the first place, that draws
Sudan's ideological mission within its neighbours territory. mean that Sudan has
tried to create .
Sudan's Islamic Revolution as a Cause of Foreign Intervention
in Its Civil War:
Insights from Balance of Threat Theory
William Rose
Connecticut College
Sudan experienced an elite-driven, moderately radical Islamic revolution in
northern Sudan in 1989. The revolution occurred when Sudan was in the midst
of a bloody north-south civil war. Although the causes of the civil war were
domestic in origin, intervention by other countries in the civil war has affected
its intensity and duration. This paper focuses on the behavior of two of Sudan's
neighbors, Egypt and Ethiopia: while both countries intervened in Sudan's internal
affairs, only Ethiopia took sides in the civil war. To explain connections between
Sudan's Islamic revolution and the varying interventions of Ethiopia and Egypt,
this paper explores the uses and limits of Stephen Walt's balance of threat
theory-which he used to highlight causal connections between revolution and
interstate security competition. The first finding is that the theory provides
important and unique insights into relations between revolutionary Sudan and
two of its neighbors. Especially important are causes associated with the analytic,
policy, and propaganda functions of a revolutionary ideology. The theory links
these effects of a revolution to other causes of conflict-particularly the creation
of new conflicts of interest and intensified spirals of suspicion-as it explains
intensified security competition. The theory explains these observations in
Sudan better than any other competing theory or single explanation. Like any
theory, however, it has limits. One is that the theory offers insights into
interstate relations only when a revolution has occurred. Even when the theory
applies, moreover, other causes of conflict as well as constraints on conflict
come into play. The second finding is that the revolution did not cause security
competition to increase nearly as much as the theory predicts. This latter observation
contrasts with Walt's own case studies. A likely reason for this anomaly concerns
the setting in Africa, where boundaries delineating states have been more ephemeral
or artificial than in other parts of the world where Walt studied revolution.
Finally, because the evidence examined was fairly thin, the paper ends with
suggestions for further research.