

This paper is a work in progress. It is not yet in a state to be published, indeed much research still needs to be done before it will be ready for submission. The author would also like to reflect on comments made at the conference before a final draft is prepared.

Simon Mollan, July, 2003.

**The problem of “control” in a condominium – the development of Sudan state
finances in relation to the influence of Egypt and
the British Empire, 1899-1931¹**

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1. Introduction:

a. Sudan and imperial historiography

There is remarkable unanimity as to exactly what *is* ‘formal’ empire. It has been described as ‘the near monopoly of jurisdiction, taxation and coercion within a specified territory’², understood more simply as ‘the area painted red on the map’.³ If we take a concise definition of ‘imperialism’ such as: ‘the sustained effort to assimilate a country or region to the political, economic or cultural system of another power’⁴, Sudan would seem at first sight to unequivocally fall into both these categories between 1899 and 1956 - part of the British empire, subject to imperialism: a colony. Indeed, an imperial possession par excellence because embodied in the Condominium status is the subversion of Sudanese territory to not one, but two external powers. This categorisation has generally seemed to satisfy historians on both sides of the colonial (Africanist) history / imperial history divide.⁵ So, for example, though the two volumes of Martin Daly’s compendious history of the Condominium era are entitled *Imperial Sudan* and *Empire on the Nile*, his metier is the role of the British in Sudan and the impact of colonial government on Sudan and its people.⁶ Close reading of this study, of course, reveals much about British imperialism in Sudan, but imperial history in the classic mode – that which focuses on the relationship between the centre and the periphery, the metropole and the colony - is not the central

¹ This paper is an early draft of work in progress, being part of ongoing doctoral research. It is explicitly both speculative and exploratory. The content of this paper is copyright of the author (2003) and may only be reproduced with the author’s express permission.

² C. Jones, “‘Business Imperialism’ and Argentina, 1875-1900: A Theoretical Note”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 12, 2, 1980, p.438

³ P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism*, (Routledge, London, 2002), p.25

⁴ J. Darwin, ‘Imperialism and the Victorians: the dynamics of expansion’, *English Historical Review*, June 1997, p.614

⁵ No matter, of course, how false such divisions prove to be.

⁶ M.W. Daly, *Empire on the Nile*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986); *Imperial Sudan*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991),

frame of analysis. The same can also be said of other recent monographs dealing with colonial aspects of Condominium history.⁷

On the 'imperial' side of the equation, Sudan is (highly regrettably) mostly relegated to the role of a walk on extra. Gallagher and Robinson in *Africa and the Victorians* deal with Sudan as a diplomatic diversion which they promptly drop as soon as the Reconquest is done and dusted.⁸ In *British Imperialism* Cain and Hopkins subsume Sudan into their analysis on Egypt, largely because, as Darwin has recently pointed out, British involvement in Sudan was an 'outwork for the strategic defence of Egypt'.⁹ All of this is, of course, highly unsatisfactory, especially considering that over many centuries the history of Sudan has been continuously touched by the impact of one empire or another, be it Egyptian, Ottoman or British. There is therefore considerable scope to 'imperialise' Sudan's 'colonial' history – to make explicit the connection between the evolution of the history of Sudan and the wider process of British imperialism; to expand upon the relationship between metropole and colony; to explore the ties, linkages and chains of command and control that knitted Sudan into the British Empire at a structural level. This paper reflects this perspective.

b. Power and Control: a framework for analysis

To provide an analytical framework for this paper I have turned primarily for guidance to recent scholarship on the ultimate problem case in imperial studies, that of 'informal imperialism'. Historians operating in this field are often more precise in the search for the nature of agency because, ultimately, this is all imperialism can be seen to mean once the simple measure of territorial domination and the subversion of territorial sovereignty has been dispensed with. Particularly instructive in this area is a contribution made in 1994 by A.G. Hopkins and this paper will draw heavily on the systematisation that Hopkins suggests for the analysis of power relations.¹⁰ To assess whether, and in what ways, Argentina could be considered subject to British imperial power and therefore, by extension, part of the British empire, Hopkins has drawn on and methodologically

⁷ H.J. Sharkey, 'Colonialism and the culture of nationalism in the northern Sudan, 1898-1956' (unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1998); H. Bell, *Frontiers of medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1940*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999)

⁸ J. Gallagher, and R. Robinson, with A. Denny, *Africa and the Victorians – the Official Mind of Imperialism*, (Macmillan, London, 1967), pp.351-378

⁹ Cain and Hopkins, *British*, (2002), pp.317; Darwin, 'Imperialism', p.635

¹⁰ A.G. Hopkins, 'Informal Empire in Argentina: an Alternative View', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 26, 1994, esp. pp.476-480

extended (by applying it to the imperial past) the work of political scientists interested in international relation, in particular that of Susan Strange.¹¹

It is worth spending a little time describing how the Hopkins-Strange analytical model is constructed, since it will provide the context for the analysis of both the structures and events that will be evaluated here. Firstly, Strange draws a distinction between relational and structural power. Relational power is described as ‘the power of A to get B to do something that they would not otherwise do’¹²; structural power, however, is defined as

the power to shape and determine structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate. ... Structural power, in short, confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises.¹³

Clearly, when referring to issue of financial control over Sudan we will chiefly be dealing with forms of structural power; equally, however, specific examples of relational power will shed light on the structural arrangement, especially when there is a tension between parties involved. Hopkins takes up these two forms of power and expands on the way in which it can be used in a imperial historical context:

Evidently, structural and relational forms of power are closely linked: one establishes the context and the rules of the game; the other deals with the contests between players. At the same time, the importance of distinguishing between the two levels of analysis ought to be equally apparent. On the one hand, conceptions of structural power should not become simply a means of inferring or, more formally, of verifying the outcome of key bargains at the relational level. On the other hand, an investigation of imperialism that is confined to relational power can be readily programmed to conclude too much from too little.¹⁴

¹¹ Hopkins, ‘Informal’, pp.476-77; S. Strange, *States and Markets*, (Pinter, London, 1994)

¹² Strange, *States*, p.24

¹³ Strange, *States*, pp.24-25

¹⁴ Hopkins, ‘Informal’, p.478

Taking the objection that analysis of key bargains might be misleading, the main focus of this paper will be to establish the 'rules of the game', or, put another way, to establish which agencies were in receipt of structural power, capable of exploiting this advantage in relational settings.

Strange breaks down structural power into four sub-divisions: knowledge, security, production and finance.¹⁵ All of these bear directly, and rely on the others, in differing measures in each unique case where power is exercised. This is certainly the case in Sudan where security, finance and production particularly all have implications for each other. However, to explore all of these is way beyond the scope of this paper the focus of which is confined to the financial dimension, and how it bears on other factors. The intention of this paper is to explore the evolution of financial control in Sudan as an example of the way in which the architecture of the imperial system grew over and within the colonial state; both tying the two together, and defining the where the parameters of control lay. The argument presented here will suggest that the action of imperialism as a wider process on Sudan was not merely confined to the Reconquest and the imposition of a colonial status on Sudan. Instead, the relationships between various agencies operative in the sub-system of the British Empire in North-East Africa were in continuous flux. These different agencies can be seen as nodes in a series of centre-periphery relationships that gradually changed the disbursement of power in the region. They agencies were: the British Government; the British High Commission in Cairo; the Egyptian Government (semi independent from 1922) and the Sudan Government itself.

c. The Problem and the Context

The dictum that he who pays the piper calls the tune is in many ways a governmental and political truism, and no less so for Sudan.¹⁶ The shifting balance of political and financial control in Sudan helps explain the motivation of the Sudan government in the formulation of their policy, especially during the agricultural depression of the 1930s when they were forced to pursue a policy of financial retrenchment. What will be shown here is that the Sudan Government jealously held on to their often tenuous grasp of power and consistently looked to preserve and increase it in the face of challenges from Egypt and the British Government. This in turn has relevance for other issues in

¹⁵ Strange, *States*, pp.29-32

¹⁶ A perspective first put by G.R. Warburg, *Egypt and the Sudan – studies in history and politics*, (Frank Cass, London, 1985), p.50; the phrase itself was drawn from correspondence between Cromer and Wingate. See p.50, fn. 4

Sudanese history, in particular the development of the Sudanese State. It also relates directly to the increasing independence of the Sudan Political Service which during the Condominium period developed a distinct culture of colonial government and a particular attitude to state building. This has been succinctly put by W. Travis Hanes:

On the basis of both their private and public papers it is not too much to say that the real “nationalists” in the Sudan were the expatriate officials of the Sudan Political Service who dominated the Sudan government. It is crucial to bear in mind that the Sudan Political Service had developed over the years an idiosyncratic interpretation of Sudanese history that amounted to their own version of a national mythology. It was they who first conceived of a modern independent Sudan, and who pursued this conception with stubborn determination against the instructions (and interests) of both Egypt and Great Britain.¹⁷

A summation of the argument that will be made here is thus: at the beginning of the Condominium, Sudan was tightly controlled by exterior agents, but that by the time of the depression and the financial crisis of 1931, the Sudanese administration was *de facto* in control, even if *de jure* she was not. Furthermore, this situation was predicated on the continued financial viability of government in the Sudan.

2. The Evidence

a. Beginnings

John Wallace Cummins, Assistant Financial Secretary of the Sudan, wrote that: ‘the Sudan falls within the Egyptian financial system.’¹⁸ In a monetary sense this was true but the issue of financial control was always a sensitive one in the Sudan.¹⁹ The origins of the lack of clarity surrounding financial control were rooted in the Condominium Agreement of 1899 and in the way the state was conceived, and then in the way it developed, which by and large were two different things. The 1899 agreement between Britain and Egypt did not define the issue of financial control or governmental

¹⁷ W. Travis Hanes III, ‘Sir Hubert Huddleston and the Independence of the Sudan’, in *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1992, p.248

¹⁸ J. Wl. Cummins, ‘Money in War and Peace’, a lecture delivered at the Sudan Cultural Centre, Khartoum, 6 August, 1941 (found in Sudan Archive, Durham (SAD)), p.41

¹⁹ See Cummins (1941) for a detailed description of the financial machinery of Sudan, particularly of interest is that the National Bank of Egypt fulfilled the role of the central bank for Sudan. How this affected the issue of financial control is, at present, obscure.

machinery at all.²⁰ The Agreement itself was largely a legal fiction. From 1882 Egypt had in all but legal technicality been run by the British (the period known as the ‘veiled protectorate’).²¹ In many ways therefore the British were in fact both parties to the Agreement. That there was a separate Sudanese administration distinct from that run out of Cairo might seem unusual, if it were not that British Imperialism and the configurations of Empire were frequently contradictory, reflecting a complex picture of overlapping and conflicting interests. So, the Condominium Government was established principally for two reasons: firstly to be consistent with the Condominium Agreement and secondly out of sheer practicality – Sudan is a large country and it was necessary to establish the machinery of government afresh. However, Lord Cromer, Consul General in Cairo, left the issue of financial control rather vague when he wrote:

The important question of the financial control ... [is] outside the [Condominium] Agreement. As it is probable that for some years the Sudan will constitute a charge on the Egyptian Treasury it is manifest that some degree of control must be exercised by the Egyptian Financial Department.²²

This status was defined in the ‘Regulations for the Financial Administration of the Sudan approved by the Council of Ministers’ which was appended to the Condominium Agreement.²³ The first imprint financial control, therefore, can be seen to rest with Egypt. At least notionally, structural power can be said to have been defined by Cairo and, to a lesser extent by London. However, the definition and scope of financial control remained fluid, which in turn created an ongoing political issue between the administrations in Cairo and Khartoum. A very early example of this tension can be seen in a bitter and petulant letter sent by Kitchener to Wingate during Kitchener’s brief tenure as Governor General of Sudan. The issue was over the transfer of budget surpluses from one year to the next. Kitchener whinged to Wingate: ‘That little creature Gorst offered O’Leary to give us the excess . . . out of last year’s Soudan [budget] and then told Cromer that the accounts were closed and refused to give it’.²⁴ He went on to say that Gorst, at this time financial adviser to the Consul-General in Cairo, was

²⁰ Agreement between Her Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of his Highness the Khedive of Egypt, 19th January, 1899; SAD 700/10/1

²¹ See A.I, Ibrahim, *The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty*, (Khartoum, 1976), p.13

²² extract from ‘Note on the Financial Control by Egypt over the Sudan Finances, 1924’; SAD G//S1220

²³ Warburg, *Egypt*, p.50

²⁴ Kitchener to Wingate, 1st February 1899, SAD 269/2/1

a little liar. I know that the accounts were not closed. . . . Gorst is the meanest little brute I have ever met, proposes all sorts of help and then leaves you in the lurch. We will have as little as we can to do with him. [I] am very sorry Cromer backs him up as he is not and never has been straight.²⁵

b. Developments

The first re-definition of financial control was in the Gorst letter of 1910. In this the ultimate control still rested with the Egyptian Council of Ministers, a body which was charged with approving the budget once it had been submitted by the Sudanese Financial Secretary.²⁶ The only exceptions to this were ‘special cases of hardship or inconvenience.’²⁷ However, Gorst wrote that: ‘contemporary correspondence shows that it was not intended that the budget be passed by Council, but that it should only have a duty of criticism and final approval.’²⁸ This passage marks a subtle change in the financial arrangements, and certainly different from the situation that existed when Kitchener vented his ire in 1899.

In 1912 the issue became dependent on a new factor: re-payment of debts owed by the Sudan to Egypt. From the outset of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the British Treasury has made it clear that Sudan was to be a self financing colony; the Treasury did not contribute. In the early years of the Condominium, Egypt paid a subvention to cover the Sudan budget deficits. As the economy began to develop, the Egyptian administration wanted to abandon the subvention. Kitchener, at this time Consul General in Cairo, issued a strongly worded memorandum:

The Governor General [of the Sudan] should remember and note that a Sudan development debt to Egypt exists, both as a principal and interest . . . until these liabilities are discharged the supervision and control of the Sudan budget by the Finance Adviser, and his concurrence in its provisions, will be just as necessary and binding heretofore.²⁹

²⁵ Kitchener to Wingate, 1st February 1899, SAD 269/2/1-2

²⁶ SAD 635/10/17

²⁷ ‘Financial Regulations, 1910’, SAD G//S1220

²⁸ SAD 635/10/17

²⁹ ‘Kitchener Memorandum, 1912 (Oct) quoted in ‘Note on the payments made by Egypt to the Sudan since 1899: Financial Memorandum, No. 2, 1924’, p.29 SAD G//S1220

By 1920, however, Sir Edgar Bernard, Financial Secretary of the Sudan (1900-1922) was arguing that the subventions should not be considered as a debt owed to Egypt; rather, that Egypt should regard the concomitant benefits of security of her southern border and safeguarding of the Nile waters as payment enough.³⁰ That Bernard was even able to argue this position is evidence of a degree of structural power vested in the Sudan Government; it was, by 1920, not merely a provincial department of Egypt, nor was it directly or tightly run from London.

c. War and Aftermath

The Anglo-Egyptian relationship changed during the First World War. Notwithstanding the veiled protectorate, constitutionally Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire. At the outbreak of war Turkey sided with the Alliance powers which created a conflict of allegiance for Egypt and a paradoxical situation for her British masters. To solve this, the British simply formalised their existing relationship and declared a protectorate over Egypt in December 1914.³¹ After the war Egypt, like so many colonial countries, and especially as she had a recent (semi) independent past, began to demand national self-determination. The Milner Commission of 1920 advised that the British recognise the 'legitimate aspirations of Egyptian nationalism' and allow some form of national self-government.³² However, Milner believed the Sudan to be a separate entity and therefore any settlement between Britain and Egypt over the nationalism issue would therefore not encompass the future of the Sudan. Thus, going into the 1920s, the Sudan seemed to be a good deal more independent than before, although no resolution of the issue of debt had occurred.

In 1922 Egypt obtained independence with the British retaining rights within the country. These issues are not a factor here, except to note that the post of Consul General was replaced by a High Commissioner. The newly independent Egypt wanted to retain her historical link and authority over the Sudan and there was issue made over the desire by the Egyptian government to style the monarch, the King of Egypt and the Sudan.³³ The response of the British Government was to promise further dialogue to

³⁰ Letter from E.E. Bernard to Sir Paul Henry, 29th June 1920, in 'Note on the payments made by Egypt to the Sudan since 1899: Financial Memorandum, No. 2, 1924', pp.30-33, SAD G//S1220

³¹ Ibrahim, (1976), p.13

³² Milner Commission Report, 1920, quoted in J. Darwin and F. Madden, *The Dependent Empire, 1900-45*, (London, 1994), p.564

³³ A. Mekki, *The Sudan Question*, (London, 1953), p.61

discuss the future of the Sudan.³⁴ Financial control became part of this attempt by the Egyptians to gain control again over their former province.

The essential claim by Egypt to have financial control over the Sudan stemmed from the unresolved issue of the repayment of the subventions. In a letter from Sir Lee Stack to Ramsey Macdonald, Stack argued that the amount owed to Egypt from the subvention should only be that relating to capital development and there was a difference between 'credits given for capital assets which are still in existence and possess a definite economic value' and 'subventions necessary until the country has been so restored to normal life and is able to bear the cost of its own administration and defence.'³⁵ At the same time that Stack was arguing the financial case to Macdonald, Macdonald was dealing politically with the Egyptian administration. The 1924 negotiations between the Egyptian Prime Minister, Zaghul Pasha and Macdonald ended without a change in status for the Sudan, to the consternation of the Egyptians. The perspective of failure in Egypt over the Sudan issue led to riots and the assassination of Sir Lee Stack.³⁶ This was in fact a turning point in the political and financial future of the Sudan. Egyptian troops and officials were removed from the Sudan and all that was left of the Egypt's status in the Sudan was her flag.³⁷

In terms of financial control, a new argument was introduced by the Sudan Government in 1924. If the Egyptian claim to control of finances rested on the debt that the Sudan might or might not owe Egypt, then surely, it was argued, the British Government had a more pressing claim to be involved in the financial control of the country. This view was put in a memorandum:

The British Government is also now a potential creditor of the Sudan Government for over £E 14,000,000 so that it is no longer appropriate that the sole right of outside control should be rested, as it is at present, in the Egyptian Government ... it should suffice for the Sudan Government to be subjected to the obligation merely of supplying full reports on its accounts and finances ... [unless the government] defaults in respect of its obligations to either Great Britain or Egypt.³⁸

³⁴ Mekki, *Sudan*, pp.58-65

³⁵ Stack to MacDonald, quoted in memorandum 'Égypt and the Soudan (sic)', SAD G//S1220

³⁶ Mekki, *Sudan*, p.63

³⁷ Mekki, *Sudan*, p.64

³⁸ Extract from 'Note on the Financial Control by Egypt over the Sudan Finances', (1924), SAD G//S1220

The significant detail to note is that the status of Sudan as debtor did not give an automatic right of control on the part of the creditors as long as the Sudan met her obligations. In this sense, in terms of structural power, Sudan can be seen to enjoy autonomy and – to a degree – some independent sovereignty, as long as she did not default and require funds direct from the British Government in London, or from Cairo. Secondly, the point was made that if Sudan did default, the British Government was in any event a larger debtor than Egypt and as a consequence her claim to primacy of financial control over Egypt was therefore greater and more legitimate. The Egyptian claims to be owed a debt in lieu of the subvention paid to the Sudan in previous years was resolved through a compromise which involved ‘the conversion of the Egyptian Army in the Sudan into a Sudan Defence Force’.³⁹ The cost of conversion was to be borne by Egypt along with maintenance of the militia after conversion, justified because the security of the southern border of Egypt would be assured by the aforesaid militia. The Sudan Defence Force was commanded by a British Officer, but he was directly responsible to the Governor General of the Sudan.⁴⁰ The debt the Sudan owed Egypt was fixed at £E 5,200,000, and was to be repaid at a ‘later date.’⁴¹ Thus, the financial dependency, perceived or actual, between the Sudan and Egypt was cut in 1924.

c. Prelude and Crisis

A 1927 memorandum noted that: ‘the interest of the Treasury in the finances of the Sudan is very large and the potential claim for more direct and complete control is possible.’⁴² With regard to the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, the issue of control was described as ‘contentious’, but ‘in reality this control has been exercised through the Financial Adviser to the Ministry of Finance who is an Englishman and it has been a formality.’⁴³ The danger of control reverting to Egypt was increasingly slight and the drift between Cairo and Khartoum and the issue of financial and political control was further exacerbated by the quixotic view of the British Foreign Office. Because of its status as

³⁹ ‘Memorandum on the Future Financial Position of the Sudan Government as it may develop in consequence of a Resettlement of Political Status of the County and its financial relations with Egypt (1924), SAD G//S1220

⁴⁰ M.W. Daly, ‘The Development of the Governor General of the Sudan, 1899-1934’, in *Journal of African History*, 1983, p.88

⁴¹ ‘Memorandum on the Future Financial Position of the Sudan Government as it may develop in consequence of a Resettlement of Political Status of the County and its financial relations with Egypt (1924), SAD G//S1220

⁴² ‘Note on the Financial Control in the Sudan’, (1927), SAD 635/10/14

condominium, Sudan fell under the auspices of the Foreign Office, instead of the more usual arrangement with the Colonial Office. The F.O. acknowledged that: '[although] the condominium still exists, it has worn thin and will probably wear thinner, and as time goes on the Governor General should become in fact – and later perhaps in name also – The Governor of a British Province. The corollary of this policy is that the Sudan Government should be given greater freedom and greater scope.'⁴⁴ However, at the same time the Foreign Secretary wrote that 'the time had not yet come (though' it may come) to transfer the Sudan to the C.O.'⁴⁵ As the 1920s drew to a close Egypt as a co-dominion no longer had powers of control over the Sudan, and the Foreign Office acting through the High Commissioner in Cairo had also lessened its grip, although it still technically retained the right to control should it so wish to exercise that right. As Martin Daly has argued:

While Residency control thus continued to diminish, the Foreign Office, still unwilling to undertake detailed supervision of the Sudan Government yet unwilling to transfer responsibility to the Colonial Office, remained a benign and distant master.⁴⁶

Martin Daly then goes on to mention an interesting example of a tension in the system relating to what can be described as relational power; that is, an individual instance of a control or power issue acting as exemplar of the structural power disbursement. During the financial crisis of 1931 one of the measures to deal with crisis that the Sudan Government faced was to raise the duty on alcohol. The British High Commission in Cairo objected that the Government was taking financial decisions without consulting the British Representatives in Cairo and appealed to the Foreign Office for clarification. Maffey, the Governor General, argued that: 'where no other important principle is involved and no new departure of note and no question eg affecting Egyptian interests, we naturally accept responsibility for taking our decisions and carrying [them] out forthwith.' The Foreign Office concurred.⁴⁷ Clearly then, the Foreign Office acquiesced to the position of the Sudan Government; however, in light of

⁴³ SAD 635/10/14

⁴⁴ From a Foreign Office report, 'Succession to Lord Allenby' (FO 371/10908) quoted by Daly, 'Development', (1983), p.88

⁴⁵ Chamberlain quoted in Daly, 'Development' (1983), p.88

⁴⁶ Daly, 'Development' (1983), p.89

⁴⁷ See Daly, 'Development' (1983), p.81; pp. 88-96

the changes to the regulations governing financial matters it would have been a surprise if they reversed the trends that had emerged over the previous thirty years. The rules of the game, therefore, can be seen to condition which agency actually enjoyed control. In this case the Sudan Government was in control.

Conclusion

Between 1899 and 1931 there was a slow shift in financial, and therefore political, control in Sudan. Whereas at the beginning of the period ultimate control based on structural power clearly rested with the British administration in Cairo, based on an Egyptian claim, the evolution of the Sudanese administration and the creation of a workable colonial state, the separation of the British High Commission and the Egyptian Government as synonymous interests in Sudan (through Egyptian independence in 1922) and the almost disinterested view taken by the Foreign Office all contributed to a transfer of power to the Sudan Government. However, at all times the risk of default on her financial undertakings threatened to undermine this shift in power. During the depression this risk was more acute than ever. In 1933, the Financial Secretary of the Sudan, H.E. Fass, wrote that: '[if there is another bad year] we should have to face another retrenchment campaign which would involve not only the standard of every service but the whole basis of our civil and military administration.'⁴⁸ He went on to say that '[there is a risk of] inevitable default on our obligations ... [and a] drastic alteration of the whole basis of administration.'⁴⁹ The Government's policy in the financial crisis was more than just an appropriate response to a problem; it was in fact the administration fighting to keep the colonial settlement in the Sudan alive.

⁴⁸ *Budget Note, 1933*, (Sudan Government, 1933) p.37 (SAD)

⁴⁹ *Budget Note, 1933*, (Sudan Government, 1933), p.40