

## ***"IGAD's Trojan Horse: Containing Sudan's Regional Ambitions"***

Mohammed H. A . Hamad

<mhassan68@yahoo.com>

Research student

University of Reading

Department of Politics

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The argument underlining this paper is that the IGAD peace initiative on Sudan was rather a lever to unseat the Sudan government rather than to mediate a neutral peace process as stipulated by the supposed ethos of a regional organization such as IGAD. The insistence of IGAD members on the Declaration of Principles (DOP) to solve the Sudan civil war was an opportunistic ride, which was triggered by the vacuous foreign policy of Sudan but also the insistence of the US and other powers to bring, by any means, Sudan back to the current international order. Thus, unlike what Sudan government had expected from IGAD's mediation, the talks soon developed into a catch, which Sudan government had a hard chance to escape. Nevertheless, there were exogenous factors that neutralized the power of the DOP: the reluctance of Sudan's political opposition groups to identify with the DOP, Egypt's resistance to the IGAD's initiative, the Clinton administration's lacks of orientation on Sudan , and finally the break out of the Ethiopian /Eritrean war. All these circumstances that evolved around the DOP gave the Sudan government a room to manoeuvre and to survive the pressure till the coming of the George W. Bush administration and the appointment of its Sudan peace envoy Dan forth, though by then there had already been signs of the NIF government's cohabitation with the "international order". This paper focuses on the circumstances that surrounded the IGAD efforts in sponsoring Sudan peace, by looking into the forms of alliances that

evolved and dissolved around the role of IGAD and how that has impacted on the course of peace talks.

#### Introduction

Following years of domestic violent conflict and natural disasters in East Africa, that spilled not only across the region but across the attentions of the international media as well, six countries (Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan, with Eritrea joining later in 1993) took steps to appear less nationalistic and adopt a pro-regional approach. Thus, on 16 January 1986 the Permanent Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (PIGADD) was launched. The aim of PIGADD was to provide an intergovernmental body to coordinate efforts in managing drought and development across the sub-region, with emphasis on food security.

PIGADD was launched not only to recognize the common problems of drought and famine, but also the prospect of boosting the economic development in an area of 5,000,000 square kilometers with a population of about 120 million[1]. Thus, the viability of the sub-region as an economic unit was shared by many since the sub-region shares many important natural resources such as the Nile Basin, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean as well as the climatic diversity and differential modes of production[1].

From Djibouti (the nominated hosting country for IGADD), the heads of the member states agreed on the following structure for IGADD [2]

- 1- The Summit: annual meeting of the heads of the states, which is entrusted with the approval of the regional policies.
- 2- The ministerial council, which meets regularly to shape plans and policies dictated by the summits, this council comprises IGAD foreign ministers and/ or ambassadors.
- 3- General secretariat, a team of bureaucrats headed by a Secretary General to oversee the implementation of the agreed plans and policies.

Like the UN system, IGADD hoped to maintain, apart from the main bodies, specializing agencies to support the running of the region-wide developmental, meteorological, and food security schemes[3]. Indeed, IGADD, by the onset of its first decade, had produced ambitious plans to reach the stated goals. The stumbling block however, was how to finance these projects. IGADD members were known to be among the poorest countries in the world, with few resources to deal with their own

budgetary problems, let alone their regional co-operative projects. Their dependence therefore on foreign finance was somewhat unsurprising.

Foreign assistance for regional cooperation was available from many donors. Indeed it was the donors who had pushed for such a forum since 1980: the European Union (EU), for example, had an elaborate program for supporting such projects. Thus pledges for supporting IGAD efforts were made from the start; a forum of various powers and international institutions was formed under the name of “IGAD’s Friends” which later on changed into “IGAD Partners”[4]. Many of the friends/partners were the same colonial powers who had once competed over North-East Africa at the end of the 19th century, an exercise in which they had largely shaped the political development of the sub-region ever since. France, Italy, and Britain were among the Friends, who also included the EU, UNDP, and the world’s only remaining super-power, USA.

The Friends’ liaison with IGAD was facilitated through the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). The Forum brought together the ambassadors of IGAD members and Friends based in IGAD member states. It met frequently to discuss ways to boost the “friendship” – or put another way, strengthen the “partnership”.

### IGAD’s evolution

It would be logical to divide IGAD’s life into two major periods: pre-1996 and post-1996, when IGADD dropped drought for development, reflecting a shift from crisis management to crisis prevention[5]. The pre-1996 era can also be considered in terms of two sub-periods. The early phase, which extended from roughly 1986 to about 1990, was characterized by IGADD’s search for technical co-operation amidst volatile political situations across the sub-region. This volatility was demonstrated in the civil wars in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, and in the tenuous stability of the remaining members, Djibouti and Kenya, with the former witnessing a limited civil war that came to end in 1993. Thus, the same period saw the deposition of many presidents in IGAD’s region, an exercise in which the role of neighbors would not readily be dismissed. The second characteristic of that period was that the prevalence of the Cold War was still on the agenda of both IGAD members and IGAD friends, and for that reason there had not been much coordination among the IGAD members or between them and the Friends. Put simply, it was difficult for the IGADD donors to aid hostile regimes.

The second phase of the first period of IGAD, which started roughly after the 1989 political change in Sudan, saw, from the outset, a close political coordination between NSR regime and the combined guerilla forces of the EPLF and TPLF that brought down the Mangistu regime in 1991. This coordination between Ethiopia and Sudan, to which Eritrea joined as an independent country in 1993, was not a fruit to the efforts of IGADD; rather it was a stimulant to it to deal with matters that would have been impossible. IGADD's Sudan initiative in 1994 was an outcome of that passing optimism, even the total collapse of the Somali state, which meant different stakes for the regimes in the Horn, appeared to have little impact on their friendship which showed decay by 1994 as will be explained shortly.

The next phase, which started in 1993 was fully reversed by 1998. The main characteristic of it had been the deterioration between Sudan and the IGAD members on one hand and the close coordination between Sudan, s neighbors in finding a solution to the civil war through the forum of IGADD, a process that was pursued with vigor throughout 1994 but then died away till 1997 when it resumed a short momentum before it got shrouded by the Egyptian and Libyan Initiative (ELI), till its final resurrection in the Machakos Protocol under the hands of peace envoys.

There has been a political role for IGAD since the first summit of Djibouti in 1986. There, Siade and Mangistu, with an Italian effort, took the chance to meet and started talks that culminated in 1988 agreement, in which both regimes backed away from supporting each other's armed resistance, though it ended with the ultimate collapse of Siade's regime. Also IGADD reached the Declaration of Principles DOP n 1994, which served to offer a structure for the Sudan's peace negotiations.

### Sudan post-1989

Throughout the first phase of the 1990s the government of Sudan was particularly patronizing the politics of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The fact that the NSR government had closely worked with the EPLF and TPLF and coordinated their efforts to speed up the overthrow of Mangistu through what was called the Operations *Hijab* 1 and 2. These were responsible for the collapse of the vital port of Massawa and ultimately Addis, thus the acceptance of the guerillas leaders to attend London talks under Herman Cohen was solely intended to placate the US which was seen as wanting to have a role in the final settlement. However, the reward for the regime in Sudan was more than satisfying. Sudan was closely orchestrating with the new leadership in security matters that linked to SPLA but also Sudan had its eyes on developments in Somalia which brought US forces closer to its borders. It was reported that Sudan had asked Ethiopia for consular offices in places where Sudan had no interests in Ethiopia, though that request was politely put down on the grounds that Israel might well ask

for such facilities which would jeopardize Sudan's volatile security. However, Sudan secured the Ethiopian approval for its army to pursue the rebels in 1991 from within the Ethiopian territories after the critical role Ethiopia had played in destabilizing the SPLA in the wake of Mengistu's fall. The SPLA radio-station and camps were shut hurriedly and the Sudanese armies were given free access to Ethiopian territories to pursue SPLA.

Yet there were issues of concern to Ethiopia regarding Sudan's linkages to the OLF, Oromyia Islamiah, and Al-Itihad Al-Islami. Al-Itihad, though active in Somalia, especially in the Ogaden, was frequently accused of terrorism in Ethiopia, as well as Oromiyah Islamiyah organisation. Yet there were fears of antagonizing Sudan too early, which could escalate the already deteriorating security situation in western Ethiopia. Pro-Mengistu Amhara were still active and were causing security threats to the regime in western Ethiopia.

With Eritrea, like Ethiopia and despite the Sudan had offered for pre and post independence Eritrea, yet the structural security linkages between Sudan and Eritrea were of concern to Afewerki's regime. The newly born Eritrea was not an exception to the weakness that characterizes most of the African states. Many opposition groups were not happy with Afewerki's emergent totalitarianism, famous among them has been, his old rival, the ELF and its offshoots together with the Eritrean Islamic Jihad. Though Sudan had closed the offices of the Eritrean opposing groups after the Eritrean independence, yet there were quiet complaints that Sudan was not dealing transparently with the Eritrean refugees' issue. Eritrean refugees reaching more than 250,000 by 1993 were a constant source of concern to Afewerki. His reluctance to their repatriation was underlined with his fear of them being used against him in the armed political struggle. Afewerki objected to the UNHCR for any repatriation without full funding, which was estimated to reach 200 million US dollars. Afewerki's intent to form a "broad front coalition" was interpreted by his opponents as a move towards dictatorship. Four Eritrean groupings have had already formed the Eritrean National Pact Alliance ENPA with support from Saudi Arabia. From his own past experience, Afewerki knows well via which channel Arab support normally finds its way to the Eritrean rebels.

All these threads of concerns were to become more alarming to the neighbors with the rising reports about Sudan becoming the hot bed of Islamic activism. The creation of the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference in April 1991 received considerable attention, both in the West and the Arab world, which projected it as an organization for militant Islam. This came at a time when Islamic fundamentalism has become a source of concern not only to the US but also to Europe. The

Secretary General of NATO, Willy Claes, was reported to have said “*the threat from Islamic Fundamentalism was one of the most important challenges facing the West after the end of the Cold War*”[6].

Having said all this, neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea had made themselves publicly hostile against Sudan despite the constant complaints via quiet diplomacy. On her part, the Sudan government, having excelled in uncoordinated activism at the expense of rational political thinking, not only underestimated any possible hostile act from Ethiopia and Eritrea, but on contrary they were regarded as true allies. Thus, the government colluded with Ethiopia to use the IGADD forum to initiate another peace process and that could be attributed to a number of circumstances.

Throughout the first half of 1993 Sudan was over concerned about a possible US intervention. That anxiety was a result of the close cooperation between the UN and the US in addressing the Somali's famine. Many believed that the high military profile of UNITAF: a 28,000 US military force who headed to Somalia in December 1992 after approval of the UNSC and the subsequent authorization from the US president, was a mission more concerned about Islamic fundamentalists than famine relief. Sudan was also worried about the possible implications of the concept of “safety zones”, which was introduced by Herman Cohen to the US House of Representatives Subcommittee for African Affairs on the 10th of March the same year together of a warning to Sudan to be included on the list of sponsors of terrorism. Also, with US lead, the UN put Sudan on a Special Rapporteur status due to its human rights record.

Also Sudan didn't want to loose the umbrella of peace talks though it was more investing on bringing a military solution to the civil war. The military successes in the years 1991/1992/1993 ultimately pushed SPLA in a very small strip of the southern Eriteria (borders with Kenya and Uganda). Thus, the government strategy was to push its military operations against SPLA under the umbrella of a regional peace initiative. Thus, the government chose Ethiopia to mobilize the IGADD members in an attempt to escape a broader international intervention on the UNITAF/UNOSOM style. Against that assumption, Sudan's President from Addis declared that Sudan was “totally convinced” that the states of the region were “more capable of solving the region's problems” and on that basis Sudan accepted the mediation of the quadripartite IGADD committee (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda)

### The Declaration of Principles

Having used Ethiopia and to some extent Eritrea as a camouflage, the government gave her attention to the military operations as well as the “peace from within” exercise. However, things didn't go well. Shortly

after, the hitherto quiet dialogue between Sudan and Eritrea unfolded. By December 1993 Eritrea's accusations of Sudan supporting the Eritrean Jihad were loud enough to reach the UNSC[7]. This incident came less than one month after Sudan had endorsed the IGADD process.

By the end of September 1993, the Kenyan president managed to talk to the leaders of the SPLA factions. In January 1994, the foreign ministers of the Committee's members held two-day talks with the leaders of SPLA factions, which ended in their acceptance of a common political agenda for peace talks, calling for self-determination for the South and the marginalized adjacent areas. The second round between representatives of SPLA and the government saw an agreement on the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, many agenda items were deferred for the May round. Thus, by the time of the May round, there was little disagreement among IGAD mediators of the regional threat Sudan was posing. On its side the government having become more aware of the change in the mood of mediators started to prepare for any possible vagaries coming through IGAD forum.

Simultaneously with the March 17-23 IGADD round, Sudan's permanent mission to the Arab League (Cairo) presented what it had called the perceived foreign threat to Sudan's unity[8]. Having thus struck a sensitive chord in Egypt's national security within the AL, Sudan secured not only the full support of the AL but also a full swing in Egypt's position towards Sudan. A personal communication from President Mubarak to Sudan's President assuring that Egypt will do anything possible to preserve the unity of Sudan despite the Egyptian incursion in Halayib.[9] Although the government had already decreed its version of federalism[10] to address the issue of wealth and power sharing and to be a basis for any peace negotiations with SPLA and other splintering groups, yet the country's unity remained as unthinkable compromise.

With the enthusiasm running high the IGADD committee chaired the May round where the government delegation went for a unitary federal state with Shariaa as the main source of legislation though an exemption was granted to the South. The SPLM clung to self-determination and the principle of the secular state. At the negotiators' failure to reach a political agreement, IGADD mediators issued what came to be known as the Declaration of Principles (DOP), outlining a secular state with guarantees for the South or otherwise, the self-determination for the South.

Though balanced and plausible as it appears, the DOP in fact represented the SPLA agenda for peace[11], because it was the suspension of the Islamic Laws (known as September laws) that made Garang to sign the 14 Nov. 1988 peace accord in Addis Ababa, which also was the reason for the NIF coup. Interestingly, it was the champion of 14 Nov 1988

accords, Al-Mirrghni, who rejected the IGADD's DOP out of hand. Indeed for the NIF government the acceptance of a secular state was tantamount to apostasy, simply because it was the suspension of the *hudod* that made them topple the elected Government in 1989. As to the self-determination there were two problems, firstly; the wording has not been altogether indicative, it could only be a self-autonomy with few political implications for the South, that fashion has already been bedevilled by the consequences of post Addis Accord 1972, or it could indicate the thorny option of independent southern Sudan. The other ambiguity that evolved around self-determination was the geographical boundaries of the South. The government insisted on the colonial boundaries, as they existed on the eve of independence. SPLA with its pro-marginalized areas principle insisted on a demarcation that should carve as well, the Nuba Mountains, Abyey, Southern Blue Nile area, and Ingesana hills area. However, it was only in September's round that the talks finally stalled until March 1997.

Indeed, the DOP looked unto the war issue as something essentially triggered by the imposition of Islam on the Southern Christians and thus, tried to offer the secular state as an answer to the civil war, though, one cannot underestimate the complexities that resulted thereafter, yet southern dissent had long lived before the issue of Shari'aa. DOP drafters confused the deep source of Sudan's national imbalance with one of its shoots. It was the spirit of the *jallabah* which symbolises a northern identity (more precisely a riverian identity), which is cocooned by Islamic and Arabic garments but also condoning a monopolistic and parasitic tendency as regarding the economic and political powers of the state, which has been the classical concern not only for the southerners but also all the marginalized regions. Yet the DOP has to be friendly with the donors' concerns.

### The Reinforced Regional Concert

The challenge that faced the IGADD committee members was in what hat they might approach the Sudan government. On one hand the members are the guardians of the regional peace who wanted to end the Sudan civil war through a peaceful forum as a necessary prerequisite for the sub-regional welfare programs which had long waited for the external aid to start in earnest. On the other hand they were the Sudan's neighbors who expressed themselves as the innocent victims most frightened by the menace of the looming fundamentalist Islam propelled by the NIF. This duality of mission has doubled the theoretical difficulties that evolve around regional political cooperation [12].

The issue of self-determination for the South had caused fury within the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). If the southerners endorsed the self-determination, the NDA northerners objected with different tones

with DUP as the staunchest, followed by the CP who qualified this acceptance to the principle but within a united Sudan. The Umma Party adopted a dubious stance: Al-mahdi was more concerned about the direction of the peace rather than the self-determination as an issue. If the DUP has, understandably, been committed to the Egyptian grand interest (the unity option) by resisting the self-determination drive; Sadig Al-mahdi passed his views on the peace to Libya in what became as the Egyptian Libyan Initiative (ELI) as will be seen[13]. Thus, one of the unintended consequences of the DOP was the fragmentation it caused to the NDA.

Parallel to IGADD talks, the government pressed with its “peace from within”, redivided the South and convened the “Juba Political Forum” which adopted the ‘Juba Declaration’. The declaration adopted the unity option and endorsed the federalism. Ghazi Al-atabani, the government prime representative to the IGADD talks, was quoted to have said “*Now we have federalism, and in the South this includes economic development and cultural activities whose aim is to raze to the ground the psychological barriers that the colonialists established...which cut off the south from the north completely[14] 50.*” the government continued softening the anti SPLA factions till the final accommodation of the Khartoum Agreement 1997.

Unlike during Abuja talks, when the government was militarily superior to the SPLA, the aftermath of 1994 IGADD talks was different. With the indefinite adjournment of IGADD talks in Nairobi, the SPLA almost won the mediators’ side and their backers, with the government turned not to fight the mediators on the table but in the military field. For Eritrea, the political deterioration with Sudan, mentioned earlier, reached its lowest point in December 1994 with the immediate severance of diplomatic relations following a year of failed efforts to ameliorate the situation; not least among them was the tripartite summit called for by the Ethiopian President in Mekke, July 1994. By June 1995 Eritrea affirmed its absolute support to the NDA to overthrow the government in Khartoum. In the following period the military activities by the SPLA and the NDA Forces become a constant nuisance to the government on the eastern flank, Afwerki had already vowed to do whatever he could to topple the Sudan government. Afewrki was not restrained from directly calling on US administration to exercise more vigor to blockade Sudan[15]

With Uganda the conflict was more complex and protracted. Both countries backed each other’s dissidents for decades, added to that is the demographic commonalities across the borders. Although, the Sudanese/Ugandan relations have never been described as sincerely good, yet the cross border instability remained under what Woodward dubbed as the politics of the periphery of the periphery: indeed, both

geographically and politically. Yet, the conflict had never assumed the proportions of the one that took place between Uganda and Tanzania, which ended up with a regime change in 1979. However, with the onset of the NSR government in Sudan the conflict shifted in nature, it worsened despite the will of the two countries to put end to it.

There has been a classical and structural challenge to both governments: if the North has been seen as alienating the South in Sudan that is the mirror image to Uganda where the South for the same historical and economic reasons is seen as alienating the North. Both, North Uganda and South Sudan have their armed oppositions, having the advantage of the weak state and their kin around the common borders, and both of them use the hosting government as an ally against their own governments. Since both states are not in position to control their territories efficiently due to the lack of resources and legitimacy, they support each other's guerillas and thus antagonize each other. This is the situation on the abstract level, the actual reality is more complex[16]

All that complexity, however, was overshadowed by what Museveni, like Afewrki, saw as a grand regional Islamic conspiracy unfolding in Sudan at a time when the NIF regime was even identifying with the most extremist Christian armed movement in Africa (Lord's Resistance Army). There were efforts to put the relations between Uganda and Sudan back to "normal". Both Libya and Iran tried to enhance the relations between Sudan to Uganda, but to no avail. Interestingly Uganda has been tolerant of the Libyan version of Islamic influence despite the complexities that was causing to the Ugandan-Kenyan relations, as Kenya has been growing nervous from the Islamic influences on its coastal populations. However, all these vagaries are understandable if put into the context of the survival strategies of the weak states.

It took Ethiopia about three months to link Sudan to the plot against the life of the Egyptian President in 1995, thus, in September Meles joined the alliance of anti-fundamentalism. Meles recycled the SPLA again and from Ethiopia the SPLA managed to capture Al-kormuk and Gisan but that was an epoch that also saw an active Arab intervention on behalf of the government; even Mubarak had to work to limit the international sanctions intended to deter Sudan from international terror.

The remaining member of IGAD's committee to Sudan peace was Kenya which despite its annexation of Ellemi triangle in Eastern Equatoria (under SPLA control), kept a fragile neutrality towards Sudan. This, some believe, was due to the generous aid Kenya has been receiving from western donors[15] Indeed, if the civil war has any positive external effects on the region, Kenya must have been the beneficiary not only

from the duties and customs it has from SPLA imports via Mombassa, but also the levies Kenya has put on the business and voluntary organizations working with the mammoth OLS, operating from Nairobi and Lockichokio. A US former ambassador commented by saying that at the end of the 1994 IGADD talks Eritrea, Ethiopia, like him, were pessimistic about the future of IGADD role. Only Kenya was optimistic stressing the role of foreign aid in keeping the process on[17].

### The International Associates

If that was the sub regional scene in which the IGAD talks developed and stalled, it is worthy shedding some light on the role of the associates of IGAD i.e. the partners. A partner is some one who works with another towards a common goal. In IGAD's case, the "common goal" has always been ambiguous and problematic. Having set up the IGADD forum with an eye on foreign aid, more than one billion dollars were initially requested. However, only 10 percent out of that amount was approved. There was the cold war suspicion, which would make western donors a bit apologetic to aid regimes such as Mangistu's regime. However, with the cold war over, pleasing the donors remained, as usual, a tempting exercise. By 1996, the donors approved of 500 million dollars, yet their distribution was adopting the theory that some projects are more regional than others.

With the US administration over concerned about the "humanitarian" situation in the South it was more than pleased to pick on the emergent chance of the IGADD forum, especially that by early 1994 the US seemed to have exhausted all its powerful levers on Sudan, save the Tomahawks. The government was also happy to see the US into the catch. Thus, when the initiative was made public, the US administration welcomed it and issued a statement to that effect. The US ambassador was describing the moment' *"I met with the foreign minister (of Sudan) a day later. I thought the government would react adversely to the statement, since it did not like being told to stop fighting in the South. However, he surprised me by saying his government was pleased to that the United States supported the IGADD mediation[17]*

Building on that opportunity, the US adopted three approaches: firstly; close coordination with the parties at Nairobi. The US diplomatic missions of Sudan and Kenya together with Mellisa Wells, the special nominee to the peace talk, were heavily involved in all the rounds of 1994. Secondly, extra support for the UN sponsored OLS to engage more efficiently in the "relief" operations. Thirdly, applying direct pressure on Sudan while being more tolerant to the East African regimes. The Secretary of the State's visit to the region in late March 1994 was the beginning of the overt and sustained pressure on Sudan which the US National Security Adviser spelled a year later, *"We will be working with*

*other governments in the region to see how we can best contain the influence of the Sudanese Government until it changes its views and begins to behave in accordance with the norms of international behavior that we think governments should follow*”[18]. That trend was to step up even more aggressively when the talks finally fumbled in September 1994. The government’s chief negotiators had already told Melisa Wells their protests at the bias of the IGADD mediators[19]. El-Turabi as well had told the US ambassador with the destined failure of the talks due to the bias of the US-supported neighbors (ibid). Thus, the *Economist* justifying the harsh choice in stopping Turabi’s regime from destabilizing the East Africa “*by giving the opposition whatever help it needs to remove Mr Turabi*”[20], there seemed to be a different approach towards Sudan which Africa Confidential described as “*important shifts in policy and strategy are emerging in response to continuing war in Sudan. Western officials have made subtle shift from supporting the Nairobi peace process as such to hinting that a new government in Khartoum is needed to implement it. Officials of various factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, who once spoke as if a peace agreement with the National Islamic Front were possible, now talk of the prior need for a new government...The United States has caught and fed the mood.*”[21] Thus, the peace backers meant to restore the military balance that had tilted towards the government. By late 1994 a “resupplied”[22] SPLA managed to prevent Nimule’s fall (the SPLA last vital stronghold on the Ugandan borders), almost within reach to the government forces, and even to drive the government forces back. There were reports that not only the 4th battalion of the Ugandan Army, basing at Gulu was backing the SPLA, but also the airlifting of SPLA soldiers from the Ethiopian air force base at Debre Zeit to Entebbe in Uganda and supplies crossing the Ethiopian territories from Eritrea to the SPLA bases in Eastern Equatoria. Tanks and military helicopters were used in the attack against Farajok-Magawi axis[23]. Thus, stalemate in the military field occurred with the SPLA becoming on the offensive and the government forces took the defensive, not only on the Equatorian front on which the government started to accuse Uganda constantly of joining SPLA, but also Kapoyta and the eastern front. There were reports that both Ethiopia and Eritrea were closely joining battles with SPLA and NDA forces till the ensuing hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1988.

With all that concerted pressure on the government it was not surprising that the political ontology of the government expanded to accommodate the dictates of the DOP, though, there was no doubt on the part of the government about the intentions of the mediators, yet, the hope was to join them since their defeat proved a failure.

By September 1997 the US administration not only declared its strong support to the IGAD as the sole interlocutor to the peace in Sudan but also aided the IGAD neighbors militarily to shift the military balance against Sudan government. Thus, if the 1994 rounds failed due to the resistance of the government negotiators, still thinking of the military card, over the issue of religion and the state, the 1997 round's failure was mainly due to the SPLA's ambitions fuelled by the expectations that the government was too weak militarily. Many observers by 1997 were convinced that the fall of the government was a matter of time. Thus, when the government reluctantly accepted the idea of the referendum for the South, SPLA insisted on confederalism and the inclusion of the adjacent marginalized areas mentioned above, bringing again the talks to an end in November 1997.

With Sudan government appearing to be compromising on the issue of self-determination, both in Khartoum Agreement 1997 and Nairobi talks, Egypt became more than alarmed about the constitutional future of Sudan. Garang had to assure Egypt with his commitment to Sudan's unity in 1997, but also he had to disappear from the NDA meeting of March 1998 over the same issue. However, having failed to become an IGAD member, Egypt joined the Partners in 1999, though to a different end.

As mentioned earlier, the Egyptian-Libyan initiative that surfaced in 1999 was in fact a brainchild of the UP leader, Sadig Al-mahdi who deserted the NDA after he held talks with the government in Geneva and Djibouti. Libya adopted the Sadig's proposal to launch a fresh initiative. The basic idea of Sadig's proposal was to counterweight the Africanization trend of the Sudan peace. Egypt refashioned it to quell the perceived separatist tendencies of the DOP. The ELI did win the NDA acceptance, even SPLA did accept it temporarily, before finally stuck to the DOP as the only legitimate formula for negotiations with the government. There were times when the ELI derailed the IGAD initiative, with Sudan government, having made the utmost of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, changing positions between giving the priority to the ELI or the call for coordinating the two initiatives.

From the point of the sub-regional concert, the Ethiopian-Eritrean war had been the heaviest blow to the IGAD process and the US policy beyond it. Both, Ethiopia and Eritrea appeared to be ready to normalize with Sudan. However, Sudan chose to cooperate with Ethiopia despite the official neutrality towards the rift. The two countries bartered their mutual security vulnerabilities. Indeed, at IGAD Summit 2001, there was coordination between the two countries to dislodge a Kenyan proposal regarding Somalia[24].

With Egypt and Libya fully backing their common initiative, making thus, an advantage not of the Arab League only but also their influence

inside the Sudanese parties. Both the Umma and the Unionists were behind the ELI. IGAD initiative again stalled as a result of this challenge as well as the break up of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 2001 the ELI reached its climax when the Northern NDA traditionalists started a rapprochement with the government, although that rapprochement was to renew the rift within the NDA as to what approach should they take with the government.

On its part, the government was increasingly aware of its survival first, adopted some sort of a Janus-like foreign policy. Having estimated that it has been isolated much more on its foreign attitudes rather than the ongoing civil war, the government started dismantling her previous policy's pillars. Usama bin Laden was deported, the PAIC voluntarily shut down, and the Arab entry visa waiver cancelled. However, all these measures proved wanting in distancing Sudan from international terror. In August 1998 Sudan got a US cruise hit on terror-linked grounds with automatic British approval. Though, there was instant outrage, the government got to know that it has to lull the various western concerns in Sudan, especially when the oil started to come on board.

There was evidence that some western powers started to engage in dialogue with the government on the assumption that the government opened up, though many believed the oil factor was crucial in the emerging trend[15]. France, Canada, Sweden, Britain, all of them have some sort of commercial linkages with the oil industry in Sudan. The US did not, but that did not prevent the government from bilaterally cooperating with the US over the sensitive issue of terror, especially after the curious break up of the NIF regime in 1999. Thus, when September 11 attacks occurred, the US-Sudanese "cooperation" was well under way. Sudan since then has been outbidding others in combating international terror.

### IGAD and the era of Envoys

The Clinton administration left a heap of misunderstanding between the US and Sudan, thus, when the Bush administration appointed its envoy, Danforth, to Sudan there was anxiety in Sudan. Thus, when the unfortunate downing of the two towers took place in New York, Sudan offered its immediate help to the US, apparently to escape the August 1998 experience or worse. It seems as if Sudan got the benefit of US doubt.

If the special relationship between Britain and US compelled Tony Blair to approve of Al-shiffa cruise attacks in 1998 it also meant that Britain lost Sudan at a critical time of its political and economic development, especially when the other European powers are actively engaged in the oil business. Thus, it was felt that it would be better to shore up the US peace efforts in Sudan. The US being not a former colonial master may

be lacking the fine arts of the African politics, its engagement in Somalia and its disengagement in Rwanda did not match her massive capabilities, thus, Britain intervened. Alan Goulty was sent as Britain's special envoy to keep the special relationship compatible to Europe's stance towards Sudan. However, unlike the flexible European companies, the US oil companies are legally forbidden to do business with Sudan unless there is evidence that Sudan is not a gross violator of human rights. For this to happen nothing short of a settlement to the ongoing war will satisfy the Congress, a situation that the administration can't do much about, but also the oil lobby within the White House is looking to the oil bonanza in Sudan. In this duality Danforth came to oversee the peace in Sudan.

The days have gone when the government objects to foreign envoys; on the contrary, Sudan welcomed not only the Anglo-American envoys but also the Canadian and the French. Indeed, the more envoys in the peace process the more the government could apply its newly learned 'yes but' negotiating technique. The real challenge for the envoys was Egypt with Libya and the Arab League behind her. Egypt made it beyond doubt that the unity option must be preserved. Both Danforth and Goulty had to shuttle to Cairo to woo the Egyptians to their efforts. It seems that Egypt got the usual guarantees as to the South's future. The pro-unity stance of the SPLA is very much highlighted, but this could only be a reminder of post 1953 Sudanese political developments. However, with the prevarications continuing in Machakos, the powerful language of the US "Peace Act" seems to have put the government, though reluctantly, on the serious track. Indeed even SPLA leadership has sensed the pressure of the mediators to show more keenness on peace. Saving thus, the IGAD-sponsored initiative from a decade of woolly situations from the part of the negotiators.

However, with the post-Danforth developments, neither the self-determination nor the removal of the government has been in the mind of the peace backers. Thus, with the self-determination as an option, leading to an independent south possibly curtailed, one of the two legs of the DOP has fallen. What remained for Machakos June protocol is a constitutional framework that would keep Sudan united. There has been an agreement that the Islamic Laws should be confined to the North, but with the unity option already emphasized, the idea of the referendum becomes an irony. SPLA has for historical reasons led the southern resistance and for the same reasons adopted this Unitarian ideology; and now for the same reasons also accepted the unity option. There is danger that the root suspicion between the South and North is well beyond the formal political and constitutional arrangements.

Egypt, which initially based her objection to the IGAD initiative on the grounds that it had not offered a comprehensive settlement, is now

somewhat complacent towards the Machakos outcome. Probably Egypt got lulled, but with the dynamic nature of the circumstances that always evolve around the Southern question, there might be a genuine referendum that leads to a total separation. Egypt had twice before committed a fatal mistake in her Sudan politics.

The government in Sudan has, since 1995, appreciated her rank in the international system and hence appeared to be more contributing to the international order rather than to shape it. Sudan has become a fashionable volunteer in serving to combat the global terror, a currency that proved to be effectively paying for Sudan political debts.

If the DOP aimed at solving the civil war in Sudan through either a secular state or an independent south, both of them are remote. The current government, seen from within, is far from being secular in orientation; as to the independence of the South, it seems it run foul with the regional hegemonic power i.e. Egypt. The other target of containing Sudan is no longer on the agenda of IGAD committee. The government is far better off than in 1993 let alone 1995. Apart from the small Eritrea, Sudan has now a workable relations with Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda and above all the US and UK.

This paper did not attempted to speculate on the outcome of the ongoing peace process, but rather it was concerned with how the issue of peace making in Sudan has been used by the various parties to the conflict to secure other stakes. Thus, if the above account validated this assumption, then there is a danger that the peace will have a poor conclusion and a miserable follow-up. No matter how intellectually excellent is the peace paperwork done in Kenya, the real devil is in the enforcement of the peace agreements. Neither the government nor the SPLA are the sole monopoliers of violence in their respective territories; a peace deal that disregarded all other major players is likely to be checked whether from the South or the North.

1. Markakis, J., *Resource Conflict in The Horn of Africa*. 1998, London: SAGE.
2. Odera, J., *Calming the storm: IGAD's peace initiatives for Somalia and Sudan*. Saverworld Focus, 1999. **1**(2): p. 3.
3. Doornbos, M.C., Lionel; Ahmed, Abdel Ghaffar; Markakis, John, ed. *Beyond Conflict in The Horn: The prospects for Peace, Recovery & Development in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea & Sudan*. 1992, James Curry Ltd: London.

4. Woodward, P., *Regional Security in North-East Africa*. Occasional Papers, 1999. 4(13).
5. *Sudan Focus: A monthly Information and Monthly Newsletter*. 1996. 3(11): p. 3.
6. The Independent, *Feb. 8*. 1995.
7. Eritrean Jihad was active among 500,000 Eritrean refugees in Sudan, there were reports of "foreigners involving in the military activities of Jihad cross borders activities. The incident referred to above Eritrea claimed to have killed two Moroccans among those killed from the Jihad near Adi Hako, 20 kilometers from the Sudanese borders. What heightened the Eritrean fears was that the (PAIC) in its 1993 round in Khartoum seemed to have secretly endorsed the support of the Eritrean Jihad, which was present in that conference (Sudan Focus, March 1994).
8. Dr. Sulieman Abo Salih, the then Sudan's foreign minister listed to the League several events which he described as a conspiracy not to the Sudan only, but to the entire Arab nation, he pointed to the Washington Symposium's declaration in favor of self determination to southern Sudan (October 1993), the Archbishop of Canterbury's unauthorized visit to the South (December 1993), and the Israeli government's supply of arms to SPLA.
9. Sudan Focus, 1994. 1(3): p. 1.
10. With federalism, the difference between the SPLA and the government was not on the principle but on how it comes about. The SPLA objection on the applied version of federalism was that such structure will sustain the same inequalities of the past, since it is masterminded by the central government for more discussion see Woodward in 10. Woodward, P. and M. Forsyth, *Conflict and Peace in The Horn of Africa*. 1994, London: Dartmouth. Pp 86-102
11. Deng, F.M. and W. Zartman, eds. *Astrategic vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement*. 2002. 35.
12. Functionalists unlike the Neo-liberals believe in gradual process of integration which deals first with non-political issues to boost the mutual trust between states as a necessary condition for a successful political cooperation.
13. Personal communication with Dr. Elsadig Bakheit, Press Counselor, Sudan Embassy, London.
14. Hoile, D., ed. *The Search for Peace in the Sudan: A Chronology of the Sudanese Peace Process 1989-2001*. 2002, Selwood P. Ltd: West Sussex.
15. Africa Confidential, 1995. 36(4): p. 8.
16. Hansen, H.B. and M. Twaddle, eds. *Changing Uganda*. Eastern African Studies. 1991, James Currey: London.
17. Petterson, D., *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrphe*. 1999: Wesview Books, Boulder.
18. Hoile, D., ed. *The Search for Peace in the Sudan: A Chronology of the Sudanese Peace Process 1989-2001*. 2002, Selwood P. Ltd: West Sussex. 51.
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20. The Economist, 1994.
21. Africa Confidential, 1995.
22. *The Crisis In Sudan*, in *Subcommittee On Africa*. 1995, US Government Printing Office: Washington.
23. Sudan Focus, 1995.

24. Interviews with Osman Al-sayed, Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia, January 2002, Adis