"Aspirations and Discontent: Examining the Government Role n the Current Armed Conflict in Darfur"

 

Ali B Ali-Dinar, Ph.D.

University of Pennsylvania

 

Paper presented at the

 

4th International Sudan Studies Conference

Georgetown University

Washington DC, July 31 – August 2nd, 2003

 

Introduction:

Historically, Darfur is composed of several ethnic entities which have played different roles in the region. The three successive political entities, i.e. of the Daju, Tunjur, and the Fur kingdoms is a testimony of the ethnic diversity of the region. Reference to the varied ethnic composite could be found in the accounts of early travelers and the current day situation. The ethnic composition is not merely limited to "African" indigenous groups, but Darfur, is home for many "Arab" nomad Arabs. Reference to contact between Fur sultans and Arab nomads dated back to the early 18th Century. Areas of contention between nomads and sedentary population could be triggered by several reasons, such as: encroachment on agricultural fields, obstruction of roads to slave raids, failure to pay taxes, and the life style of constant mobility that let them escape direct political supervision. To avert such control at times some of these groups moved temporarily to Kordofan, or further to the South. The existence of the Arab groups in Darfur has significant role in its economy; whereas, cattle, and camels and their products represent major items for local and international trade. Like other indigenous groups of Darfur, all nomad groups have designated homes (dars), with their own administrative structure. On the other hand, there's more inter-ethnic contact between these groups in living together, with more intermarriages solidifying peaceful co-existence.

Roots of Discontent:

For the current and on-going crisis in Darfur, one way to understand it is to consider it within regional, national, and international contexts. On the local and regional levels, one cannot ignore the escalation of ethnic tensions between various ethnic groups, sedentary vs. nomads, sedentary vs. sedentary, as well as nomads vs. nomads. The history of such inter-ethnic frictions is not new to the region, the famous however was between the Maaliya and Rizaigat Arabs in 1967. By that time the mechanism of solving these disputes were handled effectively through the traditional and customary system for arbitration to the satisfaction of all parties.  With desertification and migrations of peoples from rural to urban areas and with their animals to the areas of sedentary population, tensions and fights do occur.

With high rates of unemployment and for lack job opportunities for many, for some one of the options they have is to migrate eastwards for work in central Sudan and Khartoum area. The migration to the center dates back to the Mahdiya where large portions of several Darfur ethnic groups Arabs and non-Arabs, were forced to migrate to riverain Sudan. Following the collapse of the Mahdist rule some groups returned to Darfur, while others continued to settle in these areas. Since urban areas are the focal points of attraction, and due to lack of job opportunities in Darfur, migration to Khartoum and central Sudan remain the main magnet places, prior to the early 1970. With the oil boom in Arabia and Libya, large number of Sudanese including those from Darfur, migrated abroad for better living conditions for themselves and for their families. Libya was a perfect place of choice for large number of Darfur youth, who due to proximity have used different means of transport to reach their final destination. Goods (sugar, tea, coffee, flour, soap, oil, clothes, etc, but also electronics, and other commercial goods) and remittance coming from expatriates in Libya have great impact in cushioning the hardship of living conditions in Darfur. Trade links with Libya, Chad, and Central Africa dates centuries back, and flourished due to ease of transport. The importance of all this is that Darfur peace and tranquility depends on the existence of these factors around its borders. So, there’s a symbiotic relationship between Darfur and its surroundings, inhabitants and institutions.

Discontent of Darfur against post-independence central government goes deep in history. During the Mahdist rule, Darfur has paid hefty price for the new policies of forcible immigration which resulted in depopulating it from its inhabitants. This period also witnessed several uprising against the Mahdist rule, e.g. Ali Dinar, Sultan Yusuf, and Abu Gimaiza. During the Anglo-Egyptian rule, the biggest revolt against the colonialist was in 1921 of Faki Abdullahi al Suhaini, in which he lead a force of diversified ethic groups that revolted and attacked the military garrison in Nyala.

In 1952, a group of activists in El Fashir burnt the British flag following huge demonstration in El Fashir. Darfur entered late in the radius of the colonial service, due to lack of education; and thus was not represented following the Sudanization of the civil and military administration. The new national government, paid little attention to bridge the gap that it inherited from the colonialists. One good example is the hiring practices in the armed forces, where the bulk of soldiers were from the west, and only fraction of them are admitted as military officers.  All this at a time when the Armed Forces is always hailed as the embodiment of national unity, while in fact it mirrored the imbalances of misrepresentations in the civil service and the social scene.

The political and economic exclusion of Darfur was the main cause behind the establishment of Darfur Development Front in early 1950s, which did occur with establishment of other regional organizations, e.g. Nuba Mountains’ Union, Beja Front. The central government, and the main political parties, regards this movement as destabilizing factors more than genuine reflection of injustices, and in order to discredit them, it labeled them as racist movements. During the post-independence rule, Darfur served mainly for supplying soldiers for the army, laborers in the Gerzira cotton plantations, provided the Umma party with comfortable number of parliamentarian to rule, and recruiting zone for NIF cadre.

During the recent year of NIF rule, Darfur has suffered tremendously, not only in the area of services, but most important in terms of security where banditry became a livelihood for many. NIF, rather than addressing this phenomenon as something alien and by addressing its roots, it tends to believe that it could eradicate it by force through hanging and crucifixion.

Prior to recent events, in mid 1980s, there were ethnic fights between the Arabs and the Fur in Jebel Marra area, and it came to an end with the early 1990’s only with great loss and destruction. This first phase has witnessed weak government implication in siding one group against another.

Prelude to SLM/A:

In looking at the current escalation of fighting in Darfur between the government forces and that of SLM/A and the attack against innocent civilians, we have to consider these factors:

(1) National (Impartiality of the State) With the current civil war in the Southern Sudan; the shift in policies which started since 1986 by arming local Arabs of Southern Kordofan to be instituted as friendly forces that fight along side the government in its war against the SPLM is the recipe for disaster for the whole nation. The creation of Murahleen led to disrupt the friendly relations between the Messiryia and the Dinka which lasted for decades due to their interdependence and peaceful co-existence. Not only that but it added a religious tone in depicting the war as jihad waged by Muslims against the infidels. This racial policy was adopted in the Nuba Mountains, which for years was inaccessible for the outside world.

            The formation of friendly militias (Arabs) versus the enemy (non-Arabs) has continued with the NIF, and even advanced further. For the central government control over Darfur is a big asset for any political group. During Daoud Bolad’s movement in Jebel Marra in 1995, the government deliberately used Arab militias on horseback for chasing and capturing him. This was a very calculated move by the government in using one militias group against its neighbor. The government compensated the group by promoting them with province-ship, renamed I’d al Fursan, instead of ‘Id al Ghanam. This implies that who ever assisted the government will be compensated. For the victims of these wars, the perception of the government as the protector of all has eroded, by acting as an oppressor. Siding with one group against the other, is totally new policy openly advanced by NIF, and shows the impartiality of the state. This is the same “colonial” policies advanced by the British in their hey days of “Divide & Rule”. What was applied in other parts of the Sudan, NIF, is now pursuing in Darfur by coercing one group against another.

 (2) Local Factors: (Banditry) One clear factor that characterized the 1990s in Darfur is the lack of security. Banditry was the main factor behind this. Thought many assailants were caught, and subjected to heavy punishment, this phenomenon did not stop. Private buses, and lorries leave urban centers armed with soldiers to avert armed robberies. Many innocent people were either killed, or robbed of all their possessions. The government sweep against these attack, were not always effective, and at times they were overran by the bandits. The government policies in combating banditry is through the use of force, and in so doing it heavily targeted the Zaghawa. Banditry however, didn’t stop, and the failure of the government to protect its citizen has eroded.  For many, banditry became a life style for the vast unemployed men; and even documented in folksongs, e.g. yah salba nahbiya, ya ghurba sanawiya (either an armed robbery, or one year of immigration).  Banditry affected all citizens, nomads and sedentary populations. In all these events, there was no claim by any group as being responsible for these acts. Banditry, and the deterioration of government services in education and health increased the sense of frustration against the government's failure. In all major urban areas of El Fashir, Nyala, Al Genaina, lack of running water, lack of electricity; and years of unpaid salaries for school teachers, all lead to the question: where's the government?  Another cause of dissatisfaction could be found in the government scam of promising the inhabitants of Darfur to construct a highway road that links Darfur to the rest of the Sudan, whose funding was incurred from taxes imposed on sugar sale in Darfur. Millions of accumulated money were later transferred to private accounts, and the whole project was announced bankrupted. No one was prosecuted for this crime which is comparable to banditry, conducted and run by the government against it’s own citizens.

            This period witnessed the formation of “Quraish Alliance” which is an alliance of individuals from various Arabs groups who were politically active to gain more administrative seats in Darfur. Qureish, calls for the exclusion of non-Arab races from Darfur, and for re-naming Darfur. This took place during Sadiq Almahdi’s reign in power, but the government did nothing to curb the racist propaganda.

Government’s Role in Ethnic Violence, Chronology

With the bribery of giving supporters material benefits in terms of administration, the government shows itself as impartial in the existing strife in Darfur. During the ethnic disputes between Arabs and the Masalit in Genaina area, the government was clearly siding with the opponents of the Masalit, and reports of army involvements, and funneling of arms to the Arab militia were well documented. In all the systematic policies of burning the Masalit villages and government inaction in bringing the perpetrators to justice is another example of government complicity in the affairs between the two groups.

            Following recent fights between the Fur and the Arabs in Jebel Marra area, the government this time has clearly sided itself with the Arabs. In all, more Fur villages were burnt and pillaged to their property, without government intervention to stop the aggressors. When the resistance against the aggression became quite vocal, the government started detaining some Fur activists who denounced the government siding of the Arab militia. The escalation of violence continued on an unprecedented scale of events, as we shall see later.

Prior to the first announcement of a political motive behind the events in Darfur, there was long list of incidents that took place in Jebel Marra and Genaina areas which dates back to early 2002. In all, reports of armed groups attacking civilians, destruction of villages, rustling of livestock, detention of Fur by government upon reports of destruction; all these incidents were widely reported and documented; and every day there was an escalation in violence. In 25 February 2002, Sudanese government and tribal leaders held a conference aimed at quelling tribal violence in Darfur.

In these events, which chronicled a shift of the tone and target of violence, officials said eight civilians and four police officers were killed; while Amnesty claims this war has killed hundreds of Sudanese civilians in recent years. However, on February 26, an armed group called itself Darfur Liberation Front seized the town of Gulu, capital of Jebel Marrah province, and installed their own administration, and raised their own flag. The conferees in Al Fashir, recommended that negotiations be attempted with the rebels before any resort to military action and urged the establishment of a team of officials to take charge of the talks. However, on March 6th, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim of Justice and Equality Party claimed to the media from Germany that his group is behind the current political events in Darfur. He asserted that: "Our movement isn't secessionist ... we only want a role in power and a share of resources”, and that his movement is focused on "ending the internal colonialism" practiced by Khartoum. Khalil said his group's struggle would go on until the country's regions gain more rights and a system of a "rotating presidency" between the states is implemented. 

In an attempt to discredit the recent movement, NIF vice-head of national security, Maj-Gen Muhammad Atta, denied any direct link between the Popular National Congress [PNC], the Communist Party, and the Party for Justice as behind the events in Jabal Marrah.  He showed his ignorance in stating that Abd al-Wahid Muhammad Ahmad Nur one of Jebel Marra leaders was a Communist Party member; who had joined the SPLM and started working with Dr Sharif Harir of the Party for Justice and Equality (i.e. the Federal Party). He added that retired Brig-Gen Abdullah Abkar one of the military leader in Jebel Marra, is not a Sudanese. On March 14, Mani Arkoi Minawi, the group’s secretary general in Jebel Marra issued statement in which they changed their name to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), instead of Darfur Liberation Front (DLF). The group’s charter states their objective as ".. to create a united democratic Sudan" and that "armed struggle is one of its means to achieve their legitimate objective." "Sudan's unity must therefore ultimately be based on the right to self-determination and the free will of the various peoples of Sudan ... on an economy and a political system that address the uneven development and marginalization that have plagued the country since independence,". On March 18, the conferees in Al Fashir reviewed the Zaghawa report which included steps taken by them about the release of captured delegate. The Fur report was not submitted because the delegation was in talk with the SLM, even a local government Minister Mr. Khalil Adam confirmed that the dialogue with the rebels had already achieved some positive results and he expected the committee to conclude negotiations that day. On March 19, SLM/A in Jabal Marrah has put forward its demands to the Fur committee. The claims include five main points, the most important of which are a general amnesty for the armed group and a [government] pledge to implement intensive development projects in Darfur state. The security committee listened to the report of the Arab team which carried out talks with the SLM/A in Jabal Gurgei, Al-Ju and Jabal Marrah.  Mr. Khalil Adam Al-Karim, added that an agreement had already been reached with the SLM/A to stop all aggression and military actions between the two parties, on the condition that neither the government or the rebels would attempt any military action. The agreement was also aimed at restoring security in the region and allows the security committee to consider the SLM/A's demands. On March 20, the ceasefire between SLM/A, and the Sudanese government was broken when general Mini Arkoi Minawi claimed that two government helicopter gunship dropped bombs in the area. On March 27, SLA forces captures al Tina on the Sudan-chad borders. The same day, the Sudan's ruling National Congress party decided to use force to end a month of rebellion in Darfur. First Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, who chaired the meeting, also referred to "the importance of military action to confront the repercussions of the armed robbery in Darfur states," On April 13, General Al Bashir visited Al Fashir and there he met with the Chadian President, Idriss Deby, and pledged his support to Bashir in his fight against the insurgents. Bashir was quoted by Radio Chad as saying the rebels were bandits who wanted to create instability along the border. On April 14, Sudan has declared Darfur, as a military.

In keeping with the policy, the governor of western Darfur province on April 22, accused "gangsters" and "highwaymen" of having launched raids on government positions as well as on civilians, and said loyalist troops attacked them following tip-offs from the local population. The same day, the Sudanese government said its troops had driven rebel forces out of a stronghold in West Darfur province and taken control of their abandoned camps. On April 25th, SLA invaded Al Fashir, killing 70 soldiers, destroyed 4 helicopters, and 3 antinov on the airport, and abducted a Sudanese air force major general. On March 28, governor of northern Darfur said that SPLM has aided SLA, and that members of the SPLA had taken part in the offensive on al-Fasher. While the next day, Sudan's foreign minister accused Eritrea of involvement in the recent violent incidents in Al-Fasher. He also advised his government to find a political solution to the situation in Darfur and to be "vigilant and cautious in discharging its duty of maintaining security, especially as the Sudan shares borders with countries that create problems to the country."  On May 11, SLA forces attacked Maliet.

            In all these events one could note the government position of denial, and contradictions regarding the movement. It also exposed and contradict the government view on referring to this as armed robbery and banditry; i.e. having no political agendas; and at the same time stating that this group get its training and finance from Eritrea, SPLM, or Israel; all of which may have political interest in the fighting and not sheer banditry. It also reflects a sense of mistrust and suspicion of the NIF towards the negotiation between the local government and the SLA. The sudden statement by the central government of resorting to military solution to the problem and brandishing the group as a bunch of outlaws is counter productive. This lack of trust and the racist policies could be some of the main factors behind the government intervention of backing specific segment of its citizens against another.

Government's Militias, and SLM/A

The support against the Masalit however, could not escape the same analysis by the presence of Issa AlHilu, an SPLM commander from the Masalit, and who is now in charge of Nuba Mountains. The government adopted a proxy war against these groups by arming Arab militias against them promising them with land. The government alliance with these groups has nothing to do inherently with Arabism or Islam, but mainly an alliance to fight government dissenters.  In all, the government resort to the use of Arab militia, riding on horsebacks killing the infidels, is an attempt to re-create history, in its own “civilization scheme” by relying on imageries that are synonymous with the heydays of Islamic expansion and submission of non-believers. Branding the SLM as bandits, or non-Sudanese, is an attempt to discredit the group from any legitimacy.

On the other hand, the effectiveness of SLM military activities is not parallel with political engagement that is subtle and coherent paralleled to its military wing.  Although little was made public regarding SLA demands, it’s apparent that the people it’s talking on their behalf were kept on the dark on the very important issues to correct the injustices. It’s important for all these demands to be stated in order for the movement to gain more support and legitimacy inside Darfur, and on the national scene.

Ramifications of Machakos:

The current negotiation between the government and SPLM on the future of the Sudan, after years of war and hostility, is a testimony that in some cases waging a war is the only way left at times to achieve peace and equality. This position could definitely prompt other groups to take arms to achieve their objectives. The central government is clearly stating that it will not relinquish power by peaceful means, only in the battle field. Moreover, the government tendency to resort to arms even at time when peaceful negotiation could be pursued clearly shows the immaturity and callousness of the regime. The labeling of the current events in Darfur as banditry, and at times the government agreed to negotiate with it, reflects insincerity of the regime, and its opportunism. Thus, the government is pushing all victims and disfranchised groups to resort to arms to solve their problems, and for exerting power upon the central government. The inclusion of other regions, e.g. Nuba, Ingassana, and Abyei region in the discussion between the government and the SPLM, is another method through which these regions are aiming to get concessions from the central government.

The Future of Darfur Crisis:

The current crisis in Darfur is very critical to the issues of peace and war in the Sudan. Darfur has enough natural resources are available to form a backbone for real development and prosperity for its citizens. But, given the scarcity of resources in others parts of the country; the government is less inclined to pursue even a decentralized form of administration since this will rob it from greater assets. The same is true for the discovered oil in southern Sudan and south Kordofan. The treatment of Darfur as a convenient area for voters without conducting real investment and providing assurances for impartiality will lie short from attempts to achieve real peace. For peace and prosperity to flourish, the following are need from the Government:

-         Re-consider old notions abut Darfur, which it inherited from the colonialist, and to start looking at it as integral part of Sudan, that was neglected for decades.

-         To confess that there’s political/economic/social injustices being inflicted on the people of Darfur, and now is the time to mend these injustices.

-         To desist immediately from its policies of backing and arming local groups to fight others on its behalf and instead to consider all groups on equal footing.